Pragmatism and its limitations by Morris, Bert Jasper
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Dissertations and Theses (pre-1964)
1908
Pragmatism and its limitations
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/5857
Boston University
-~===== === ----- - ------
Pr&~matislli and i ts Limi tations 
by 
b. J . Morris 
I· 
j· · 
I 
'P ,,, ··:··,! 
•< 
I 9 0~ 
I ========~========================================~=======---
I~ The Nature of Prag~atism 
It is called a heresy , 1; Di scards a ll a pr iori 
pr incip l es , 2; Pr i marily a method , 5; The fa ll acy 
in ! ur ning it into metaphyeics , 7; Tests theori es 
by their conseque nces , 10 ; Its rel ~tion to Posit -
i vism, 15; Mediates bet ween Common7sensism and 
I~ e ll ectua lism , 16; Proceeds by analy sis , 18 ; 
Di scards aHsumed starti n~ points i n Philosaphy,24 ; 
Ap pr oaches the ~ orl d -Pro b l em open- minded , 28 . 
II . Pragmatism as a t heory of Thou ~ ht 
Thought as a discursive r1ab it , 40 ; The corr.mon vie v1 
of t hou~ ht , 41 ; Lo tze ' s view, 42 ; The pragmatist 
cr i t i cism of Lotze ' s vi ew , 47 ; The prag nat ist 
ana lysis of the thought - process , 50; The evolutio 
a ry ori gi n of t hought , 57 ; A co ntrad icti on betwee J 
t ne orig i n and relativity of thought , 59 ; The 
p ra~ma tist vi e v: of experience criticised 61; Ex-
per ien~e a cont i nuous process of sel f - ~ctive i n-
te lli gence , 63; Pragn:a tis m ne\'J only a s it li mits 
ti1ought to a. part icul ar s ituation , 64 ; The value 
and error of such liffiit a. tion~ 66 ; Summary , 66 ; 
Pragmatist dis tinction between ' subjective ' and 
' object ive ' , 69 ; It s fa il ure , 71; The objectivity 
of thought and transcendental empir ici sm , 75 ; The 
nature of the stimulus of thought , BO; Affirmat ion 
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of objective i deal i sm , 87 ; The i i nal test of 
va li dity of Lhou~ht , 89 ; 
- ~ ~ .. . 
i the t 
1 I I I. Prag rn at i Sfll and Truth . 
The vague use of tetms , 92 ; The i nie lleet ua l i s t 
viev; of t.r ,lth, 94 ; 'T'he pr r.-21'1rl.ti st ana ly s i s o:t' 
trut h , 95 ; Eecap i tulation, l uG ; AU t il iiJ kin i?. has 
a psycholo ,~ ica l bush., 1 0 1~ ( a ) H s trut h , and 
(b ) its confusion ; Lo ~ ioa l n.eanin~ cannot be sep 
arated from psyc ho lo ~ ic al cond itions , 103 ; Ooject 
ive and su~jcct ive ce r ta i n t y ; The fal l acy of 
evo l utionary think in £; , 107 ; 1ile pragn1a t is t con -
fusion of ' utility ' and 1 trut.h '; Un ive r sa l s and 
pa.rticulars , 109 ; Two overr:;ights , 111; i> cla i1D to 
truth is va li da t ed by its consequences , 113; 
Ja.-es ' Vi ew , 11 3 ; Seh ill e r ' s v iew , 115 ; Hov1 new 
tr ut hs are d i scovered , 117 ; Dist i nctloJ be t ween 
' £ iven ' a.m1 ' n~a.de '' 11 9 ; s~).t i sfaction a tltark of 
truth cr itici sed , 120 ; ~ ea n i n~ of de~ree s of 
Lrut!l ; Re l c tion of ;" ill Lo Intellect , 121; Our 
vi8w of ho~ c l aims t o truth are verified , 124; 
The mi nd functions as a uni t, 125; VaricLies in 
experi ence , 1L 6 ; :i'hese systeu.a t.iz ecl rJy ra;lson , 1 27 . 
Varieties of ra ti onal i ty , 12'7 ; The he~e lian 
relativity of truth criticised , 128 ; 1est of 
truti1 t, ·,·1o - r'c;, l ~ (~) ens~: - e,i. p iricisn. and transcend -
cnt<?.l - C!i:p ir·i (jiso.) , 131 ; The f i 1a l tes t of tr ut h , 
132 . 
IIV. Pra~ rna tism and Rea li ty . 
The d il en:ma of pragHa.t i sn:, 133 ; Rea l isn~ uo aid he l' e 
p ;o ,· The fr1ilnre of intelleotua.li sm , 140 ; Pow the 1; ; • I 
,il cmma can be es caped , 14 6 ; Bxperience on ~, 
func tions ll'i a.ny , CatE. ~, or i es i nt crpro2.ted. thrc.· f1h 
I 
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the self , Kant ' s doctr ine of the pr 1ma.cy of the 
practi c»l r e~son , Act ive int el ligence the 
ulti mat e r eality, 154 ; Speci f i c stateaents 
estirr.atecl ; (a) [~(:~ ;dit.y ie ];; .:k~ t erm inate , 155; 
( b ) Rr:3 f·dity is :nade · by us, :61 ; ( c ) Hca. lity 
is the product of finite ex [~ ri e nce , its 
t ruth and error , 169 . 
, I I 
The Nature of Pragmat i sm . 
Some years a go at a meet i ng of the Fh il osophica l 
Union of the University of Ca li forn i a , a speaker , in the 
course of his remarks , used the express i on " a workable 
hypot hesis". The chairman of the rl!eetin g in corlilnenting 
on t he ren,arks said they "·were dan ~erously near to prag-
ma ti sm ". Not hav i ng heard of this new doctrine before, 3.. n 
a s t hese remarks occurred in a discuE'.sion on t he pbiloso-
ph y of reli 8 i on , t he fir·st thou g ht t hat c~atr! e to me v1c..s 
th a t pra~ rr,atisrE rn uE:t. be some heresy. 'flhis , accord i ng to 
s ome t hinkers , was not entirely erroneous . 'ihat r a tional 
criticism is to theology , pragmat i sm is to " the rece ived '' 
ph i l os o phy . And just as many t h eolo ~ i a ns were quick to 
br a nd th e conclus i ons of r a tional criticism as heresies , 
so ruany philosophers · bra•. rd prag ntel.tism a da nt;erous doctrine . 
~· ur·t he r , .just as the forn,er sub mitted t.h e rr,ost c herislied 
doctr i ne s of q1eo l o ~ y to unscrupulous criticism , so the 
latt e r su bm its the a.c:cepted conce p tions of philosophy to 
sca.thiru~ analysis . Modern philosophy has prided itself on 
- 1-
il being critical and free from un warrant ed assumptions, but 
I' 
d pragmatis m takes up its fundamental conceptions and en -
ll 
·J de avors to reduce them t,o contin gel1t facts . All its 
, ~ ur1gr1 pr i nciples concern in g firs t thin~ s , ultimate 
J truths , abso l ute s tandards , e tc., are set aside . 
I 
Philos o-
,, 
phy loo ked on with s e lf-co mp l acency when scien:;e and high -
wr critic i sm were riddlin g t he tetrets of theology , but now 
'I vrhen pragn:atisn1 t urns a like searching li gh t on the t enet s 
I 
I wh i ch phi l osophy herself hol ds most dea r and sacred a 
boisterous cry of dangerous heresy is raised throughout 
the land . 
Wit hout ant i cipating in advance the validit y of 
J the results of t he pr agmatist method, we must say that its 
scientific invest i ga tion of a ll metarhys ica l notions and 
beliefs should be welcomed , just as t heo lo~ i an s have come 
to we lcome scientific investi gations i n t heoloBY· Ti1e 
results of t he l a tt er ha ve already proved to be on the 
wh ol e for t he bes t. As there , s o here in ph ilosophy , t he 
on ly res triction s that shou l d be i mposed upon the nev1 meth--· 
1
1 od is t hat its investi ga ti ons should be compe t en t. 'I'he-
' olo ~ i ans ar e ch i ded by rationalists for t he ir opposition 
I to cr iticism wit h t he t a unt i n ~ re mar k that "the old worl d 's 
a ll ri ~h t.; it i s safe to li ght a matc h any where", yet much 
-2-
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of the outcry against pragm ati s m has manifested an unwil-
linguess to accept this in regard to the world of philoso-
pfuy . Some be li efs , li ke the conceptions of eternal truth, 
of unerring reason , of unchan gi ng reality , etc ., are too 
s acred to be criti c ised. This , moreover , is just what 
:i pra~ma t ism proposes to do . 
I 
Aeain , as hi gher criticism has repl aced a ll A 
!I c,r:iQI:i assumptions as to the meanin g of the scr i ptures by 
interpretations based on pat i ent and thorough- going 
histor ica l investi gations , pra~ matism endeavors to replace 
all ~ gr:igr:i conceptions of truth and reality by concep-
tion~ based on an i nducti ve exam inat ion of t he cor ditions i \ 
1 which par ticular truths and known realities arise . Every 
1 thou~ htful student of the Bible knows that the unscien ti f -
ic and unh i storical traditions connected with the teaching , 
" We shall come to be grateful that this pat ie nt , 
critical study of the Bi ble has shown us t hat the Bible 
itself makes no such claims of errorl ess stateme1~ on a ll 
-3-
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1 possib l e points as our ~ £.U::iQr:i theories clai med for it ; l 
and v;e shal l so be guarded fron1 serious n,isapprel1ensions 1l 
'I 
I 
of the real purpose · of the Bi ble that have naturally led 
to its r ejection by many . Such attacks as those of 
I 
\ Robert In ~ersoll , for example , ~ et their whole point from 
II 
t he assumptions of an la: ~U::l.QI:l theory of whaL t he bible 
Jl!USt be , if it is to be ( 1) a di vi ne revelation" . 
' 
Thus l ay i n ' aside toe traditional a ~rigri theo -
ries about what the f ible must mean , hi g her criticism care 
ful l y and di li ~ently seeks to find out just wha t t he Bi ble il 
:I 
does rea lly wean . So li kew ise Pra~mat is n eschews all 
~ gr:.i.Qri t11 e ories concerning truth , real it y , and the Abso -
lute and addresses itself to the arduous tasK of d iscover -
1 in 2 r1na t are the i nduct i ve facts concern i ng particular 
1
\ trut hs , and particular realities . 
This bein~ true , the question immediately arises , 
Where i n then does praglilat ism differ f rotiJ En,p i ric i snJ? To 
1
1 t his, the answer iE briefly . 
I 
r; he reas tile l at ter is a p:Oi 1 
II 
osopi1y in itself , t he former is a method for o btaining me t -
aph_ysical data. And just as h i ,l her criticism ends wit h 
e stablishin ~ what t he facts concerning tl1e Bi bl e really ar 
-4 -
I 
s 0 Pra~ n ,atism must content itself v1ith sett i ng f orth whaLI'. 
a re the real facts concerniru1 the me tap hys ica l problems . 
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( 1) Re c: on str-uc:t.ion in ~'h eo lo ~ y , r · 142 . II 
I 
'-· 
G he rr~ost. prom inent pragJ;aL is t s today lay muctJ ep1phas is on 
t he point t hat Frag Da t ism ie first a ph il osophical me thod , , 
il a ·nay of approach to rr.etar;hys ics . Thus Profassor James 
says ; I I 
1:1 
"Pragntat i sut represents a perf eo t ly fami 1 iar att i _II 
@.. 
tude in philosophy , the ·n,piri.:;ist attitucie , but i t repre -
I se11ts it, as it seems to me , bo th in a more r ad ica l and in 
il 
a l es s objectionable form tnan it has ever yet assumed . 
A pra(matisL turns nis bac k resolutely and once for a ll 
upon a lot of i nve t erate habits dear· to professiona l ph il -
o~,ophers . He turns awp,.y fron! abs t.ract.ion , and insuff ic -
i ency , fron, verbal so l utions , from bad g. ~r.i..gri reasons , 
front fixed princ i ples , closed systems , and pretended abso-
l utes anci ori gins . He turn s towards concreteness and ad -
equacy , to wards facts , towards ac t i on and towards po~er . 
'I'hat rr!eans t.ile emp iric i st. t. ell!per re gnant and t ne rational-
! 
lj i st t empsr sincerely g i ven up . It. n1eans the open a ir· and 
,j 
r:·oes i t. ilities of nature , as ag ail!st ciogn!a , art ifici a lit y , 
and pretence of finalit y In truth . 
" At the sarre tin1e it does no t stand for any 
1
\ speeial results . It is a method only . 5u t t he general. 
triU IPp h of t ha t n1at.hod v10uld n1ean an enorn1ous ch~m£~ e in 
'11hat I c a ll ed in my last. l ec ture the " temperament. " of pili l 
- 5-
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TI os-ophy. l 'e•ct.ers of the ultra-ra tionalistic t ype wo ul d ==1=--==-=-=-= ----
j1 froze n out , much aB t he courti e r· type i !:: frozen out in I 
re pub lics , as tl1e ultra - mo ntaine type of priest is frozen 
out in Protestant l ands . Scienc e and ~etaphys i cs wou ld 
con!l3 mue;!J neare r to ge t her, would i n fact l'l ork absolutely 
I !land I in hand" . (1) , A~ ain , Mr . 8chiller concludes his 
1 defin itio n of Pragn:a Li sm and as follov:s : 
'I 
II 
·I 
II 
I 
" As Pr·->t) rr,a t _i sJ·_,-_, and llun~a 11. f';J_·J·, rla" e b-e ·n d<>f1. ·1ea' 
"''=> - v c; . ~ I . ' 
neither of Lile tL ne cess itat es a me t aphys io . 
ods ; the one restricted to t he speoial problems of know in ~ , 
t he ot he r more wi de l y applicab le . An d he t~e in lies tlleir 
val ue , f or me thods are necess iti es of scientific progres s , 
and t herefor e i nd ispensab l e . Me t aphy sics , on t he ot her 
hand , a re really luxuries , pers on al i nd ul ge nces t ha t may 
be c onceded to a lif e lon g de votion Lo science , bu t of no 
coercive ob,j ec t i ve va l idH y". 
Pragma ti sw is, then , li ke .l i Bher criticis rr, , a 
metnod . The cie t ai ls , of course , dif fer becc.uise t he su bj ec t 
rr,atter is d i fferent . Ei ut tllis doe s not co ncern us here . 
l'ie ere not interes t ed in t. he part i cu l a r deta il s of t he l a t -
ter me t hod; a nd t11e de t ails of t.h e f orJr,er will te ta ke n up 
\ l a t e r. 
t he se , 
Befo re , ho~ever , tu rnin 8 to a consideration of 
we must note on e more ana l o~y between these two 
I ·~~~- ==~~~~==~(=~=)===p=.r=a=~=i n=:a=t=. i=s=m==p=.==5=~=-=5=2================~-================~~===~==== 
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methods . Hi gher criticism p~epares t he way fo r t he r econ 
struction of The olo ~ y . In it se l f it is no t pro per l y a 
The harmful eff ect s tha t have come from it hav 
been very large l y due to the rds t ak i ng of the results of 
criticism for a new th eolo ~ y . Ma ny opponen ts denoun ce it 
as if it were tryin~ to take the pl ace of t heology entire-
l y. On the o t he r hand , many of its adherents lose t hem-
se lv es i n it a E a me thod and t hus see no need of a recon-
struction 1n theol ogy on t he results of their work as crit 
ics . Jus t i n so far as criticism is taken as an end it se l 
I i t is unsatisfying and unprof it ab l e . Morecver, the instan 
i t IS accepted as an end , t hat i nstan t it becomes as do~ -
matic as scholas ticis m itself. Bu t as a me t hod it i s 
reces s a r y to t he p ro~ r ess and de ve lo pmen t of r eli gi on . 
L1e sat!le is true of p r a~matisrr. . As a n.e t hod it 
ll!USt have benef ici al result.s . And just as i n t he case of 
h i ~ her criticism, so here we f i nd prae ma ti sm be i n ~ de-
n o u n c e d a s a n i m com p l e t. e p h i l o s o p h y • 'l'h i s , h o v; e v e r , i s of 
very lit. tle consequence . Viha t ph ilosophy i s compl e te? 
1 To be s ure , soffie ph ilosoph ies ar e more systematic than 
oth ers , and in t. hat sense seem mo r e comp l et e , but a ll ph il 
osopbi e s , like t !1eo l oio;y, JJust acknovded~e mys t er i es here 
anci t he re . We n:ay be abl e to dec ide how we ll! LlSt think 
--==--=--~-==4-===================ti=--==--=--=---==-~ 
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abo u L r· e a l i t y , but y; e m'.l. n ne v er· f a. t horn i t s de p t. h s . 13 u t it, 
i s not the oppon ent s alone who turn pr agMatis M i nt o a phi l ! 
o..;ophy . Eve n those 1fihc; i ns i st so s t renuously on the poin t 
t ha t it 1s only a ,i,e thoci vr·e among the first t o accept 
.1 res ul~ s as final . 
II 
Professor Jan.es ' !ifiS r· e eog nized t h i s 
i t s l 
Jl 
fact s nd iia.s giv en express i on to it in the following words 
" I tr!,ys e lf have o n l y used t he t er·m to i n d i(~a i. e a 
:r,e t hod of carryi ng on abs t.r· a ct d i scussion . 1'11e ser i ous 
,I rT!ean i n~ of a concc::pt ~' s ay s .. ~ r . Pierce , " lies in t. he concre te 
d iff e r ence to son,e one whic h its be i ng true v;ill lr:ake •••• 
/U l tlw .. t t he pr a£tr.a tic meth od inq::: li es , t hen , i s t.hat 
tr· u t. hs si1oul d ha ve practica l consequences . I n Rng)and t he 
word has been us ed ~ore broad l y , t o cover t he not i on t ha t 
t he trut h of any s tat ement QQU~ii~i_in t he cons equences , 
and pa.rticul a d y in their be inG !load co nseq ue nces •. lj~r~- :!1 
I flQ_hEL~QmL~Li~ir:~_ Qf_ll!~1bDsL~.lhH.1. ~11Hili: ; and s i nee my 
p r a~matism and t l1 i s wide r pr agma t ism are so d iff e r en t, an d 
bot ar e i rq;or t an t. enou~h Lo hav e; di ff e r e nt name s , I t hink 
lj !.lr . Sehill e r ' s p rOt-JOSi:d to cCl.ll t he Yl ider· pra gn:a ti sn, by t h -
narr:e " numa nis m" is exce ll en t and ou!l il t to be c:.d opt ed 11 • (1) 
M r~ Sch ill er ~oes no t. see~ to agr ee wit h 
, Pro¥ os;.or Ja,,es i n thus I'es trictin <; pra;\n.at.i sn• to a ne thod 
1 
o n ly . " 13ut t hou €_ h tr a~, IH.\. ti=> m anc.i liuman i s tlJ a r e", he says , 
1 ( 1) I!un,an i l:: n' and Tr uth , ~l in d , N. S. no . val. XII I. 
,, 
- 8-
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on l y me t hods .in t he n.se lves , it s houl d not iJ e for §!,ot t en 
th a t «et hocis may te turned into metaph yeics by a ccept i ng 
the ma s u l t in·ate . Whosoev e r i s whol l y satisf i ed by a 
Be t hod may :1dor:;t it as hi s ll!e t a p hys ic , ju2t as he may 
1
1 B,do p t t he wo r k i ng corwept i ons of c. sc i ence . Eoth Prag -
r.1 dis m aud Hurr,a nis m, t herefore , rra.y be he l d a s n.c: t aphys ic s : 
Ltlis Vl ill ir,ci uce no di fferenc e i n t he ir doctr ines , but 
II 
only in t he a tt it ude toward s t hen". (1) 
II This v;ould be e x ~~ ct ] y th e turn in [ h i e_ her s a rr,e as 
criticism i n t o a theo l o( y . Here the fall a cy is perfectly 
1 
e vid e nt , and it ou(;ht to be just a s evid e nt i n tile case of 
' 
1 prag u,a t.is m. T'o say t ha t 
11 tl":e truth of a s t. a te ment om t~d::-~ ts 
I in its consequenc~es" i~ to confuse the e ss e nce of tr u t h 
I ·H h t he t est of truth ; to t a ke one eleme n t 1n a proce ss fo 
t he 11hole pr oce s s ib s e lf , to ~1 et he r with it s f uJl n:e an ing 
an d e ssence . And Frofes scr ' Ra lph Barton Per ry i s ri ght whe n 
I he says , " ~' hat t he tr u t h when sou g ht and found i s s a t isfy-
ling, no one will be disposed to d e ny ; but to '2-a,y that. the 
~~sat i sfacti o n e le1nen t is i dent ical wit!qh e trut h e l e men t 1s 
11a nother u:at t e r . An d it wo ul d !:'Gem t. o me t hat t he frB,nk 
:1 . ~mp iricis m of t he pra e matist her e provi des a d i s proof of 
• ,onc l us .i. on , l!avi ng insist ed pr o per ly enou ~ h t hat true 
1-· ciO. e belonf_~ s to a p r a c t ical cont e xt , he ne f_~ l ects t he f aet 
pr'e cisely at t he po i n t where know led e., e is true , it, 
tudies i n Human ism, p . 19 
be l on g ~ t o anothe r con t ex t , name ly , t ha t cf "rea li ty ".(1) 
Thus we find a close ana l ogy between hi~her crit -
1
1 ieisn. a.r:d. prab n,& ti~J! · . Soth attack t he ir respect i ve pro~ - ! 
I 
'I lerns in an ir.ductive ivEL_y . 
i 
All ~ ~rigl1 assumpt ions are 
cc.:st as i de . Noth i n ~~ bu t. the fac:t.s as sc i entif ic.: i nvest i-
'I r' ations finO then• '<ill te accepted . 
to the sp irit of the tifl!es . t:ut as n~ethons they are onl y 
In t his they are true 
u.lt.in!ate in t heir· fields they des troy t heir own usefulne::.s 
F' ro n, thj.s ~enera l v ievi into t he natllrE:: of rrall-
Jr. atlSD: , r;e \·1ill t.urn to a consideration of i ts ;r,o r·e ~;pecif 
ic eiw.r·acteristics . 
v;e no Le in tl!e first place , that pru~lU:i tism test:::. 
a ll theoriE:s by tl!e· prac.tic.;c:d effect::: 1~hich t hey have upon 
li fe . Wit. b pra1~ ne. t ism , life Ylltll a ll iL s i n terests y[ -l ~ 
1 the ii!Os t fundarH)lrt al thin gf . Not theories about l if e ; not 
1 epeeia1 phases of life , li l~e tLe. c&paci t y to rs<:ison or ~ he 
capacit y to exert free - will ; but real lif e as it is l ived 
day by d1'1.y . Life 1·.- it.i ! i t s ~ ~ arry, tJ, of foe li n~l , fu llness of 11 
desire , riellness of tflOlHj h t , an d streng tH of purpose . 
, L i f e , t o o , of t h e i r' ci i v i d u a.l n o t of h u H! a n it y a t. l &.r ~ e • 
a d ispute ar i ses t he first ste~ to be t aken towards 
(1) A Re vi e~ of Pra~matis~ as a The ory of Know l edge , 
. The Journal of Pi1 il. , P8yc h. and Sc i. ! 
\e tn . Vol. lV , ~~ 1 4 . 
-1 G-
l 
i ts <>et.tlerr:ent. is to a~k what paTt. .i cular person or [:J ersons 
a r e concerned , and i n win t way t ney are cone ern d . It, 1 s 
1
1 th e concret e f a ct s wh ic h are t.o decide t he caBe . And 
I 
ii tiles:~ a re det.errl! ined by t he intore~~ts of the particu l a r 
,, 
.1 r, e:; rsons invol ved ir. Lho ciisvut e . 
.. th·2 mectnin ~. !I 
II 
:I 
of a ny t)r oposi t ion i s to be de turn~i ned by it s t)racL i cal ef 
feck u1~ on llldivi d ual Lives . If Llte propos it i:)n l1Cl.nnot IJ
1
. 
rel ~ L ed to the .int e rests of ~O rPc irHl ivi ,.· ual P•3 1'2 0!! , i t is 
j te ani nKl ·.ss and lienee r,o be c~a~;t a ::; id e . 
I I t is ar ;;ued that ti1 i s 3. Ltitud0: if u 1i ve rsa.ll,y 
I ad opt.f.::d v10uld d ispense forri ith wi t.h ma ny of tJ!C pe:q l e x ing 
il pr obl ew ..:; of pil ilosopll,y . Jl.b t:.t !'D.ot not.ions about. t. he d ivine 
I 
I rsyc holo(y , th e d i vine epistenolof].Y, t he doct rine of crea -
l! t.ion Q;o, nil.!iJ.g_ , t h ·?. or i ~ in of n1an , the cau8:::.1 re lat~on \..;e -
ll t 1·:c:en 'l:i ncl a nd body , at> solu~e just ic;e , ubsol ut e t:r ·uth , etc J 
ij all B L CI1 verba.t c~ u est io ns ·:;ould be tB.b ooed as j.rrelevant. . I 
' Fh il oso p lly , in2,t.e a. cl of be i nt; abs t.r aet ve J·bs.liE-tl:, wou,ld he -
co me a. Jos iLiv e sou:cce of.' iJJf c.,rma tion for pra ct.ic~d li fe . 
I n or .:ler t o sn1phas i ::;E:-) t fi is point , l o t. U"' con Bider 
1n ~o re deta il on e of the ab ov u problems t h8t is so p e r p lex 
i n ~ t o tn a ri y r l i 1 o so ~· 110 n t o day • We t c.1. k e t i1 e on c L hat r e -
. the. 0 . 
.l ates t o t he r·0laL l on bctriCB:lM!l nd a nd the body . 01nce the 
I ti me of Des Ca r t e s , H!OSt. ph i loso p!te rs ili::tVe he lci Lo a 
-----~ 
II 
\\ 
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distinct, qm.d .h a tive oift' e r e nce bet ;·:een menr.aJ. acts and 
rn<1ter ial r..lun~ s ; beGI'iecn psych ic. phe nomena and physical 
'' ph e non: cna . Ir1 popular· thou ~~ ld, this is a sitl!ple an ci iJ'!::: i ~;-
1 
'I r ific FJn t cp,;e!;:tion . The ri:ind a.ff ects t he Dociy ; for do we i I 
net nove- cur hands at will and c.Iirect our feet to carry us 
I whe r r.:. ver Vie v.is h t. o go? Fh}siolo g ical psycl olo~ ,y has ~l one i: 
I I 
'I further e.nd by c: :q,s l"i menting with ti1e sphY timograph , th e 
r- I e t. f J ,y ·~ mograph, and such like instrU I!!B n t ::: , has snown that 
t ~e r 9 l ation between the mind and body is much rrore inti m-
I 3.t.e and i ntricate t.nan cotldl!On ex[)er·ienee d iscloses . E:x -
11 fS~' i tnm: ts Liti1 t he::: e inst!'UH!ell t.!:> lHlll1iSl.a a i, J. y SllOW " t hat 
I evcr· y shade c_,f va r·iaLion of ti le psych i c li fe 1s fo llov1ed 
i by i r.,pe rc op tiU e char1 l~ E:s of t.i1 e inner or gans of t he body ". 
I ( 1) I n c:r i te c.i' l iwE' e f8.et s of n:odern ps,ycilolo ~. Y , phi lose 
ph:y raise£ tf:e qu.e sLion , ''If psyci!ic: e vents an d physieal 
phen o n.e ne. ::J.r(; v:11o lly inco n:niensurab l e wit h one another , aow 
c an tfF-::re be an y cau:o.a l conne.:;t.ion be tv;een tilen1·?" 
:: o p s r· s i s t en t n as t r' i B r l' o b 1 en. be come t I1 a t i t 
t.hrc a t.en~; to en~ ul f systel!!' of philosophy i n con:p l e t e 
: ll•ys t e r y. .l <::n.y t hi nke r'::: 110la that Lh er·e arc only tYio a lt er ll ll a t.iv c ~; e it her· t! tere 1 s al.,; :::;olut.el,y no causal rel a t i on be -
LViCen t he t, ~10 ~. E!r'i~~ ::. of l i i i8 tlO!!:e tl et 1 ur· t ha t t hey n,utual l y 
-1 2-
' . t t ' L!lt~. 1liO ond 
event.s ru3. j be ciue l. o an umledy.in;) UnklJOVIc:Lbl c . uthe :cs 0 re 
H:cre :i : ator i al .i~t.ic and aff i rn, that tl!e menltt l life is c:.. 
1 C;ollatera.~. by- p1·oduct of ne rvc·u~ action . Ne .it. her· cf tl ose 
One very pr·owinont t: i~i loscpher in Ger many holds 
t ha t. a ,y e: e.usal rel.:~ti on bct>;ecil t he r. i ncl and body is untel 
al ;le ~.:.n- ende<:~vor·s to st.ren ~ t lien t ile '.'iew of paralle li .::IJ! 
1 by r·ev ivi nh Lhe o.ncienl theory of Hylozoi sn1 . Eac i! particle 
of fl !uLL.::.r i::.; <J.Ccon,pe:ln i <;;d by a psjclli c<d sLate . Or !i:or.::.. 
ace u t~ ;-J.k. ly ped:aps , " e •Jcry corpo r ea l l.:~Y~~Lerr, i!:. the l:ea.rer 
or· t ody of an inner life" . P a rq~ s ych isn , , as this theory 
i n i ts new for 11· i s c a. lled, i ::; sr1.id to of:cape collis i on 
1, wit.ll the t i eo!.'Y of Llle consetva.t.ion of eneq~ y on one hand , 
I ' t I I an a t11e c h a n i s 111 on t he o , 1 e r • 
' 
I 
Othe!' well - knov.r1 ~; hilc' oopilers OL Lile present ti l!!c 
I I e ndefivor to solve ti : is p:coble!l: iJ.Y ar· ~ u .i. n? L i~ o.L T. !e .rtal 
I 
l rheHO if! enc;, ar e nuL connecLcct 1n a ny eausal \';ay \'d1atcver with 
) t he ph ysjc8 . 1 ~\er i eo; , nor a.r· c they to t.;e con i d":)red n.e!'' E:d.; 
I 
as collat.eral 3.e -·o wpB. nirr·E.;nt. s of n~:n·vous ac t ivit y , and 
\ thou')1 U:ey belon~ t.o an •:Jnt.lr(..dy different ·:orl r , yet. they 
I 
fin d t.heir p l ace amon•~: tne [Jhys i cet l pl!e;wn!ena t hrough ~rips 
II 
I 
I 
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I of ~he question . To thi s t:n· a~;. tua t i sn; wou ld r· ep 1 y that flll 
II 
I 
I 
:::,uch problen:s are for bin; non - existen t and setrseless prob-
Pra~;n1 atisru "concerns itself v ith n:ethods and in -
strurr: er~ts of know le ci.~; e F;.nd a.ction '", and thus l ea~n~ to ao 
"•VIlthout philosophy"·· "·If we f5ran t t h is", t he crit i c 
re plies , " ;hovl t hen does it differ from Positi vi sm 11 ? It is 
true that pra0matism rurd posit ivis m agree in reject in ~ 
· jJetaphysical guest io 1s as e~. bsurd , but while pos itivisn. 
rejects them on the t round that thqy are insoluble , prag-
n.atisn!1 on Ltte oth,;;r hand , holds t hat there is t:o ptoblem 
t h~ re a t. al l. Life presents itself in that ua l form , and 
life is fundamental and therefore to be accepLed without 
ouestion . f.. better staten,ent of this difference would be 
t hat pos itivis ffi d iscards metaphygics as refined fe tishis~ ; 
1j a s ~n attemr,::t to escape a;:..nost i c iE' m by a verbal solution 
1
1 of realJy insoluble prob l E~fljl;) ; pr·agn;a t.is11.1on the oU1e r hand , 1 
11 ma i ntain£ titat when the fetisll eE' of physical e.nci psychical 
phenon,ena ~ r e d iscarded t. .lte \'!hole problelii va.nisr1es . J 
Some pra~~atists cal.l t he ir method prope- pos itiviE m, 
I and e:xp l ain the prsfi~ 11 1prope"' as n eanin :~ a 1' broad and 
I r a ther inriefinable extension of tho term"' v;hich is n;odifies 
'.I'i1 is view of pra~mat is m wou l d acc!ept many of t he tiwolo~ ica I 
I conceptions vmich positiv i sm sur!w!arily rejects . B, urther 1 1 
I 
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wou l d foster t he i ~s tinctive be li efs of t he race wh ich 
posit ivis m rele gates to the "t heo log ical age ". F'inally, 
pra gmat ism is different from posit ivis m inasmuch as it 
accepts Scho l astic Realism tp t he extent of ma int ain i ng 
that some ~en eral conceptions are r ea l. Rea lit y is divi dec 
i nto facts and the ir relations on one hand , and ideas on 
the other . In so far as ~ eneral ideas a i d i n t he conduct 
of li fe , t hey are just as real as the facts wfu ich t hey 
i1elp to relate . 
It i s t he nature of pra!~Jl!!atism 1 i n t he second pl ace, t p 
n;ed i a t e be t ween comn!otfsensism and rationalistic int e ll ec tu-
a lism. The meanin~ of an object , accordin~ to pragma tism , 
consists ne it her in it s sensible qua liti es nor i n t he 
1 t houghts wh ic h co mport with it. But , to use the words of 
the founder of prag ~1at isn; , ".it consists in t he tot al of 
al l general modes of rational conduct wh ic h, condi tioti a lly 
upon a ll the poss i ble di ffe r ent circ umstances and desires, 
I Ylould ensue upon the accep t ance of the symbol" (1 ). Hence , 
j the sensib l e qualities of an object are no t to be confused 
l •ith the mean i ng of the object. Ne itl•er are t he though ts 
1 which occupy the mi nd when the ob.Ject I S be ing considered , 
I 
: the mean ing of t he object. It s mean in ( consists rat her in 
I t he crtanges in lif e to Ylhich th e objec:t leads . And 
I 
(1) Monist, vol. XV . 4 . 
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although the pr-e.g rna.L is t ' s usua l way of s peak ing of Lhis 
vie w of trie meanin g of an objecL is "it s practical effects ' ,, 
yet pract ica l here is used in t he broad sense of any kind 1 
of activity,- intellecLual or phys ic:al. SLaten1ents as to i 
v1hat the ob,jec:t. means apart. fron . its bearin g on the conduc I 
of life , pragmatism considers to be '' meaning l ess met~pnysi 
cal e i bber i sh ". Thus t he mean ing of an object is d iscover 
a ble · y the methods of observation a l investi gations . And 
phi losophy , · whose bus ines s it is to discover this mean in ~. , 
is not a mat t er .. 1of empir ical conl1110n-sense on the one hand , 
nor of r·ationalistic i ntellectual i s1 . on tiw other. Rat her 
it b ecorne~ t he ";hi fl hest of t he positive sciences ". The 
:1 instinctive· be liefs of common-sense are taken up into prag-
1 ma tism just in · so f a r as t hey are found to have " eood conse 
1 quence s"• upo r' t he conduct of life . Intellectualistic theor 
I 
: ies about ontolo gical reality are accep t ed on Lhe same 
I 
I basis . The st.ricLest log ica l consistency wil l not ga in for 
I t he m an accep t ance ap a rL froili their actua l bearin~ upon the 
donducL of life. Ot her thin ~ s equal , consistent theories 
\ would have p ~ eference over inco ns ist ent theories , but the 
!point is, lo ~ ical codsist.ency in it self is not a test used 
l by p ra~ n . at i sts in de termi nin g the validity of Lheories . 
I I n connection with this point it is we ll to note 
======4il~~~====~~========~~=-======~==~~~-~ 
I 
.I 
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common -sense 1n ing that 
percep tion is the test of a large portion of reality . Wha t 
perception ~ iv es 1s as raa l as what t hought or r a tional 
~· inference indicates to be re a l . In fact , perception has 
the best of t.!wu ~ ht · 111 this r espec t for it is direct while 
t hought is only indli'rect . ·rhought forms a part of the 
process of finding reality, t ut it lS only secondary, while 
perception is primary. But on the other hand , pragmatism 
also hol ds that the relations between facts of perception 
are real j ust i n so f ar as they are efficient in their 
bearing on t he conduct of life. So wh ile it accepts common 
.sense realism nearly in tg~g , it also accepts much of 
I 
I . l t. 1' 1scno as.1c- rea 1sm. For inst ance , pragn,atism aff irws the 
eality of some genera l conceptions , such ~s harciness (of 
dia ffi ond ) , the past of ti me , etc. Such thin gs are accept 
s real because they have practical effects on life . 
ra~ natism mediates between common - sensism and intellectual 
sm , finding good in both , yet testing both by their influ-
nee on conduct . 
Thirdly , the nature of pragmatism is seen in its 
eve for analysis . The fundamental conceptions of intellec 
alis t ic philosophies are all without exception subjected 
' o minute analys is . Take for inst ance, the concep tions in 
t he following proposition : Truth 1s corresponde nce with 
re al ity . ' I The term trut h has co me to have 1n 1 any quarters 
a dign ity and sacredness wh ich make it next to sacrili gious 
to ask for its credenti a ls . Bu t pragnatism ~ays that t he ' 
essence of trut h is its workab ility . Apart from its use - -
fuln ess 1n th e "dust and tur moil of life " t here 1s no 
Jr.eaning in .i.t . F'urther, trut h itself depends on the con-
ti ngent elemen ts t ha t go to make up the process of gainin ~ 
know led ge . It 1s not above t he d~s ires and struee les of 
finite lives , but is 1 on the other hand , itse l f made by t hes 
very t hin £1 s . Trut.h doe% not. exist. before it 1 s known , but 
!rather it ge ts its existence and mean in g frorn t he consequen 
es of our efforts. I£ our effor ts wh ich are governed by a 
certain propositio n bein g satisfact i on , t hen that proposi -
tion is true , but if dissa tisfac tion, then th a t proposition 
is false . Therefore , truth 1s not something wh ich exists 
1n its own ri ~h t and for its own sake and as the goal for 
a ll our striving, but it i s "a pro pe rt y of our i deas " t.o be 
t ested by t he satisfaction wh ic h results when we act 1n con 
fon lt. y i'l it h our i deas . 
Likewise, th e te rm •Lcor-respondence" 1s not just 
acce~ted as .i.f its meanin g were perfectly cl ear to everyone 
It is analyzed i nto severa l mean in gs accord i ng to t he 
- 19-
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character of tile situation 1n hand . Thus if we are talking ~ 
of sensible objects the correspondence be t ween our ideas 
and t hose ob jects will consist in a kind of copying of the 
objects . That is , we will have an in! a g ~ of th e object in 
mi nd . For in stance , when you loo k at your ha t and t hen 
r turr you r head or shut your eyes and t h in k about t he hat , 
you wil l have a menta l p icture of it.. Had you a menta l 
I 
~ ic:ture of a cat and appl.i.cd it to your hat your i dea wou ld I 
not c orrespond to t he object with wh ich it was i ntended 
to . Hen ce , it v1ou ld not be a true idea. Th i::, is then 
one meanin Q of t he ter m correspondence as applied to the 
rel a tion between your idea and its object . 
but all the objects v1hich we t h in k about are not 
1
sucn as can be 
1 
" e l ectricity" , 
thu s i n , a~ i ned rr.entally . Take for instance , 
11 f or c e 11 , 11 'i n t e S; r· i t y 11 , e t c • In s u c h cas e s 
Khat sort of correspondence i s there between your idea and 
i ts object? Certain l y , not one of a n!enta l picture , for· 
suc h objects of.. U1ou~h t cannot be picture' . Her·e it 1s 
clear that tn~ corre sp or dence ~ust be of a differen t nature 
t han i n the case of tile hat. 
Again , in t he ca se of past i1istory, wha t i.:- the 
na tur e of t he correspondence be tw een your ide a·· and the 
past e~ents? Certainly not a mere copyin g? Further , we 
- 20 -
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c.ie note objects by na!l!e8 wh ic h have no corres ponden ce wit h 
at ail. 
t he ob je(!t " All th ese dif fe r ences and many rl;0re ar e r ead - ~ 
il y found in U1e term correspondence . 'l' he pr agn;a t i s t corl'T' _ ..
elusion fron1 such an ana l ysis of _ t he ter n, "correspondence '' I 
i s t ha t vd1a t is 11Jeant i s ~i mp l y son1e sort of gui da nce . If 
the i dea gui des us 1 n our pr actical dea lings with t he 
ob ject then ou r i dea is true . Thus a~a in we are brou~h t 
bac k to t ~e test of serviceabl e ness . What is mean t by 
sayint~ t hat en i dea corres p o nd~ wit h an object i ~ t hat the 
I i dea wil l l ead us into useful and satisf ac tory rela tion s 
I 
wit h t he objec t . Or will ~ uide us so t hat we will ac t f it-
! I tingly in r es pect t o th e obj ect. Fut t hi:::: overt hro ws t he 
· Vi ew tna t t he object pr c; - ex ist s as a pe r ma nent t hin g and 
I 
for w!Ja t ever pur pos e "i.' e app ro ach it , we mu st have j us t 
lone cer t a in , definite , and de t erm i na te i dea , for no ot her 1 
l idea will eve r be tru e of that objec t . 'l'he upshot of it 
la ll i s t ha t t he ki nd of correspondence de pends upon t he I 
' purpose for- 'id1 ic: il ; ti1e condition of aff a ir·s unde r v;hic h; a nd 
I t he means by wh ic h, v:e seek t he object a t t ha t par ticul ar 
! 
1 t i 1118 . 
I Wit h out t oin g furt he r- into det ail s and wi thout 
I 
1 rrulti p lyin ~ examp l es uselessl y, t he ana lytica l nature of 
p ra~1r.a ti sn: i s obviou s . Th e r e a re no 51 L1ri2.t.i syn t he tic 
-~ 
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co ncer;t ion ~ t ha t are to be accep t ed so l ely on t he rr;ir1d ' s 
own warTant. 'fhere a re co nc ep t ions of eo mm on - sense Vi hic h 
appear to ha ve a n unan:.:d ysa ble n:ean in g , but p r a~1matisrr: goe 
wit h emp iri c i sm bac k to r ace - expe ri ence for its ~arr ant fo 
these . Tney too have been built up ana l yti ca ll y and ~rad -
u.a ll y throu~ h useful hab it s and serv iceab l e concep tions . 
I n speak i ng of Lhe f am ili a r forn1s of t holl~h t . l'ih i ch Kant 
he l d to be A griQti and due to a synthet ic a c t of Ap per-
capt i on , Professor J ames ha s t he fo llovdn;,; to say : 
" Our fundarnenta l v1ays of t h i nk ing abo ut th i ngs a r 
d i s co'Teri e s of exceed i ngl y r emote ancestor s , wh ich have 
been ab le to preserv e t hemse lves t hrou~hout t he exper ience 
1 of a ll subsequent t i me •• •• • Even today ~c i ence a nd ph il-
1 
: osophy a r e st ill l a borious ly tr y i n~ to part f anc i e s f rom 
I r· eali t.ies i n our experi ence ; ana 1n pri.rr it.iv e ti me s t hey 
I ruade on l y t he ffi os t inci p i ent d i s t.i nct io ~s in t h i s li ne . 
~.~ en be li eved wh,?- tever t hey t hour;h L wit h any live li ness , a nd 
t hey mixed t hdr drea n1s v,,i th t he i r realiti es 
-22-
I 
t hey have been ~i~QQ~~,~~ by pre l1 i storic gen i uses whoie 
names the ni gh t of an ti qu iL y has covered up ; they n,ay h~:nre 
l 
I been ve r·ifi ed by t he i nHted i a t e facts of expe rience wh ic h 
I t hey first f itt ed ; a nd t hen f ro m fact t o fac t and fro m man 
to man t hey ntay l1ave ~l.1I.: ~~~l, unt il a ll l anguage rested on 
them and we now are i ncapab l e of thin ki ng naturally i n any 
-23-
ot he r terms . Such a view wou l (i only fo ll ow the ru l e that ~ ~ 
ha s proved e l sewhere so fer· til e , of as$ uming t i1e vast and 
relli8Le to confe r~ to t he laws of forlliation that we c an 
o bserv e a t work in ti-,e small and near "·. (1'/.) 
Th i s brings our, clearly tf,e analyt i cal me thod of 
pr a gn:a ti sn' as op posed to t he syn t Let, ic n:cthod of i ntel l ect -
ual istic pi1 ilo sophy . Przgn,at is m does no t com rn i t i tself to 
t he vie w t hat t hese f undamenta l conceptions a r e truer 
1 representatives of rea lit y because t hey have been deve loped 
I 
I I h i storically and no t due to t!le syn t het ic act i vity of 
I i nte lli f! ence . Viha t it does infe r from this .i s t ha t t he·.}' I "' . • 
l are due to practica l experi~en ts . I n o t he r words , t hey ~r e 
t he d ire ct outcome of testin g t heor i es by t he ' tr· i a l and 
1 e rror
1 me t hod . Me n proj ec t ed t he ori es c onc erning ways of 
I 
\ dea li ne with expe ri ence , and amon ~ those projected , th ese 
~ ha v e con;e do wn to us because t hey brou ~ h t t he most satis-
l factory resu lt~ . Aea i n , t he test i s t he pr act i ca l conse -
i 
(1) Pra~matis m , pp 170 , 176- 7, 182 - 3. 
CJLferwes on hun!BJ1 l1fe . Hence, :even t hese "eommon - ~Cens e 
categories 11 m<'l,y be far from ar;ree i ng wit h rea lH y, ar:d 
furthe r t hey may i n time be superceded by ot hE r mor e usefu 
ways of hand li ng the facts of experience . Pragmat i sm i s 
free to accept ~ny suc h ways i f t hey can be verified. 
Fourt hly, pragmati sm discards assumed 
starting- po i nt s i n ph ilosop l!y . Throughout t he hi s t ory of 
ph ilosophy i t has been cus t omary for phi l osophers to assum ·_ 
a cert a i n a ttitude of mind to be necessa r y i n order to 
ph il osophize . The School ~e n 's mo tto# was Qr~~Q yt iot~l= 
l.i"~W · 1'his was ussd i n reference to t he dogn;as of t he 
1 cur r en t t he o 1 o g y • 11 o t he S c h o c l me n , t he o n ly p r· ope r w a y t 0 
understand the doct..r i ries of t he c hur·ch was t.o fin>t be li eve 
t hem . Th i s , l10v1ever , l ed s trai ght i nto strict At~ r i or i sm . 
All i nduc tive inves t i2ations of s cience were denounced t ha t 
d i d no t agree wit h t he ir I gr.i.Qti be li efs about nat ure 
and its l aws . Philosophy been~ r i g i d and civilizati on 
sta f; nan t. 
As a react io n aga i nst this assurllej startin!~ po i nt. 
i n ph ilosophy , Des Cartes aff irmed that the proper att itude 
for a phi l osopher was t o doubt everythin g. His we ll-known 
[ motto was , _Qubi~Q ~~ iut~llit~[ Proceed i ng thus , he 
[arr i ved at the pos itive result, Qg~i~Q~ er~g_ s~w~ Bu t 
havin c, atta ined tlti s pos itio n, t1e was i n no bet t er relatio n ~ . 
-24 -
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1-u ncn .. ura1 1aws and events t llan tEe school men were . From 
t his pos ition he had to proce ed to deduce the nature of 
tl1ings in accordance wit h pr econce ived notions as to how 
t hey mus t be, i ns tead of inductively findin g out just wha t 
the l aws of na ture actua ll y were , and wha t had act uall y 
t aken place . However , he had ~ade one i mp ortant step for -
ward . 11 his was freedom·. fro m t he past. But Philosop hy wa: 
t hus r e leased fron1 the dogrlias of t he past only to be ens·la\ ~d 
~ anew by r a tionalistic abs trac ti ons . 
In revolt a~a i ns t th i s false l y assumed s t arti ng 
point i n ph ilosophy , Loc ke and h i s fo llo\·,;ers he l d t ha t 
ph il osophers n;us t be ~,i n with "t ne first i l1!press i ons of 
sen e e ". Ne it her past be liefs nor presen t co gn itions afford 
ed t he proper starti n~ - po i n t for a true phil0s ophy. Wha t 
c anno t t e traced back to an ori gina l sense-i mp ressio n , must 
a ccordin g to t h i s vie w, be den ounced as "fic titi ous". The 
l r esu lt of t h i s a ttitud e , when strictl y ao ne r cd to , is ph il-
oso phica l scep tici sm . 
tlow , t he prag,ila tist i ns i sts t ha t t hese ph iloso-
- pui es e rr in assum i ng un natura l startin g- points. Ph il oso-
pLy , he aff irms , r1as t o do wl!olly wi t h t. he be li efs and 
1 doubts of' t he on e philosophizing . But for eve r·y man , there 
I 
j is on l y one a nd can be onl y one poss i bl e s t a rti ng- point . 
I T h i s 1 s t he at t i t u de of rl! i n d Vi i t.. h v1 h i c h on e f i n d s h i 1!1 sEd f 
when he 11 se t s out" t o th i nk philosophi cally . F'or one t o 
attempt to doubt everything is, in his vi ew , si mply imposs -
b l e • Mere 1 y t o say t hat one do u b t s , or to " w ri t e do vm on 
a p i e c e of paper t lw. t you doubt "· .i s not t he k i n d of " do u b t 
in g" t ha t leads t.o serious thought. Rnd F~.c t i on . But only 
the doub ts that you cannot poesibly escape have any reli:i -
tion to t he philosophical attitude of mind . According to 
pra~~atis m , then, e ve ry man has his own unique starting 
place in ph ilosophy. Those who have endeavored to follow 
t r1e injunct i op , u s t a rt v:i t h t he first in!p ressi ons of sense", 
or wh o ha ve seriously tri ed to understand this atti tude , 
know how impossi b l e it is for one to i gn ore the present 
"rr1ake - up "· of his mind . I n ~pite cf t.he rwst s trenuo us ef -
for·ts to do t his and thereby ge t back to the first i mpres -
sions of the sensel:? , the a~~sumed "st a.rtin~ - pointtr is alvn1ys 
l tin~ed by the present beliefs of t he philosopher. Tne con-
j tents of the mind are not something held as i n a vessel oy 
I the mind , and can be poured out like water froc a eup and 
lea ve t he mind unaffected . lienee , the ph iloso pher cannot 
determine \'l ith wha t doubts and be li efs he ;·? i l l beg in hi~ 
philosophy , but he must te~ in with just those teliefs and 
doubts which he finds himself to have y;hen he does begin . 
Here the pn-u-1mat i st. t akes his stand and says , 
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"Tha t vh ich you do not at all dou bt , you mu st and cio re -
fa r d as i nfalli b le, ab sol ute truth" . 'ro t he obj ect i0n 
t nat this woul d tr:ake "w ha t a tu=m does not doubt l !:!1?.Q lfii:.Q1 
tr'ue" , he replies , "No ; but un l ess he c an ctake a t h i ng 11 
wh it e and bl a ck ar. onee , LQh a s to r e ga r d wha t he cloes t1o t 
doubt as e.b e: o lL t e l _y true ". ( 1) Thu s f or t he pr af;rr.ati :::: t 
t he t rue and the f a ls e are c om pa ti bl e with f u ll y accred ite: 
te li ef . To say th a t wh il e I c ann ot doubt t h~ t a cert a i n 
t hin g is wh it e ::l.nd not bJ.ack , yet I may be mir:.t aken a bout t 
a nd. ti1erefore n:y beli e f , t hcu ~)·t it cannot be dou bted , i s 
af ter a ll f a lse a nd not true , i s ~ore ly trifli n~ wit h 
" make - be li e ve be liefs" . And these are j us t what he wan t. ~. 
t.o a voici . To do t h i s he stolltl y affir ms tf;a t you must as 
ph iloso pher " s e t out. Vl it.h t he v ery s t. a t.e of rr,i n:1 i n which 
you ac tua lly fi d your!'>elf a t the ti me you do ' s s t. out "'· 
Th i s at fird Uance savors R vast dea l o f the 
S :~ h o o 1 n · n ' s C r e cl o l; t i n t e 11 i ~~ a m • F- u t a l i t t 1 e r e fl e c t i n 
vi· ll show tha t. t he re is no t Liw Je~st reseti bl aP.ce be t't;een 
t hen~ . TitE: S..::h ooln:e n apr.li E:d t his to f?t' Oposi tio ns no t yet. 
ve rifi ed , Vihile t he pra gmatist. holds t ha t th e s e proposit.io s 
j1ust. be ve rified be for e t. he_y c a n be accer,t ed as beli"'f s . 
In t his respect the p ra~n - ati~: t i~. a t h orou g t1 - ~ oi n ; Car t es i· n . 
The re is for him no previously es t ab lished se t of trut h~ 
=====~==-==~,=(1==) ="=1'r=1e==~=~ o=n=l=.s=t=,==v=o=.==x=,v=,==p=.==1=6~8=.================~============~~== --=-==-==-~ 
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!whi c h he is bound to verify . Ra t her· t ru th is C(::md itioned 
by human interests a nd wha t min i s t e r s to these cons tit ut es 
t he essence of tr·uth . It is only the a lready " e.ccredited 
beliefs", be li efs verifi ed by t heir serviceab l eness to 
human needs , that a r e to be accepted as "absolutely tn.I A''. 
,Consequently wha t hunan needs , int. eres t s , purposes , et c., 
lhave in your 
II your t rut ll . 
I us err!pnas ize 
case shown to be sa t.isfactory , t. hat is for you 
5 u t l'l it h o u t em p lias i z i n g t h i s p o i n t he r e , J e t 
thaL the pragn::a ti st • s s t artin~- po i nt of phi l-
osophy is jus t those be li ef ::; thaL have beeO!J,e so in grained 
i n _your ruent.al mak e- up that you cannot seri ous l y doubt 
t hen! v1hen you try . 'l'his is "your stock i n trade ", your 
c ap it al with wh ich to set up in business as a phi l osopher . 
ful i n establishing an ultin,a.te philosophy . Ihe nost t.tla.t 
you can do is to invest your capital i n sor:!e pr ac ti ca l un -
de rt akin~ and thus make just as b i ~ a n i ncome in the way 
of ve ri fied beliefs as you can. 'I'hese Vi ill be aci.ciecl to tlle 
stock of 11 funded t.r uths 11 wh i ch \'J ill i n turn DeCOJli8 carital 
for you ami for o t hers in the bus iness of l if e . 
Finall y , t he pra.gn1at i st app t' oaches the " Vi rld -
probl em"· vd th an open rJJ it Jd . Vie corr:e lle1'e t.o one of t he ·rr: os 
- 28-
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char·acteri stics of pra r,ma t ism. There is no thin g 
1 n v: h i c h t he p r a 1_~m a t i s t. t a k e s m or e d e 1 i g h t. t h a r. 1 r: h i ~ i n -
siste!Tce upon a n op e n- n,inded vievl of the rlorld - probl em . 
1h is open- mindedness is expreseed 1n a t hreefo l d way; 
in re ~ zrd to truth, in re~ard to reality , and in r e~ar d to 
trw outeome of the wor ld . l'ie will tarry here a little wh i .e 
1 1 n orde r to get a c l ear vi ew of the prae rr,atist ' s attitude 
in r·cspeet to each of these prcb lerf! S. 
B1 i r s t , t hen , i n r e (; a r ci t 0 t n e p r aQ mat i s t, 1 ' a t. t i -
I tude tov.aras til e nature of truth . 
I 
I 
Re do not i ntend to 0 iv 
. . ""::. 
iwre tne prag iJat ist ' s aecount of truth . This will be take 
I 
II up later . He r e v: e w i s h on 1 y t o p o i n t o u t h i s a t t i t u de 
~~ to·t~ards t he prcblerr.. Truti: , accord i n~ to pra ( n;atism , is 
, not so methin ~ pre-existi n ~ and ready to b0 d iscovered , but 
ao metr i n~ t ha t is made by persona l efforts . Professor 
James says , rr;rruth lS (!J~~~ ~ .just as healt h , \'18Ulth , ana 
stren ~~ t,h are made , i n th e course of exper ie nc e ". 'l'hcn he 
continues , " 'I can ima~ in e a rationalist. to talk as follov1s : 
"· ' Trut h is not made ', he will say , 'it abso -
l ute l y o btains , bein<5 a un i que relation t hat does not vm it 
upon any process , but shoots strai ~ ht over t he head of ex -
pef'ience , and hit s n<alit y every tinte 1 11 • Thls n,ay be a 
\ stron~ ~ utti n~ of th e rational i st ' s po i nt of vie w, but wnen I => 
we turn to Mr •. Joach i m' s treat ise on Lhe " Natur e of 'I'ruth 11 
=-=-===-=-=~~==========================~======~==~ 
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we Pind much t hat supports t his st.f'l.temen t. M:r . Joachit!l 
11
'fr ut h i2 - from the po i n t, of view of hurn8_n intelli-
1sencs - s_n ideal , s.nct an i dea l wh ich C3. n never as such , or 
1n it~, con:plet.eness , be ac t ua l a s human exper i ence".( 1 ) 
In anotrler place he says; "t ha t th e truth it.self is one and 
whole a nd complete , and that a ll thinking and all exrerienc 
!moves within i ts reco~nition and subject to its ffia nifest 
autrwrit_y ; this I have never doubted •••. Truth , beauty, 
~oodness, a re ti me less universf'l.l, independent structures , 
and yet a l so it is ess~ ntial to th em to be manifested in 
I the thinkin g of finite suhjects , in the ac tion s and voli-
tions of perishin ~ 3~l ents •.••• Truth , if it is to be for me 
!l!USt enter into my intell ec tu al ewleavor". (2) 
These statements certainly indicate that to t he 
ratio_ a list truth is r,ore than liverif i ed numan ex perience". 
It is some Lliin( "inderiendent '' 'Of all finitel expe ri ence 
which human know le d~_,e does not n;a.<e but discovers. This 
i s what the pragma tist disallows . He insist s that " All 
actual truth is human , a ll actual knoY1in g is pervaded thr6' 
and t hro ' by the purposes, i n t eres ts, emotione and volition 
of a human persona l Hy. "· ( 3 ) Such trut h as is ''independen t' 
\or human experience 1s an "'i111potent. pha nto m". Hence there 
( 2 ) 'l'he Na ture of Truth , Pp . 21, 163 , 178 . 
( 3 ) Schiller; Studies in Human is m, p. 170 . 
II -. 
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1 1s no ete r na l truth awaiti n ~ to be discovered oy finit 6 
I thin kers. Tr ut, h co ·Y::' s into ex istence and gets all it s 1J:C.:Cl.n 
I in ~ t hrou gh hu man experience . Vie not only r~maKe ou r trut h 
I but we really a rd truly make it wtJa t it i s . T i1er·e n,ay .JG 
I " fu nde o trut hs " whic h v;e of this present ti me have not a nd 
·I I do r,ot IT!ake , but the~~e trut.ils in the first pl ace rlave been 
! marie by our huma n ancestors , and 1n the seco nd place t n6y 
l are a ll s ub ject to correction and a "re makin ;; ". There is 
I 
no i nit i al at so l ut ~ t ruth. Khat t he f in a l t rutn sll~ll be 
i s sti ll an open ques ti on ~ That a final absolut e trut l. 
j ll!atis t ~ , bu ~~ Lh2. t truth is now a bsolute and eternal and 
li the pre- estab li shed ~; oal of a ll our· stri vin g , prafl ma ti s m 
1sto utly de ni e s. Hence he :; ri de£ hi n,se lf on h is open - ri:i n:J -
1 
je Jn ess 1n r e ~ ard to t he essent i a l and ultimate nature of 
:t rutrt . 
I a 
I 
lrld 
1l' his ma y not seem to be Aun i que departure from t he 
1 and tried philosophies, for it appears qu it e eviden t fr n 
I r;e fore goi ng tha t trutl for t he. praf}mati st is co-e x te ns ive 
11ith f i nit e k now i n ~ . Now no ph ilosophy woul d denythat a ll 
l 'inite knowl edge was a product of human experience, an d 
it was subject to mod i f icat ion. Some t n i nkers 
insist t ha t cert a i n knowled ~e is absolu te ~nd ~hile 
==~==========~==========================~======~ 
it has come i nto our· p os~ession t. h 't'ou gh our· ov.'n eftorts or 
t hro u f~tl the effor t.s of o ur fore - t' C1l hers , ye t it, be5.n:: t he 
n:P..rks ot' univer8&.lity ~nd is therefore i n eert a ir. respects 
fi na l an::l. absolut..e . '1 ut. while th e ~ragnat.ist ~l'!a / idei1t ify 
!I Lru lh wll h fi nite k ~o., ledge , yet, he ci o~s not with thiD 
I c l o::e h1s rr:1na to tne wor l ct - pr·oble::n:. t'1ot only is trut h 
I ::::n b:e :~::::l ::::::•n:::,e:::' r::l: ~ : s i;::~: ;:.:·::i :: 
becon:e<:.' rent , not exact l y asunder , but .i nto d ivis i ons . 
Not d iv is i ons i n ~he sense of factio ns., but r ather in t he 
nense in which t hs term 1 s used in ref er·t:::nce tc; an arn:y. 
Son•.s t3.k t: one fi e l ci a nd ~ o 1 11 one dlr·sct i on , son:e anoL her 
f i eld , a nd anot he r direction . 
Professor James pre f e rs not to say much about the 
probl em of re1:dity. Por the r,!o s t pcLrt , he ass un:o s t ite 
I COllt li~ o n - sen, e rl8.ne and acu et: t. t: the ordi •1a ry facts of e .-
I pe!' .i.en(!8 ;.tncl. tiJeir re l a t.ions ac ·:.:c·r.st. it \jti n[~ one £ i de of 
!'es. lit y , and our id e as as c.ons tit.ut i n~ t he o Uter . HO\'I ev e r , 
I t h is J:as pr·ovt:d t.o be soi ~· e 11hat. un l:- o. Li sfac t.. o:cy a nd. jH y 
I ( to ren,~. in prCJ~matic) !lave t.o be rr,odif i ed . •! ost of the 
I j criL i cisn:s of ProfE::ssor Jams· ' s Fra c~ rnatis w , i ~ct v e cen te red 
i a rou nd. this feature or his YIOT'i\ . Accordin g ly , he has r·e -
1 
plied th::.t the c riticis~H s ace for t he eJ ost pb.rt lJii sunder-
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s t a11d i n 1~. s. (1 ). 'J' r,is vi e w ~ ivss t 1 s i n,r r eE sion of t he ssp-
a ra.t i on of " truth''· e; nd " r· ea lit y" . 2u t t he se p.rc;.t ir.n of 
:\ t.r uLh fro rr, r·e a lit y i~. ne t an ea jO_y :::t.e.p f or r.-r a.fims t.ls tr' to 
!I t a ke . ~ r . Sch iller ha s r eco ~n iz ed t h i s f act and has pre-
f e rre.J to pu t t he " rBcd.:: ing of re zlit y " on s i mi l ;; r s t a nd -
i n ~ ~~ H fl t lt ~ " t11 s. k i n t1 of t r u t h" • 11 .l o w t h i s" , he "' f f i r rr• s , 
1 trj_~. a re-su H of i rHl,en se. philosoph ic: i n· r_. c,rtc:-, .. cc. For it I
sys te j Ja tica ll ~ bars th e VH~Y to tLe pers i st ent !... ut. :ie l usive 
1\ no tic. o t ho t "tr"th" a nd "realit y"· someho" ex i st e.v•.rt , and 
a pa:!'t fr· on: UE :::~Ni lt8.'fe t.o Le. c·.oe.xeJ or coere:. E:•:..~ i nt o 2. 
1
_ un ion , 1n l li~ fru it s of which we car~ 
:I Tl>e ;,,a;. l nO ot trut n , it IS plo.i n , " 
n!i n'ol'i rr \, of r pal'i y - n!acl.e f a d . It is 
s o me ho~ parti c ip a t e . 
a nyt h i nfl ~ut & pass l v ·l 
~n ac tiv o endeavor in 
I 
vd, leh our· Viil cle ni'\l ur e ls e nga~eJ , and i n Y1f:j_u !1 ou r des ir e 
1 \ i r, te.rest~. , <~ n cl .c..i rLS Lak e a l c o.d in ~ par-t . • t~ e v er!L o re , the re 
:1 i'or e , e a n Lr1E: ~.l.!J2j~~1i~§ r:1a kin ( of r ea lit y be ier: i ed or 
I i f nore d , · v. i1et.he; r- i t be in t he in t eres t. c_,f ration a U..-::n11 
I E.r1cl in orde r· to r ese r- ve t he n.c1k in (, of r e:<:di t y for an 
I 
ij " r1b so lut e ti tou !d ht. " , or v:he t he r i n t. h t:: i n t c re l:.~t of r eeli srr! , 
I • ' 
•i '"nd in CJr cie r· to f! JfJ. i nt.ain the a bsolutene ss of a n " i ndepe nd -
. e n t" f 3. ct. 1.1 a ken t:; t ric t l y and for 1·1 h s. t it profes s e ~::. t o be , 
I 
t he no t ion of tr uth as,,_ " corresponde nce " beL v;ee n our 
il mi nd s a nd SO I !Je tllin ~ in tri ns ica ll y f'or·ci Cn to l[·,en! a s a 
-~~·l==================~~==~=====t~===~-
.1 ( 1 ) See Philosopui cal Reviev, , vo L XVII , no . I. 
'I 
\ 
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'I mirrorin (; of al ien fact , nas cc mp l c t.el y broke;~ do i 'l r:. . '1" h:=re ! 
. ' II 
re a lity to ~ h i~h truth was s a id to ccrrespond, i. e • v; !·· .i c h I 
it ha s to knov1 , is UQ.t. a f a. c t i n it. r. o vm r i g h t , Vi h l c h 
:I 
~rc - ex ists the co ~ nitive functio n in G. It i. 8 L t s c lf [1, f B c. t, 
wit .<.in qj.owinu., in;rr,anent l y depos it ed or pi.~ ec i pitatul by 
fnnctionin (; of our thou(:ht . The prob l en~ of knowJed11e , 
I 
t he} 
:1 t !:.erefore, is 
j r ea lity"? It 
Q.Qt:, -- " hov1 can t hc u ~h t. en~ender trut h about 
is raVler .- ;' hew ca n \'/e b:st descric .:o t he 
I c ont i n.Jous p~oces s wh ioh en(;enders our systems of " truth" 
· an d our acuep tan ct~ of " rec.d it.y ", and (radually l~efines 
·I t h8m into rwr, arl'l moi'C adeauat.e reearjt,; fo!'' the c on t !'ol of 
' our g;·c;er i en c e '? It i s i n U!i:~ co~n.it.i v e e l abor':tt io n of 
I . t ' t L t l d 1 , t . exps:c 1enc.e . 11 :'.l. t-ru i :in re~ ._1 y t,ro w tip ~~r:1 Ul2.~£1J . 
'1Rcal ity'' is r ea lity for Lu:: , 2. n6 knovH! by uE j ust B.8 "t :ru th " 
I . I l' 
,j l s \. r u , u for ·us . 
11, u ::; t v 9. p o co us l t y p 0 t h c s .L ~~ i ~ co r! ::- c l i d c.. t s d i n t o t he h o;. r cl0 ::. t 
·I . . ' b. . I 1 
r ;d! . !I'tOS t ll1 C! U l v &.) e 
I ' ~ " t .. , •.. r e ·r 0 1' A ..,. r:) , "' r~ ., ·.:: .I I,...... .-.. - - ) ...:l ,. ,. '..J~ '..l ..._. 
I 
1 makin~ of t.ru Lh and t he m~kin ~ of r ea lity seem to be 
I [.lt!!.li~ill~!:d.d~.ll:£-QU~- " ( 1 ) 
HerE:: we. see t. It a t rea li ty is the r od Lw t of hurr!an ex-
jj t:.e!'ience . Of course , Mr·. Schill er ha s to " pos t 1J l :3.te an 
I ( 1) SL u.d i es 1 n Human i sm , p. 425.- 6 . 
·I 
li 
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initial ba~is of fact as the condition of ge tti ng to wor k 
at a ll". But what he insists on is that this initial basi 
of fact" , is a ' mere-startin g- point , variously, ar·bit.raril 
caus a lly selected '. And that the finished product i s 
entirely different from the initial basis . What reality 1 
for us , therefore, is due to our own n,ak ing. To emphas ize 
t his point, Mr •. Schi ll er reminds us that t he personal 
.
1 
knoi'l er is a part of reality, and that it is indisputable 
;j that t he process of kmwing changes the knower . Hence, 
I 
as we build up our own knowledge (and this mill scarcely 
be denied by anyone ) we do actually and really make 
reality , viz. the rea lit y that stands for t he difference 
between ourselves as i gnorant and ourselves as possessing 
1 knowledge . Further he emphasizes t he fact that persons 
influence one another and thereby bring about a real 
chan ge in the reality of each other. Thus it is insisted 
I t ha t there is a kind of reality that is truly made by us . 
16ut t his is not a ll of r·eali t.y. There is t he very per-
11 sistent notion that a reality exists beyond our subjective 
world and is independent of our making . This r ea lity •~ 
"find"' and do not "·ma ke '". 
~ I Mr Schiller reco ~ nizes that we do find some 
j realities as well as make some . To carry the discussion 
I 
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beyond 'subjective' reality, into the real m of "objective 
reality would be to leave epistemology for metaphysics . 
But staying within the realm of epistemology 'reality ' 
as well as ' truth' , is made by us. But M r~ Schiller is 
not willing to stop with epistemology •. He pushes his pra ' 
~atism on still further. Not, it is true , to the extent 
of turning it into a complete cosmic philosophy and there 
by renderinQ it responsible for the explanation of object 
ive reality, but only to the extent that the difference 
between '' •subjective"• and "objective"· reality is a practi -
cal difference , and therefore , can be pragmatically ex-
plained . "To wish for a chair and find one, and to wish 
for a chair and make one , are experiences which it is not 
easy to confuse , and which involve very different opera-
Lions and attitudes on our part"·. (1) 1'he only differenc 
1 he seems to infer , is the difference in our attitude 
towards reality . And then comes his farthest fli ght of 
a ll. Since this difference is practical and depends on 
our attitude , we may seize the hint and conclude that the 
differenC!B is, after all, not absolute.. At any rate , he 
thinks we are justified in i gnorin Q the reality not made b 
us, because it is to be conceived "only as indicating lim-
its to our explanations, and not a s reNealin g the solid 
op . ct . P 430 
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'rhe foreg oin g i nd i cates de fi nit e l y the open-
'\ mi ndedness of pragma tis m towards reality. Realit y and 
I' 
II 
truth ar·e both "i n t he mak in g". rha t they are to be 
ultimately depends upon how we , yes, we human persons , 
make the m. This t hought br·i ngs us to t he question of the 
'I outcome of tbe worl d. And wit h t he above facts in n·i nd 
j we can be very bt.ief in st a tin g the pragrr~.at i s t' s vie w of 
1
1 t hi s . 
·I 
II 
In th i s respect t r1e pra ~Jmat i st is just as open -
minded as in the cases of truth and rea lit y. In fact, 
1 their position on this po i nt is only a corollary of t he ir 
'I vie ws of truth and rea lity. As truth and reality are both 
'I " in Lhe ff,akin!l'\ t he charact er of the worl d is sLill 
1 
· 1 ·r · · 1 · · 11 
I 
pr·oble rr.at 1ca • nere 1s no assuracce t 1at• 1 t vn end we l 
, Ye t the possibi lity of its be com in~ better and bet t er has 
II 
a s t ron~ all y i n praL matism. If we have t he responsi b ilit ~ 
on our shoul de rn of determi ni n~ the outco me , and i f prag-
:l matism i s unfettered by preconce ived no ti ons of wha t truth 
J and rea li ty must be , t hen t he pra~matist method lends it -
1 self readily to the mak ing of reality such tha t the final 
outcome wil l be t he bes t poss i bl e . We mus t further keep 1n 
the fact t hat wruile the real it y wh ic h we make today 
--T can. be to a certain extent ren;ade again tomorrow , yet in 
·I 
t his freedo m of remaking reality there is a limit. Though 
II 
.I the 'i nitial basis of reality ' is i ndeterminate a l most to 
;I an infinite de ~: ree, yet as it passes through our hands thi 
I · d . . d 11 d I l n e t e r mlnateness ~ lVBS way e ra ua y to eterminateness. 
I 
1
\ As progress continues the pl asticity of the 1 discoveratle ' 
I reality becomes less. As pragmatism fashions reality 
,I d' I t ' f' f I accor 1ng to sa 1s actory consequences on li e , there 1s 
I , not h in~ in 
I 
! this point 
it opposed to a final outcome of the best . On 
Prof~ssor James has the fo llo wing to say : 
•,j 
"Midv1ay between the two ( Optimism and Pessimism ) 
l\ there stands ohat •ay be called the doctrine of n.eliorism , 
' thou~h it has hi the rto fl ~ured less as a doctrine than as I _) ~ 
an attitude in human affa ir s . Optim i sm has always been 
I 
,\ the re g_nant doctrine in !Buropean philosophy . Pess i Jr,ism 
y • ·:t~ only recently introduced by Schopenhauer and counts few I <lA 
systemai ic defenders as yet. Me liori sm treats sa lvation as 
lj 
'lne i t. he r necessary nor impossible. It treats it as a poss iT 
I 
' 
bility , which becomes more and more of a probabilit y the 
imore numerous the actual conditions of salvation become . 
I 
I 
It is clear that pragmatism must incline to wards meliorism ~ 
'some conditions of the worl d ' s salvation are ac tually extan , 
· nd she cannot possibly close her eyes to this fact: and 
I 
'I 
II 
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should t he residual conditions co me , sa lvation woul d be-
come an accomplished reality 11 •• ( 1) 
I 
I 
I 
In all these res pects, then, pragma tism is open- I 
grea t 1 When we recall what-aAaeterrent to t he progress I 
II 
:J minded . 
of c ivilization dogmatis m has been, t his open - minedness 
will render pra~matism very attracti ve. But so far we 
I have been interested only in setting fort h our conce ptio n I 
1 of t he natu r e of pr a gmat i sm and ha ve not concerned our-
' selves with its value or its lin!itations. But, however 
I attract ive it may be as a philosophical me thod, we must 
. not l et this prevent us from inquiri ng into its merits and 
:1 demerits . To do this , we will proceed to consider t he 
pra @ma tist disposition of some of the le ad i n~ probl ems of 
philospphy . 
I 
I 
IJ 
!I 
==--===If=\ ===r=:=f=~==:=.==~~== ========#.=! ==-- ==---=== I (1) Prag natism p. 285,- 6. 1 
I 
I 
1\ 
+ 
ij 
I Pra ri, urat ism a~ a Theory of Thought . 
Ill T . rue to 1ts ana lyti c instinct , Pragmatism sets forth 
I 1 
its t heory of' thought in the form of a careful analysis. !· 
t hought is treated as being equivalent with reflective 
thinking. So we find a t once a narrow limit set to the 
scope of the pra~ ~a tist ' s theory . Thought , for him , may 
well be def in ed as t he discurs ive habit of expe r ience . It 
i s thus, as it should be , make one f1otor of experience . 
An d this indicates clearly t ha t tnou ght is derivative in 
c haracter . It is not the funda ment a l bas is upon which 
life is built, but a factor in life . Even the most pre-
! nounced Aprior ist must adwit t .hat experience is the test 
I 
1 of all knowin g. Thought , whether t aken i n its narrower 
meani ng as t he praQlli &tist does , or in ite wider s i gnifica-
J tion as t he f ormulation of basic life princ i ples and hence 
: a pHi losop hy of experience as the intellectualist does, 
l thou Q_ ht. , I s~y ., is an elerv.ent in experience . So then we 
!!agree with th e pragma t ist t hat exper i ence is the fielci i n 
!which we l!;ust look i n search of the mean i ng of t hough t. 
I 
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!I 
'l 
And without criticizing the prag rr.at is t 1 s view of experiencl 
,, here (this we hope to do later) it is accepted as the only 
ll and therefore necessary starting point for the analysms 
1
j of the proces!: of thinkin g. Assumin~ then that we a ll 
I understand what is meant by the tern! experience, I proceed ! 
to sta te in my own way what I believe to be a true account 
of t he pra~~ matist 's theory of thought . 
As t hou ~ ht is derivative , the first step in its 
analysis is to determine froru what it is derived . In 
other words , vd1 at are the antecedents and conditions of 
Vl ith the pl ain ll!an , the presence in conscious-,
11 
t bought. 
ness of a feelin g, a memory, an idea, or anotner thou ght 
of any kind whateve r may be the antecedent of reflection. 
There is no question, in his mind , concernin g t he subtle 
1 problem of how these thin ~; s Clan be a cause of reflection, 
but this is wha t experience presents to him and it is 
accepted as true without further ado . 
This view,moreover, presupposes tilat reflection 
is a distinct act ivit y of the aind. The question of 
,
1 
causality is not ra~sed, .. but. i~ one should ask the pla in 
' man how tne percept1on, reeling, etc ., could be tne cause 
I 
II ref 1 e c t i on , he w o u 1 d , no d 6 u b t , rep 1 y t hat t he tu i n d was 
I 
~ self-ac~ive and could t hin k about any phase of exper1ence 
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II II 
I 
wh ic h canle under iLs observa' tion or attracted its 
attention. The p~~ c e p tion or feelin ~ , under considera tio . 
does not ~ ive t he mind the po~er to ac t , but only the 
mater ial to act up on . But such free activity of t he mind I 
, i s extreffie ly distressing to t he pragmatist wh o knows n oth~ 
i ne of a self apart fro m the va r ious stages ":i n t he drama I 
of ( ~n ) evolvin~ experi ence". Consequently the pr agmat ist 
sets this vi c~·~ concerning t he arr.tecedents of thought as i de 
I 
as unbecomin~ a believer in evolution . 
1\ 
I' For very similar r easons al l Ka nti an Vi e'IIS 
wh ic h emphasize t he synt het ic ac tivity of the self in 
t hinking are distress i ng to tr1e pragmatist . But t he pra (; -
mat ist deems t he vi ew of Lotze deser vi ng his special 
I dcn tinl~ i at i on . Th is vi ew comes too near to rendering a 
I true vie w of evol ution compati ble with the self - activity o 
!I the thinker to be cet aside as pre-evolutionary. Accord-
1 in gly, we f ind t hat Lotze is made the center of a len ~ thy 
pol emica l discu ss ion of lo~ ical t heory . No be tt er way to 
the uncierstat:d ing of the pra~mat ist ' s t heory of thought 
can Le f ound Lhan a consideration of hi s criticisms of 
Lotz e ' s vi ew of the a.ntecepdents of thou flit t. 
-42-
As set forth by pr ag.:,atis s , Lot ze ' s view conforr s 
very closely to the view of the pl a i n man. He distin guis · 
-~-~ 
,\ e s bet. ween t h o u ~ h t - ao t i vi t. y and t h o u f h t - rga t e r i cd . b'u.rther 
II 
!I 
,I 
!' 
the ultimate anteceden t condit ions of thinkine are found 
in i tr:pressions . These are sta~es of conscious ness or 
.• 
~e r e psychical hagpenings which are due to external object 
as sti muli . H~wever , the presence of the external object 
is not a lway s necessary . After a n impression has once bee 
received it leaves a sort of an af ter-effect . Whate ve r 
t he nature of this after - effect, it has a t least t he povrer 
to arouse other s ta tes of consciousness like the ori ginal 
il s t ate . ~tirt ne r , when one st ate has been aroused it has 
I t 11e associative pov er of reawa ken i nt ot her states vrh ic h 
have previously existed in conn ection with it . Th is point 
tow a rds t he associational t heory of thou~ht . And so fa r 
it i s in a~reenent with t . ha~ · theory . Bu t the essential 
feature of Lotze ' s view snows a decided d~sa9reement with 
t. h orou g h- ~ oin g associa t ional i sm . It. is t his feature of 
I !tis system t hat · bec: omes the bon e of contention for the I 
!I pra~ma List . 
! We hav3 re fe rence here to Lotze ' s view 1n which he I . 
\ distin guis he s two kinds of connection between i mp ressions . 
' I As the impressions become conjoined simulta~eously they 
I 
li cecome ideas and as conjoined successively t hey becoma a 
~ current of icleas . With associationalism thouflh t is a 
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11 product of such associat i ons of i mpressions and i deas . Bu 
!I Lotze finds more i n thought than a mere associ a tion of 
ideas . Though t is a refl ective process . Associat i on is 
onl y the cord ng toget l er of i deas throu gh mutual affinity . 
I• On this basis t here would be no ~ round for n1akin g a di s -
:\ 
I 
II 
ij 
!I 
'I I 
,I 
tinction in the vl i ue of i deas as true and not true , And 
1 t here is where the d i s tin ~ u is hin ~ feature of Lotze ' s systen 
appears . As has been said , he d istinguishes t wo kinds of \1 
connection between ideas . Some i mpresEions co~e si ~ ultane 
ous ly and oft en thereby en ~ender an associat ion of i deas 
t ha t is mere l y coincident and not in any way rea lly fuelon g 
i ng to ~ether . This kind of connection may lead to error 
and not kn o wled~e . But there is i~ associ at ion also a 
coherent connecti on between i deas . Th is is the con nection 
that leads to know l ed ~ e . I n association , t hen , we have 
both coherent and co i no i dent. conneotions between i deas . 
But t here is nothin ~ as yet to po int out t he d i ffe r ence 
be t wee n t he~e . Associationalism has n0 way to po i nt out 
t his d ifference . With it error is as good as tr uth as lon . 
as it. l as ts. 
Th is peculiar mixture of truth a nd erTor , of 
coincident. add coherent ideas , constitutes the condition 
for refl ect ion. A mi nd unable to reflect woul d be a t the 
-44-
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me rcy of t hi s confusion of coincident and coherent ideas. 
When a horse with a saddle on its baqk was presented to it. 
t he saddle wou ld be as much a part of the actual horse a s 
the horse ' s ears, neck , legs, or· its body . What i deas 
really be longed together and thus gave a knowledge of the 
\1 horse and what were only eoincident and did not. really 
I 
I 
I 
belon~ to the horse , t he associative mechinisru could not 
determir.e . Only a reflective mind could do this . This 
work of reflection is an activity that be longs to the rr ind 
apart from it s ability to form impressions . This activity 
is wha t constitutes thou~ht . What ideas t:.he mind sha.ll 
have is not a conc~ern of thou gh t at all , but what worth 
t ' . d Cl ne 1 e-:s have is a concern of thou~ht . This br ings us 
t hen to a clear distinction between the ex istence of i deas 
as psychical events , and their mean ing for knowled ge . 
Without emphasiz in g at this point the though t of 
the last sen te nce , let us recall our object in the fore- j 
goin ~ discuss ion. It v1as to find out what, in Lotze's viev l 
constitutes the antecedent conditions of thou ght . This 
we have seen to be the . nature of t he connection betwee n 
ideas. The antecedents of t hou~ht are impressions, bu t 
1 the occasion for thought is the mix ture of coincident and 
I 
1, coherent ideas . 1' hus he ar~; ues that experience i s funda-
l! 
'I 
mental , that all knowledge comes t r1rougi1 experience, and 
that an unreflective st a ~ e of experience pr·ecedes thou gh t. 
Further , that thou gh t - activity depends upon or gro0s out 
of a specific situation in experience . The thou ght - activ-
ity is not , t heref ore , somethin~ that exists apart f rom 
experience and determines in an ~ grigri nay what experien e 
shall be , but on the ot her hand iL is an organic part of 
experience for a definite and ~enuine purp6se . Th is pur -
pose is not Lo support life , much less to ori ginate life , 
but t he more humble yet worthy and di gnified purpose of 
eva!ua tin e the f acts of experience . Apart from reflective 
I t hought, the facts of ment a l life stand as mere existences 
\1 without. any d.istinction be tween the m as to their wor·th . 
1
,1 i'l t . . ,, . I t , . . 1 f I iJ:'hu,: unre . ec 1ve exper·1enue ntrnls 1es .ne rna.r.i:H'la s o 
1 life and. reflective thou ght. discloses tiwir respeetive 
I values. He nce the ori gin of ideas iB to be distinguished 
from their worth . 
l
i 
often as true i deas , but t he ir worth is recognized and 
I'he untrue id eas have !.he . same or·i g i n 
I I brough t out t y reflec t ion . The point that is left in con-
' fusion here , is bov1 impr ess ions or ideas are poss i bl e? 
\'i he n t he antecedent of thought is referred to as 
1 an unreflecL i ve sta~e in experience without considerin~ the 
I nature of t ha t sta ~,e , we lla. ~ e sin: ply i ~ nor·ed the questim: 
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fund~ment a l question i n 
t he probl em of k ro1o wl edge . ' ia i v i ng tl is ques ti on for t he 
ti me be i ng, and accep ti ng t he vi ew t lta t t he a nt ecede nt con 
d ition of t hought is an unreflectiv e exper i ence , l et us 
~ o on and see \·Jhat crit i oisn: pragma t.isnr ha \3 t o make up on 
Lotze ' ::: v i ew of the ant eceden t. c: ondit.ia.n s of tt1ou ~ hL . 
First the re is an o b je:~c tion raised that Lotze i s 
equivocal in his use of t hs t ern: impt·e~sion or i dea . 
Mr . Dewey in spcakin~~ of this obj ecti·on says : "1'he irr1pr·es -
s io r.s and ideas p l ay a ver sa til e r·ole; t hey now a. ssur,~e t ne 
part of ultimate anteced~nts and prov ocative condi ti on~ ; 
cf c ru de ma t eri a l; and SOIH>how , Ylhen ar r a nt;ed , of con t ent 
II for t houe;,h t. r h i s very ver· ~: ati lit. y awakens su::>pic i on ".(1) 
il 
The versa til e ro l e which t he i :n tJress ions and 
i deas arc here accu3e2 of p l a yin g by M:!'. Dc ney involves t h 
po in t t'at we just referred t o as be in~ lefL i n c onfu s i on . 
1 If we ac ceot. an unr•ef l ec tiv e 8L a.~~~e in e >~ per i ence as t he 
I 
11 
antecedent of tnousht , and tr!ake the u!EiXt 1Jre of the co -l -
i ncident an:l. t.l ie cohe rent " the pecu li ar· ~roblem which 
insti ~at es r ef l e ctive t hi nk i ng, as ~ r. Dewey affir ms t ha t 
Lotz e does (2 ) I fail to see t he cause of ~uspic ion a s 
Mr . Dewey po i n t ~. i t out. lie s.ccuses Lot. zo of n!ak i ng ideas 
!I aiL Limes "n:e r e l y psych ica l events wl: i cl fJ f:.'';.rve only a8 
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,, 
\ 
I provoo•tive< of thon~ht , and •t ot·fe r ti<,es "etuf f for 
I tbou ~' t ' ~ . II . exercnse , 1.e . · ~~ev are at once the cause and 
II effect of thouQ ht . Cr i n other words , he aceuses Lotze 
of affin: int~ t ha t i deas ar e now "bar e subject. ive eventc:: 11 , 
and now lo ~i cal contents . Fut ho~ ean he ci this wher 
accor-dinr to hi~ o;m staten:e1 t t. i t is t re rd.A1.l.l.I:~ tetv·een 
coincidel.t a nd co . berent ideas. t hat sets the crol~ lerr. fer 
refl ection , end not t he mer e subjective existence cf 
i d e a s ? I n e co 1 t. r 0 d i c t i on ·N h i c h i s s o a o p a lli n k? t o 
~ r . Iewey is one cf his c~n rrak in ~ . even af ter his ex~osi-
tion of Lotze ' s poc::ition is fully accepted . 
fth ether t~e i mpre~sions bave an actual lo gical con 
tent cr mear i nQ fer t~cu ~ht tefore ref l ective thin ki1~ be-
~ i ns 1s an entirely dif ere~ tbir ~ fro~ ~hether the ~ix-
ture of coincident and coherent ineas i s w~at arouPeD re -
flection . Th e co.incidert i deas JTiF. t have " stuff for 
t h o u 9[·. t " a s w e 11 a t> t.l- e co t• e r en t i d e a s • A s tA r • Dewey s e t s 
fort _ the antecedent condition of refJect.ion in Lotze's 
&yRterr there is nothin Q that contradicts this . H nee tbe 
' absolute tranBf orn:ation" of i deas from rre e f.>ll b ject.ive 
events , n:ere existences , to lN'ical contents , "meanines 
. for k nov:led~e " , is not the ·.cr l\ of e lecticn . 'l'h is has 
been done in t~e prev iou s s ta Qe of unreflective experience . 
-~ 3- · 
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This is the point that ha s bee n lef t in confusion. Ahd it 
is the cle arin~ up of this confusion t ~a t will decide 
whether ideas are mere su b.iective exi s tences or aualitativ 
cont ents fo r t ho u ~ hts . Bu t we heve assumed a previous 
staee of experience in wl ich coincident and coherent i deas 
are Qi ven and t he quest ion at issue no~ is what i s tHe 
"cue " t hat }'l ives rise to reflective t hink i n.Q . As we ha ve 
repeated aQain and aQa in this with Lotze is t he mixture of 
coinci den t and cohere.rt i deas. The wor k of r e f lection is 
t he eval uat ion of this mi xture , rej ectin ~ t he coinci dem t 
and af firm in~ the co herent i deas . Thus th e first ob :ectio 
of praQ~ a tig ru a~a ins t Lotze 's view ia due to t he fact that 
the prBfmatist t~ists t he mean in Q of his own exposition 
of Lotze ' s view into a con t r ad iction. 
Wit h tte vanishin ~ of this objection ~ oes t he 
seco nd one , viz ., that t he distinction between coinc i dent 
an6 coheren t is not one of loQic, but only 6f a suspected 
coherence and a r ea l coherence. The suspected coherence i 
just as ~ ood ( accordin2 to t ·te pra .fim atist ' s own showin Q) 
as the real co herence so l onQ as it works . Fu rt rt·er t he 
distin c tion arises only in re f lec t ive thou P. h • Certainly; 
and it is t he wor k of reflect ion to brinQ out t his 
distinction . The distinction is not made by reflection bu 
T 
I 
it i s d iscov er ed and exposed by ref l ec ti on . And t hus t he 
eo n n e c t i on i s v i n d i c d 6 d b. · r e r' .l c c.: t i on and nor, b y t he w 0 r :K 
i ng of the ideas, for as prat mat ist s in assuming an ex -
per i ence which runs a l ont smooth l y befo r e reflec tion be~ i nR , 
admit that the coinc ident or suspec t ed cohere nt i deas work 
as s moothly as co h~ r en t i deas do . The t est , t hen , of co-
heren ;e is reflection and not nVI orkab ility 11 • 
Rut i t nas not so much to s how t, he fu t il .i i~ y of t ho 
pra e rnat i st ' s obj ect.ioYJ to Lotze ' s V i .O;)W ( 3.8 we have not 
cornm i t ted ourselves to his v iew ) r,.s to prepar e the ¥"8.Y for 
a stateme nt of the ~raJmat i st ' s own acco unt of t he an t e -
:1 ceaen t conditions of thou~1h t . The f oreSo i ng d i s c ussion 
I has c l eared the way for a conc ise ~tat e~ent of his po2 i t ion 
It ·s as fo llows: 
Fi rst , there is an un r ef l eotive period of e~per -
i e nce i n which l if e runs 3 lo n~ wit ho ut int err upt i on or ~es -
it a tion. What. ex]_:e:r·ience deman ds for i ts sat i sfaction 1 s 
'.!' ne nee ds , des ires , v1 i s hes , appetit es , 
throu g1i the i mn1ediacy of eY.perienoe . 'l'i1e r e l a t i on 
be L ween l i f e an c i t. s en v i ron m c' n t u . one of i n s t i n c t i v e 
adjus t le nt. 'J'he wind Vih il e .i n th is ' E: l ys i <'l-n ' staLe tr eas-
1 u r e s u p h e l p f 0.l be 1 i e f s • l3 tl t a 1 a s ! [-'or we i lU !!! an c r e c:.. t u r e s 
i t hi s peri od canno t l as t. In our onwa rd rus hi ng we outs tri p 
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ll 
1• experience an run straight up aga inst 
I 
I an obstacle. Our inst incts f a il us Rnd v1e ar e l eft over-
~ whe l med in a puzz li ng situat ion. One pragmatist refers 
I 
to th i s situation as our fin din g ourselves i n a "hole". 
This is des i ~ nated t he second step in the ~alys is of the 
theory of thou~ht . 
~ indin~ ourselves in this ' hole ', we strive by 
br·ute force to ge t out. But the ' hol e ' is too deep. Agte 
we a re convinced that sheer brute force 1s going to leave 
us swamped in t he mars hes of our env ironmen t, we beg in t o 
reflec t. Vlhere t hi s power of ref l ection comes frou, i~. a 
mystery . But anyway, we be1:in to r ef l ec t. F' irst we ask 
what is this puzzl ing si t uat i on anyway? Wha t would have to 
be the conditions of experience in order for us to ee t what 
we want and not find ourselves hopelessly ~:dwt in by ti1e 
I h · · h -~ : l P Vl B l S I .:. 
: waat these 
of t his bi ~ ' hole ' ? We ll, finally we thin k of 
conditions would be . How we come to thin k about 
t hese is a mys tery, for t he re is nothin~ in this s it uat io n 
I but our previous unrefle~tive . expe·r-ience a.nd this 
!' ho l e " . Tfle r e 1 :3 no s e li- t~. Ct lv lt y but v1ha t the pre viou s 
unreflect iv e ~vo lving exp~rience and this puzz li ng si tua tio 
I to gether offer us. But neverthe l ess in this st.<=.t ~ e of 11 the 
\drajJa of an evo lving experience" we think of ·wha t the 
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VT OU 1ere were no obstacle 1n our ex -
t he 
per i ence . 
II Wit h our orojection of hypo t he ~i s concerning 
condition of aff a irs in wh ich t here is no " ho l e", t he way 
i s prepared for the fou rt h step in the ana lysi s of t he 
I 
0 
I 
I ] f we fa i l t o secure t he 1r: t h r c u ~ h t h i !::' II 
hypothes i s we try ano ther . And if t his one f a il s , we try ·j 
thou ~h t - process . This step consists in our sett in ~ abou t 
·' 
establish the condit ions se t forth i n our most li kely 
hypothesis . 
:I 
ano t her a nd so on unt il we hit ~ p on one that wor ks . When 
v1 e h i t upon t h i s one , t, he p u z z l i n g s i t u a. t i on van i shes <.=~ n d 
exper i ence assumes its ri ~ hLful immediacy again . 'l'hus ~;e 
are brou ~h t around to our unref l ective ~xper i ence once 
1 more , and are now r eady to s t art out i n quest of an ot her 
~ " h ol e ", · for by the time t ho ught helps us out of one pre -
1 . d f . d. t . . ' l d i cament , t ne ol way o 1n1me 1a e exper: 1ence 1s so au 1 
II 
1 
we ca n no t ab i de in it with peace and s a ti sfac tion, be -
si ries t he strugg l e in the pr evious conflict has lef t us 
new bel iefs and t hese soon ~ in ~ us face to face wit h new 
co nflicts in our expe rience . 
The fore ~oin g is a description accordin~ t o pr a~ -
n:at is rn ., of t he situation in wh i c h t hou ~ ht arises . It 1s 
1 not meant to ~ ive a co mpl ete t heory of t hou~h t a s he l d by 
======~====================================T===-~--= 
II 
,I 
ll 
.I 
II 
I 
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the pragjJatist . W·rat it does ~ive , however, is the con-
ditions under which thouQht takes its rise . It is these 
conditions that we are especially in serach for now . So 
let us Ql~rce back at this situation and pick out ttie 
"cues" which arouse thought to activity. As seen in this 
description , there are several factors involved . T·re 
beliefs of the unreflective experience , tre puzzlin~ 
situation, the desire to get out of the puzzle, t~e 
instinct to preserve the immediacy of experience, etc. 
All ttese are the cues to thought, but the ultimate 
cne is tre break in the unity of experience . It is this 
break that arouses the thouQht - activity , but the 1~tnre 
I 
1 of t re thou!:1.ht thns aroused is determined by t ~e specific 
factors involved in the sit11ation . The whole worth of the 
1 thou~ht arises from the situation a1rd ends with the 
I situation . Thought has no power to reach out beyond tre 
: specific situation ard construct meanin~s that will abide 
\ apart from the particular occasion in which it took its 
I rise . Thus in order to understatrd the worth and meaning 
l or any thought , one would have to know the particular facts 
I 
of the eveht in which t hat thouQ~t arose . The history 
l and the meaninQ of thouQht cannot be separated. 
I 
Thus not the impressions nor the distinction 
!I 
'I II 
,
1
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I between t he kinds of connect i on bstween i mpressions are th 
· ult1n.a. te ant ecedents of thought . But rather t hs whole 
dynam i c s it u~tion in which a conflict i n experience ar i ses 
i r:: t.h~: ocea.sion of though t.. 11he po wer t o fo r m proposit io n 
about the puzzl i ng s i tuat i on , t he po~er t o ciescr i be and 
i nt erpret t he diff i cult y that causes a break i n t he con-
ti nui t y of habit i s no t due to self - ac t iv i ty of t he per -
son whose t he experience i s , but due to a comp l ex arrange~ 
riJt:: •rt of al l t. he f<::tl~tor:; of which t.h~ s t-i t uat l on i s composed 
To brin~ out more 8l ear l y these vari6us factors we will 
a t tem pt 21. f ur ther ana. lysi ;~ of t ile situation in wh i ch 
t bouf] iit appears . 
F'i r st , ti1er·e ar·e tlH::1 be li <3fe. w.h i ci1 are firrrdy f ixed 
1n exper i ence . These !l!ay be due Lo previou s Ii iOlnents of 
reflect i on , or they may be immediate i n ~0itions of f ac~s . 
They may be properly re f erred lo just a~ fac ts of ex -
per i ence. 
Secondly , 3 .. new ob.j ect. presen t s itself . 'I'i1i 8 obj eet 
1 s p!'oo l ej!at ic:l l. It. ean not be ass i rPilat.ed wi th the ot he r 
f a. c:t s of t?. }'per i enc~e . A lJUestion arise s a~:; to \'i il 0. t. it i s 
and ho; exper'ience rr:u::> t. t r·eat j_ t . 'I' his i s t he cause o f the 
c o n f l i c t , t il e 11 h o l e " 1 n ex p c r i e n u e , t rw c1 i f f i c u l t i e B t o o e 
overcome in order t.o ~Jh~ se r· v <:.J t. he unity of exper i ence. 
Th iidly , hypothes~ s are formed conc ern i ng tne disturb 
in g e lements in t he si tuatio n. It Jilay be that t hese are 
only c:oneeptions , at tempts to define t he objec:t. , such as ;-
This unknovm object. is a man , or a stump . 7'hese concep-
tions or ideas wou l d be attempts at defin i n ~ the object. in 
erws of the <nown facts of exper i ence . They may be calle 
t ne " instruments of reconstruction" . 'rhis endeavor to 
in e r prc:t t he i s turbing s le ment 111ar·ks th e pe riod of 
ref lection. lt is the real theoretical e l e ment of the 
s ituation . 
Fina lly, there i8 w!Jat some call the " Noetic I nter -
est" . Th is is tlle subject. , the kn ov1er hin,se lf, l"ut. a~:: such 
I terms carry witll them the no t ion of self - activit y , it is 
I 
l custorf!ary to i nterpret it as a need attemp~ing to relieve 
itself . It is not sufficient in i tself to perform free 
, acts , but it is a need , a purpose seekin g fulf ill ment . 
Here then we ha ve the chief e l eme!l t. s i n t he si tu-
! at.ion in whicll t nou~ lit appears . I ney a r e fixed be li efs, 
I . 
0bjeots or object yet unknown , t e ntative interpretations of 
t he unknown object , a nd finally the need c l amorir,g for r e-
lief . These four elements t.o ~et her male u~ a situation 
"in tf1e cirama of an evolving e xp e rience 11 v1 h ioh fu rnishes 
1 the dynami c..~ conditions fo r t.hoUf; ht.. The va l ue anci wort.n of 
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I 
th e thought is measured by its success i n int erpre ti ng the 
un known e l emen t in the sit ua tion so as to satisfy t he need -
e l ement . The unknown e l emen t i s not a f ragment of rea lit y 
wh ich the "·instruments of r·econs t. ruct ion" must interpret, 
but it is the li mitat i on of that particular need and it 
. 
must be transformed or reconstructed so as to fulfill that 
so 
need or else it must be Ainterpr e t ed as to show that the 
need is incompati ble wit h the rest of experience and must 
t he r ef 0r e be exc i sed , and ~ i ve place for ohher more ap -
pro pr i 3,t e needs . 
From this accotmt of the s it ua tion in wh i ch though 
emerre s and va li dates it s elf, we find no pl ace for sucl1 
t h in ~: s a s perceptions , sensationg, a s mere psychical ex -
l istences , and on t he other ha nd , meanin ~ s that have wort h 
I and di11, nit y apart from the historica l eircumstances i n wh ic 
t he y foru; one e l ement . Furt her t he r e is no pl ace fo r a 
s ynt he tic activity that bui lds up ab idin g meanin [~ s that have 
! any s i ~;n if icance apar;t fr on. the e xper i ence of w hicn they 
I 
a r e e l eTI!en ts . Eve r ythi n2 i s subo r d inated t o the "evo lving 
e:xperi f.: nce " t hat gets its exi s te nce a.nd wort h fr·or!i the 
!dynamic i nteraction of thevarious e lements . 
I Fven if we perm i t the characterizati on of person a l 
\ to t he experience we niust not a llo ~i t hat1 t ern, to indicate 
I 
I 
I 
il 
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more than "a center of experience" throu k1h which the pro-
~ ressive sta~es of evolution manifest themselves. That 
t ·tese centers are selfcon~cious means no more than that a 
part of the sit iu. tion in which a conflict amon~ the 
elerrents of experience arise, can reco~nize that a certain I 
other part of the situation exists but. that the nat t.Te of 
its existence is still uncertain. The whole situation 
forms the object of consciousness and the holding off from 
assertinQ a definite content to the situation is the sub-
jective aspect. Thus the two essential factors of self-
conscioustress are provided for, and that without resort-
in Q to the fiction of a self-active, personal intelligence 
which has the pov1er to act according to its ovm ra.t11re • 
Our estimate of the foreQoinQ theory of thou~ ht 
will take the form of a discussion of two propositions 
whi ch seem to us to Qather up in a compact way the real 
implications of the theory. 
1. Experietroe is a product of evolution. Expe ri 
erce has two aspects: one im mediate and instinctive and th 
ot~er mediate and reflective. It is cle~r that the above 
theory of thouQht e1~eavors to put the process of thinkinQ 
on an evolutionary basis . Thi~ assumes that experience 
I 
11 is an outcome of a proQressive cosmic evolution. Ae such 
it Eradually develops fro m a life of m ea ~ re reaction to en ll 
viron ment to one of a hi ~ h complex adjustment to euviro !Jll _ 
ment. As t he reaction and adjust ment between the life-
~recess an d its euvi ronment Erow 6radua 11 y more complex, 
certain forms of reflex action develo~ in the life-process 
structures which in turn have other functions. It is 
based upcn a functional psycholoQy which in turn is a 
synthesis of the ~odern structural psyc holo~y ru~ Qenetic 
psycholo~y. Structtt"Tal osycholOEY invest i ~ ates the di f-
ferent reaction - times of various structures to different 
stimuli. That is, it studies the nature atrd the li ll'l its of 
t he tension of activity produced by competing stimuli . 
Genetic psycholo~ y as defined by H. H. Ba-v1den "is a study 
of the types of experience w i t~ in which tension arises and 
\I of t he chan Qes which one type of experience (such as 
I 
I 
j i nstinct) under~ oes i n t he process of t~e ener~ ence of 
I consciousrress (i n i rr pulse), and its transformation into 
anot her type of experience ( hat i t) " . ( 1) 
Functional psychology, t herefore, traces t he 
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habits and conscious beliefs of unreflective ex erience bac · 
to a functional adjust ment bet ween tte life- process of ttle 
(1) The meanin ~ of the psychical from the point of view of I 
the functional psych olo~v . Phil. Re . Vol . XIII, No. 2. 
! 
II 
!I orQ an isrr end its environmen t . In this a.djusti~JY t rt certain 
!I 
I breaks occur. These breaks are descri bed as tension~ in · 
experience . Lan y of these tensions are overcome i nstinc t-
iv e ly and as it were immedi ately throuQh the habi t s of the 
organism . 'Pov1 ever , as the orEf; 11 i sm become s more and wore 
co mpl ex a1rd the adjust j:tehts more a1 1d more corr:r; lica ted, in -
stinct fails to overcome t he tension . In this situation 
1 the orQa nisw is thre atened with destruction . Eut at this 
1 point a savin f'J element corr·es into pl ay . This is the ele men 
I or factor of reflection . The result is as already outlined 
\ above . Thou Qh reflective t houQ ht is somethin Q in function 
lj wholly different from instin(.!t and irrpulse, yet it is 
i\ deve loped from t herr!. 
We are not concer"ed so wu ch about t he validity 
I of th is deduction of t he r eflective process as we are to 
I 
\ point ol..lt t ·rat the pr agmatists , by fallin g back on the 
I conclusions of functional psyc holoQy , br i n~ themselves to 
believe that t he y t hu s escap e t he dua lisw inherent in their 
theory of thou Qht . Put in this they are dec e ~ved . For 
I j this view cf the ori ~ in of experience flatly contradicts 
I t he ir rr.ost c he ris•red p r a~ n, atist t ene • 
, only individuals ar e real , whe re as t he 
\ 
I 
This tenet is tHat 
abov e theory rr.ake s 
individual depend upon t!ie universal for its verv 
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exist etrce. Wi t hout tl··e assurrotion of a cosmic evolution 
t here would be no particular purpose man ifested in the 
individual experi ences . Eut t ~ e rrost ser iou~ defect of al 
is t ha t they steadfastly affirffi t~at thou Qh t is wh oll y in-
stru~enta l in character end t hat it carnot have any valid -
it y apart frorr the ~pecific conditicns i n wh ich it ori ~i -
nates . But if we hold them strictly to this view of 
t h cu ~h t, then t t ev ha ve no valid i dea s about any cos mi c 
e v o 1 u t i on whatever . A 0 a i n , i f t he s t i n• u 1 us of thou g ht i s 
the particular tension in ttte particular experience, And 
if the meaning ~rd nature of thou ~ht is determined by t he 
peculiar conditions of th at situation , then they are for-
ever cut off from affir min6 t hat t houQht is the outcome of 
a ~enetic deve lopment in t he structu re of the or ~ anism . 
T~ese ar e not mere fanci es . They are real difficulties 
whic h t he pra s~atist hri n~s upon hi mse lf when he endeavors 
to unite his doctrine of t t e 0o~plete relativity of th ou~ht 
with the functional view of experience . Hence , he wust e 
I either abandon one or the other . If he abandor .s t he l atter 
t hen he is hopelessly cowrrit te d t o an insurlliountetle dualis .• 
Fxperience. 
On one ha11d he affirn•c an unreflective excerienc 
On the , L prior to and provocative of r ef lective thou Qht . 
I 
I 
I 
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other , he has thou~· tt sprin ~inQ up from this unreflective 
situation spontaneously and without any otHer justifica-
tion than that t here is a situation which baffles un -
reflective and irr med i~te experience . The only way out of 
this dif ficulty is to abandon the notion that thou,ht ie 
me re instru mental in c ha racter , and view it as an or~a nic 
part of the indivi dual experience. 
Th is means a complete transformation in t he prag-
rnat i st vie w of experiem~e . The pr agn,at i s t vi ews experienc 
fro m without and as an external obse rver . From t his po i nt 
of view his anal ys is of t he though t process is very plaus-
i ble . The whole situation is objective . There are t he 
fixed be li efs of the i rumed i a Le expe rience , t he unknown 
, object that t hrows the sn,oot h runnin g experience into con-
fus ion, the ter~ta tiv e att empts a t def inin ~ this di stur bin g 
elen;en ~ and finally there is t he "noetic interesf" t hat 
des ires the preserva tion of t he un it y of experience . All 
these are th ere just as t he pr agmat ist has descr i bed t heffi . 
And fu rt hermore , a ll are of equa l importance , for an ade -
quat e int erpretation of the s itua tion . The agent , or " noet i 
interest" woul d be mean i ngl ess l'l it hout the other factot ·s , 
\ and t hey in tur n wo ul d be unc l a i rned wi t. hou t it . ·so fro m an 
I 
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external point of view there i s no ot her explanation of t h 
observed ac tivi ty t han that t he pecu li ar arraftgemen t of 
just these factors s upp lies t he dynam ic power of the 
occasion . Finally, as t he purpose fo r which the reflect-
ive process was insti gated is confined strictly to this 
peculiar situa tion, the reflective process mus t a lso be 
confined st r ictl y to the particular situation and not ex-
tended to anything beyond . But then t ha t s t age of ex-
per i ence would be co mp l e t ely isol a ted fr om a ll ot her stag e~ 
and knowledge wou l d be conf ined t o that stage a lone . A 
mo re thoroughgoing so li psism could not be i magined . The 
objectivity is so co mp l ete t ha t it beco mes owned by no-
bociy . 
Now when , we pass fro m t he external vie w of exper · 
e nce 1n ~hich it is loo ked on f rom wit hout by the scientis 
to the interna l view in wh ic h it is cons i dered in a ph ilo-
soph ical way by the subject whose exper ience it is , the 
confus ion of the subject with its beliefs, its puz~ l es , its 
purposes and its relation to reality disappear . We no 
longer have a n exp1r ience r ent i n twain wit h i mmediate 
processes on the one hand and ref l ect iv e processes on t he 
other. Neither ( and this is t he most i mportant fact ) do we 
have indiv i dual and part icular purposes poppin~ up now and 1 
~====·==----·~============================================== 
then to be realized in the mse lves and f or t hemselves . 
But rather we have the consc ious activi t y of a purpos ive 
I intelli ge nce seeking by many means to realize an ever grow-
i ng idea l. 
Fro m t his poin t of view exper ie nce is one co n-
tinuous ever-develo pi ng process . It s purposes are practic 
and or ~ na ica ll y connected with its i dea l , but its i dea l 
reacttes out beyond its present s it uat ion into regions far 
d i stant on every side . Its environment is present not as 
i f it consisted only of the particul a r conflict wh ich 
I seemed no1 about to de stroy ~bsolutely the un it y of its 
I 
I li fe , but as a gr eat wor l d of opp ortunities crowding i n 
upon it to be 
!\ isolated need 
t by be i ng ab l e 
realized . It has no in kling that it is an 
f am i sh i ng I n a lo nely deser t and saved only 
to transform and to co mpre s s t l1e puzz ling 
~ objects to a degree tl1at will enab l e it to encomp ass them 
I 
ent i r ely and thereby save itsel f by provi ng its superior 
l stren ~ t ri or more cunnin g ability . Ra the r it kriows it self a 
I 
:connected in an organ ic way with a realit y t ha t tra nsce·rds 
l it in eve ry way. It s relation to t hi s reality i s not one 
\of a sub ject surrounded by ot be rrea lities more real and 
\rea l i n a d ifferent sense th an its own rea lit y, but i n a 
I 
lsense of a rea l communion witl1 a real it y t ha t pervade s a ll 
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things and for thaf reason connects it wit h the wh ol e 
universe . 
Now when we view exper i ence from wi~h in and see 
t he tr uth of the above remarks , t houe ht no longer appears 
to us as an instrument solely of ref l ection and as a 
temporary function mere ly to he l p us out of a "hol e '', but 
it comes to us as a deep l y i n ~ function of a conscious 
pe r son strivi n~ to realize here and now ami d the condition 
of this time and space wor l d an i dea l th at reaches to the 
et erna l. This in no way conflicts with the notion that 
thou~ l1t is a funct iona l instrument for dealin ~ with t he ~ .~ 
pract ical problems of every- day li fe . Nay , it but confirm1 
it. Thought is functional; thought is practica l; and 
thou~h t always has to do with a par ticul ar situation . And 
what is mor e , t hougt1t i s reflective and is to be under -
stood not by ignoring it s presen t conditions, but by care-
fully investi ga tin g t hese i n t he li ght of t he i dea l wh ic h 
t h ou ~ ht al ways sets before itself. 
When I scan t he history of phi losophy wi th t he 
contentions of the pra~wat ists in mind it seems t ha t about 
t he only real new fe ature i n it i s the conf i ning of t hou~ l1t 
mere l y and so l ely to the present condi tions under which it 
1 works to t he entire excl usion of all references tm t he 
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ideals of thou~h t . This is not mean t to deriy that pra~-
mat ism has been useful. F'ar fron! it . For while pragmatis, 
is a new doctrine by virtue of its ignoring the constitu-
tive idealizinC principle of thought , yet it has already 
done an i mmense service to speculation by bringing home 
more forcibly than has ever been done before the fact that 
thou gh t is functional in a practi cal way . It is a well 
known saying that teachers have to ~o clear beyond the 
tr•uth wh ich they would teach in order to get those t hey ar 
instructin~ to collie even up to t he truth . Without hesita-
tion I affirm that praglliatism has in this way done a ~reat 
service to philosophy . The fact that they are exad~ertin~ 
~ -
the trut hs which form the basis of their philosophy (for 
t hei r tenets are true and it i s only their li rJJ itation of 
truth to them that is false) has made it possible for phil 
oscphy to see the trut h of such tenets . 'I'he prag.Jiatists 
t hemselves see the be~ innings of t he ir philosophy as far 
back as Protagoras an d Aristotle . Further , others see 
traces of pragrr,a tisrE in the methods of Socrates, in the 
theories of trut h of Plato a nd Aristotle . With Kant it 
bec:omes the central doc tr·ine of his system. F'ichte n: i xed 
it with his absolutism, and Hege l b rou~ ht. it in as funda -
menta l in various places in his logic . Professor Royce 
/ .~ 
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includes a ll the pos itive side of pragmatism wit hin bis 
Absolute I dea lism, and Dr .Bowne has been expounding its 
truth for several decades . 
But the t:rue doctrines of pra§.mat i £, n!, thou gh thu 
reco ~ nized by ph ilosophers of most a ll periods , did not 
becorr:e ri Gh tly es ti mated or rather are only becon;ing ri ~~ h t 
ly estirnated since pragr:!a t.i sn! has been emphasized as a 
iriethoci. in itself. 
But 1v hile it n;ay be necessary for teachers to 
exa~gerate tne facts in order to ge t others to apprec i a t e 
t he ir full s i ~ nif icance , it is not just if iat l e to proclaim 
t .e exa~ geratio r.s ~-s t he essence or tite facts . l'lhen this 
is done such teach i ng becon;es n,ore har nt ful than useful. 
Likewise , ~hen cer t a in truths about exper i ence are not on l . 
emr-hasized to the e xc lusion of other truths, but even pro-
clai med as the only t ruths about experience , it is t i ttle fo 
a l ways concern od with experience , t ha t a rea l diffe rence i 
thou gh t makes a real difference in cond uct , and f i nal l y 
that thou Qh t. apart from experience is use l ess and not to 
-~-
1 
'I 
be r e 1 i ad u p c 1 • 8 u t p r a g Jla t i s rn i s VI r c n B i n In a k i n g t h o u g h t 
functional only in a reflective sense, in confining it ex -
clu~.i.vely to a pa rticular individucd purpose, in depl"iV i r:(: 
it of a ll worth save its adaptability to particular situC!t lo 
tions, a nd in denyi ng it t 1e p ol'iE~ r to rise ab ove pr3tsent 
cond itions and fol'u, purposes t hat involve eterna l prin -
cipl e s . Agt:A in, frotl! t lte for e ~oin (; d iseussion, it. is cl e ur 
. 
t 1at t houe ht is constitutive as well as reflective in 
c har·a oter . By this Yi eJH::an t hat th oue ht i s not n;erely an 
accident a l f unction wh i oh experience ha s someho~ hit 
upo n as the be st weans of p reservin .~ its unit.y and biolog-
ica l a cijust ment t o its environment.. . \'i e mean rat her t hat 
t hou ght is "the eur,c.re Le a nd self - conscious attitude of 
the se lf Yil1il: h !], ives to expe:r· .i. enc:e its s i gnifioacee an d 
its possi iJ lity of i n terpreta t ion". (1) Th e tension 1n 
ex peri e nce ~ hic h i s e r ed ited by p ra~ ma tism with being tl1e 
I a wc. kener of t hough t i s t hus seen to be i t s e lf t he outcon,e 
) of L h ou ~ h t . Sur e l y evolutio n \'iOl'ks i n the life-process of 
the a ni mal in an intermitt e nt way as well as in the li fe of 
a t h inkin g bein g , bu t t he t. ensions in t. he process do not 
orea t b re f lective t hou gh L. How, the n , c a n t he i i?i person a l 
I 
j situation be s a i d to be til e cre ator of reflection? \'l e eome 
I to a d iscovery of t he tension not throu ~ h an unreflective 
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ex p.Jri enee but by the con ~ titut ive acti vit y of t hought 
it sel f . The gaps in experience th a t are due to a ma lad-
ju stme.rt of the bioloei ca l fu nctions to t he environ ment 
are for the most part , at l east , brid~ed apart fro m 
r eflection. It is on l y as t he ideals of thought crea tFl con 
di tions of its own t ha t thou ght is call ed upon to he l p in 
I t he a :i.jus t rllen t. To conf i ne thou ght just to the IJ resent sit -
uat ion wou l d exclude a ll possib ilities of pro gress in civi -
i zation . Man l ea ves the savage st~te, not by r ef lecti n~ 
~ere l y on t he present s it uation i n which he finds hi mse l f 
tut by p r ojectin~ i dea ls bef ore him a nd t hus crea tin ~ r ea l 
ec n f lict~ betveen !lis presen t condi ti on and an i dea l one 
~ h ie h is not pre s ent i n t he sense of a tension I n an un -
r·efleet iv e i rrmed 1.ate e xp e rience, bu t in the sense of a con;-
struct ion of t he self and in posed upon t he se l f . These 
are t Le rea l ten s ion s in exper ienc e wh ich thou12h t is called 
I u~on t o overcon.e . An.:J wit h t hi s fact in rr.in d the purely 
I 
I 
j i nstru me nta l c l a ra.cter of t hought van is hes i nto ins i .:;.n ifi-
ca nce oo~pa r ed wit h it s const it utive charauLer . The for mer 
i s se en to be in ~eed pure l y r e la t ive and mean i ngless apart 
fron, t. he part i cu l a r co nd ition cf its existence , but the 
I l a tt er is seen not on l y to construct t his part ic ul ar con-
1 d it.ion, bu t also to construct it in accorda.nce v:ith 
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princip l es t haf connect t hi s cond itioD wi t h numer ous oth e~ 
condit ion s or s itua ti on si n a pro~ r e ss i v e r ea l i za ti on of 
a rurp ose tha t ho t on l y i nc lu des a ll t hese particular s it -
uat ions tu t a l so includes cor r espond i ng situations 1 t h~ 
purpos i ve life- process of other con sc i ous selves . 
(2 ) Th i s , of course , ra i se~ the question of t he ob-
j s c t i v i t y o f t h o u ~ h t. l'i e n a v e se e n t h a t p r· a g m s t i s m d i s -
pc 2e s of thi s quest io n v~ry readily by af fir ming that the 
who l e situat i on in tbe unreflectiv e e xper- i ence whi e h 
&rouses thou ght 12 ~h at i s meant ty t he obj ect ivit y 
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of expe ri ence. It i s to be noted that t he tern;s ' cbjectiv 1 
and • ~ub j ectiv e ' for pra gma tism have mean i n8 s only i n r e fe -
ence to experience a~d not to t hou gh t . Th ough t as t hey 
view i t cannot have such d i st i n~uis h i n~ a ~ pects . It is 
t orn out of a pa rti cular situat ion and passes away with 
thut f.i tu ation , hen c e it has no refe r·ence to anythin ~~ beyo1 d 
th<:!.t situat io n. Therefore , the tet'rrJS ' subj ective ' and 
' objec~ tiv e ' app l y only to experience as a 11hole . Th :i .;; n il 
e1ab l e us to under st and , t hen , what is meant when it is 
s a i d that t he who l e situat io n i~ the 1 ob j ecti ve 1 aspect 
and t :w unce r tOJ.ln t y of t he outcome t he ' sub .j cct.i ve ' aspect . 
Fo :- t he parti c ~Jlar pu r·po se involved ir! the situat i on all 
'I 
I 
I 
I 
II 
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Li if:: f~l.(:tor· s c f t. b:3 situat, i on stand out as objeet.s ove.r 
•· ·' •· 1. ·" t i ~ ··  e p· :::t.5 d. n..;;. ·' l'. o .L . This constitutes the ' obj ective ' ele rr ent 
of exper i enee . Thu:; the ' that ' o f t he situation is thcr·e, 
but. how t he situation is .~; oing to conduct itself, i . e . 
hov1 we ur e g:)' ng, to loo k lJpo n the 1\'dn1t' of t rw s ituat ion 
iR still in doubt . Th is uncertainty is t he ' subjective' 
f eat ur e of t he situ~tion . Thus it would be proper to sup -
pose that. when ·xp·· rien c e run s e.long ~1rr,oot. hly there i~ no 
distinction bdreen ' subjective ' 2.nd· ' o b jeet.ive ' . 11 hese 
o nly appear <:18 fac:t.or s in the· "confl i c:t,'' betv:een r·ef lect -
i V•:3 ext=•er-ience aPd i lli'red i a t e exper i ence . tq:mrt from t r1e 
tran s ition ~roc •3ss ths ex pcrierwe be l ong2. Lc it. her to t. he 
f.no v.·e :r· nor t. he kno \:n, bnt only to the 1' d rarl!c.. of an evo l v-
i n~: exper i ence" in wi1 ieh :;d l d istinctions vani~ h . 
This view of the na trtre of the ob j ec tiv!ty of 
experi ence i s put for wa r d · s a corrective of ontolog ical 
views of though t. ~uch has teen said about t he failure of 
alJ ontoloO cal systen.s t.o tr,al\ e c l ear hm; thou gh t. c:ould 
derd wit h a r ea l it. y t hc:.t. ; t. r a. n sc:e n~ s exr:.e r i e nce in a r! y sen s 
whatever . It if said that to hol~ th~t t hou~ht functions 
truly Nhe n it functions in accordance with rea lit y not 
>1r10 lly in ·o lv ed in the p<:trticu l a r ~;~tuation but r·each in g o· · 
to RJ-~ l.Jlvolvin 6 a ll ttin0s , is to bold an inexp l icab le • J , Ju F~ --
,, 
a rd vliw ll y e_r:tans.Gl e t h i n11 . An e .e rn a l rea lity , li ke t he 
1 (~ o b b l ~ r ' s i de a 1 s b c e , i s of n o u s e w li a t 6 v En· i n :-1 e a 1 i n ~ v: i t 
co ncre t e cases. Such e t er-n ;:ll anci. i dea J. t hing s a r e o n l y a 
c u~bran c e t o one dea li n( wit h parti c u l a r and e~ec i a l s it -
nat i ons . Thus no t.. fu n<5 tio nin :1 c. t. s.ll in t\ ctua l e x pe r iE~n ce 
w 11 i c h i 1 <:: s t c· o c- so 1 c 1 ~~ vd. t. h t t: e c o n c r e t e c a. s e i n hand , 
be 
t hey a re toAd i scarded as f ic t ions . 
No vi t hose lihc t hus cb j E-ct to the usel e s sne s s of 
etern al !' eo. J.i ty and id f::Ed shoes , oV·e rlook t he f act tha t 
t hey do ,not. rt:~3.k e c. l ear how thou ~H fu_ net i ons i n the cor: -
crete a nd par t ic~la r situa t i o n . 11
-VIhy y.- es we- do " 
. , . , ' • ' 
I 
t hey v: i 11 ~erha p ''· s t. nr ti ngl y rep l y . " Ev o l ut i on exp l a i ns it '· 
5ut wi1c::n we clSk titen. v;J-,at evc,J.ut i on .i s t t-.Ft t it sho ul d 
recsi vc such hc~a~~ . wo f i ~d tl1cm s t ra i gh t way l ea vi D~ the 
I 
I 
pa rL i c ul ar ~::iLu::..Licn , v. it. h i t s e:one r e t e s.nd se l f - e onsc ious 
self , it.s purti oular rnq :otoe , i t. s r..a rt i ca; J. ar t ens i on , its 
I p art i;:~ u 1 a. r 11 i n ~ L rt.\ lH ,: n t s c f r e co n s t r u o t i on " , f or a g en e r <~- J. 
I oo1wcptio n that could ne-t po2.si b l y be t Le pr-odLw t of one 
e nt i re GX[:e i enc·.E: !H! n _y L i n,es l es s tl:e ~ · r·od!.) C t uf a par t i-
1 c u 1 c.. r· s i t 1..1 <.l. t i o n • 
Eut ~ r;-J,n ti n~~ the vc..l i d i l y o f t he prs:~?JtHa ti s t 
1 v i e \'I of t. he or· i [) n of t Lou gh t , we ~J. e t no ex p 1 an f.; t i on o f 
I 
l 
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how it da.n Ylo:r k . The l aw of evo l ut ion does not. tell us 
how a n i nstinct can chan ~e i n t o an imr ul se and how an 
i rr, r~u ls e C!an deve l op into consciousness . If v.re: a llow thP 
I 
I 
pragrr,at ist. to l eave his part ieul a r i nsta.n t long enou~h to 
I say t. hc;. t. "a.n e volv ing exper· i en ee " does it e ll, we ask , , aJ 
. I 
I' 
11 
" e voJ.vi ne exper i enc~e 11 r,e r ely <Hl in s ti nc t once and t he· 
~ ~ of i ts e lf done bec~rr"' a me r e i trr-u ls e, 
I a ~a i n becallie conscious in a particul a r situation . 
and of its e lf 
"6f 
I course not
11
, Vli J.l co me the r er l y , "f or experi ence i s a ll 
~~ t. hese ~t. once. 
fl appea r as s t a~es 
It si mp l y ~ oes on and these 't ens i ons ' 
in the proeess . 11 
~ave weaR yet any exp l ana tion bow r· ef l ec.t. ive 
thou~ht CBn s prin 0 out of an unreflect iv e exper i ence? 
h , tlte reflective tho tH~h t a devel onn,ent from t he un -
r ef l ect ive expe rien ce? I f ~ o , is it still unref lect i ve 
t houg ht i n r erLiel d i s!~ u i se or has it beeon!e ~on , e t h i n~: 
:1 else er. tirely? If it has becorre s o rr . e t h i n ~j e lc e , ·:: .,e re 
I did it ~et itc n~t»re t hat cons t itutes it so~e thin ~ e lse? 
Sure l v no t from unref l ect i. ve ex·~erience fo!' l t wou l d not 
ha ve it to ~ iv e . Now i f ~e wa iv e th i s l as t s t a~ement, 
and adm i t that thou gh t d i d de vel op rrom unreflec tive 
e xoer i ence, st ill ~e a r e unahle to refra in from askin g , 
i s i hsn re f Lec tive thou dh t the s~me as unreflective 
• I 
:I 
'II 
:I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
experience , or is it truly a de ve l opment end a trens -
forn,o.Li on of it? If the l atter, t hen c:ertainly v1e CMl 
not expe0 t to li mit it to t he s ame round as that from 
v;b ic h it develop ed . And the same holds tr ue of con -
st ructiv e t hou~h t . Gran t that it is an outco we of evol-
ution, then if it i s ind eed a r ea l deve lopment, it c:annot 
be c:o mp r ehended i n the t er·n's of that f rom w h i. a h i. t. 
deve lo ped . To understand what it i s in itse l f we must 
t C:l.ke it for what it is in ext'er i ence . And v1hen we do this 
we are no t in any way a~and oning experience hut ar e onl y 
wit h d ra~i~ 0 at t en tion from unreflective experien ce i n ords 
t o dir·ect it for a wh il e to th e work of a self -c~onsciom: 
i ntelli gence . A reference to lower asnects of experience 
cannot. possibl Y he l p us in understanci. in r~ the unique ch<::.r -
acter of the hi~her aspect. Now this i s just w~at is done 
when we loo k to evol ut i on for an explanc>,tion of our se lf -
consc i ous life . When we see this we find t hat the praA-
mC:l. tist view of thou~h t reduces to th e particular situation 
in wh ic h the paremPtist fin ds himse l f wh en he offers to 
ex r:b,in 11is theory . The result of thi s a~r!unien t is that 
in steAd of correct i n ~ the bl under of ontoloe ical systems 
of t hou;1ht , prac 1.at · sm prov es U1a. t t hey n,ust in son1e way 
1 be true , or e lse t he p ra~matist hiir,self is floatin g around 
.I 
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on a little island in t.he sea of the Unknowable whose 
shores are limited by his particular and immediate ex -
perienee . 
Thus we fjnd the prag1r:atist ref err·i ng to th e 
doctrine of evolktion in order to secure both the dvnamic 
alhd the objective.factors of thou k"~ ht . t~nd in doin ~ thi s 
we find that he is co ~pe lled to ~ o beyond his own view of 
t he strict. relativit y of thou~~ ht . l?ut to show that the 
pra~n,atist ' s c;,ccount of the ob,iectivity of t.hou~ht is a 
failure does not ~ ive any insi f ht into the real nature of 
' thou ~Lt, 1 s objeet.ivity . And sinee orM.mlitism took its 
rise chiefly as a reaction a~a inst the so-called failure 
of ontolo ~ ical sys t ems, it will be nece ssar y at this 
poin t for us to endea vor to n;ake dearer· the meanin g of 
I 
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objectivity from our point of view of the nature of thought . 
ne have already ac know l ed8ed our a~reement wjth 
the oria~matist view of thou~h t thaE rules out realism. 
.. } ..... 
The obiect of t hou~h t is not somethin~ indepe ndent of a ll ·~ ·-
t hou ~ ht, and further it ~e t s its proper tie s and relations 
for t h ou ~ ht chiefl y through the constructive wo r k of 
thou ~ ht itself. But we refuse to ~o on with pra( m~tl sru 
when it asserts that both thou~ht and the object of thou~ht 
get their fu ll meanin g from the particular situat ion in 
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exper i ence . This we h, ve seen !'educes to c;bso l ute so.lip -
s1s ro . Yet we do hold that: thou ght is t he eent.rel pr in -
ci ple of experience, That thin gs have their existence 
in t he thou~! t sphere . W~at a thi n~ is fou nd to be i n 
e x p e r· i e n c e t. i 1 s t: i s w h a t t. h "' t t. h i n g i s i n it. s e lf . T h e r \':' 
i s no extra - mental nou~enon bask in ~ beh ind the thin ( 
whieh subs tantiates o ut· ref e rence of our coneep tion of the 
t h i!! ( to s orH:::thirH~ beyond us . 
The question ri ~h tly a rises here , Wha t is t he 
si~nificance of th is r· efer·e nce of tho·· ~·, ht. beyond it se lf'? 
T' h o: q u e '2 t i on b r i t: g s us r i ¢ h t, t o t h e co r- e o f t he nat u r· e o f 
LIJOLlO: t. f-low can t. hou~. bt. be constructi ve in natu re F.l.nd 
qt,ill tt? vali0 beyond t. he eondilion in which it is ec,n -
~·. tructcd? Ou r ansVJer to t h i s is t. ba t it i£ tLe neces s a ry 
nature of thoutht to be valid beyond it se lf . This nature 
is not an eo ~ iri cal f act, if by en emp irica l fact we mea n 
Hdl · e t. h i nl~ tr.at. v;e ge t t h r·o ut~. h sense - ex pe rience . 6u t it 
i 2 en e~p iri ca l f ac t ( a feet as duely vind ica t 9d as a ny 
f~:w t . of s e nSE' - expe r- ience ) when emp irical is tal< en in the 
se: n~ e of be in £- subst.antie.lred by exre ri e noe . How do I know 
Lli l'• t fir e is hot'? Su r e l y not Leea. use hot. is sot1 e tl; i n ;;:; r e&.. l' 
in i t sel f apBr t fron a ll experie nce , but just beeause 
. 1 
11 ho t 11 is somelhin ~ llt a. if, is rel atri ve to exper·ience yet 
-l':l 
·ce l 1'J,tive in a 
I 
sense that experience under certain cond i tio ~ s 
I 
w i 11 a, l way s t e s t i r v t o t !1 e f act w h i o h we t e r m " hot 11 • 
tne 
Thus I 
e venAtrut hs that are re l ative to sense- experience and I 
wl1 ich have no mean in g apart from exper ie nce , still have a 
universal and necessary character th at transcends any part 
icular si tuation in experience . We kn ow that fi r e i s hot 
because i t gu i des us to certain acti ons. And in this prag 
matism is ful l y ri ~h t . fut we know that fire has a l ways 
been ho t f or human experience and will always be hot not b -
I 
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cause we are gu ided to a certBi n a ctio11 in a particular si -
uation , but because we are rational and therefore un iversa I_ 
i zin g, thinkin~ subjects . How we can be a. universalizin ~l ln-
telli gence we do not know . But that we are is a fact of 
:::::1:::::~.:~ ::1::·::-::::·::·:::1::.:: :::·~.::t.:f ml 
trustworthy as sense- experience . 
Now pragmatism has done a great service here to 
philosophy , but on e which a lso breaks the oands wh ic h hol d 
truth wit hin the li rr1its of pragma tis m. 'Ihis serviceis tl1a I 
she has shovm indis putably lhat expe rience n:eans rr,or·e tilan 
knowleuf~e baseJ on <\ Cllse t..·en:.eplion . ixperiano!3 ~: ~:ts its 
rr: e a, n i n s), as l:.J u c r1 f ro m o u r " w i .L 1 t o h E: 1 .i e v e 11 i:l. B i t doe s f l' o m 
our ~'ower to pe r·c~i ve . 'rho for me r is <i3 H!UCh of 2. n <>mpir-
ical fact as t he latter 1s . And it i s as r;;uch of a 
11 
I 
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power as t he l a t~ er . I n fact , it is more pr i11,ary Liw.n 
t he latter for nothin ~ can n!ake us pe r ce ive wha t v1e do not 
Vl ill to perceive . Without e rr. pnas1.z i ng this l ~st f<:l.-c:!i , l et 
us aff irm vit h a ll emphasis that t he inner po~e r i s just 
as much a power and j ust as si ~n i fican t as t he so - called 
externa l sense . 
Now let us return to t he subject un der discussion 
I 
viz ., that the universalizin 0, and objecti viz.i.ng eharacter 
of thou ~. h t i s an emp irica l fac t . 1'h inl<ing , p··~~ r: : <lt i sm 
lias shown , i s a prac tica l act ivi ty w ho ~e ai m i s to t'ealize 
a part icular need , purpose , or to relieve a tension foun d 
in experience . The need , pur pose , tension , is a g iv en 
fact , a mere datum as muon so as any fact of sense exper i -
enoe . One has as good an emp ir i eal stand i ng as t he 
other , l F: t us adir: it , t hou gh it can be ~~h ovm t hat a fact 
of sense- exp3ri ence ge t s it s si ~ nif ican oe by i~ s re l a t ion 
to a need or purpose . Bu t here as ~ i ven cia t a , as ffier · 
" bru te" facts trey stand on equal terl:1l s . Eoth li r e 1n a 
senbe i ndepend~nt of oul' rr : ak i n~ , in t ha t WE find t.he Jn. Th 
co me to us rro rr' out t he depths . Now it is t :1e wor :< of 
tr. 01u n' t •o satl.P fy tnis need, re a li ze this "t·urpose , r e li e v 1 g , V OJ 
th i s t ens ion in exper i ence .. C.u t i n orcier to Lt O Lhis , the 
need , pur pose, t ens io n &Just be kno'fln . Tltis I think no one 
i 
I 
,: 
r 
I 
I 
vould deny . Of course , it m~y be kn own only vagu8ly and 
partifally . The question ar ises not about the need but 
I 
~ t t h b . t j ' t t ' • • ' f' • t t • n t • I aacu .. e o JSC ~ na s anas 1n Lne way o 1 s s a lE tac 10 • 
~ere i::: \•;here U1e pu.zzl in ( part of the situation enters . 
I n other words , if we do not rec.ogn i ze the clmracter of t. h 
need at all 20 that '/,' 8 :1re perfect l y he l ples:2. 1 11 its pres -
er:ce v:e a r e ln so far besi dej ovsselves and are judged 
r;.bnorrl.!a l. Let LiS repeat that t.lJi s aoes not n:ean that 'Ne 
know the need thorou~ hl y but only that we know t hat it is 
and what its general charac~ter is. 
I ~h en we co me to fulfill this need , realize tr1is 
I purl?ose , we are forthwith carried beyond ourselves. Hov; 
\. tbis rr. a~t be , we do not know , but t hat we are we cannot 
I 
I 
deny . As t nll y c~ s we have a need wh ich demands satisfacti 
so truly we are carried teyond ou rselves fo r that. satis-
faction . This bein ~ carr i ed bey ond ourse lves i s a f~ct no 
lesR ~ iv en t han t he need it self . If we say we will no t be 
carried bey on d ourselves, th en t he need per s i sts and we do 
11 net fn lf i 11 it. If 'e say t nab< we wil l not ~ o beyond our-
,1 s e lves to r e c> l.i. ze our· purpose tLe purpGse re mains un -
l realized. Ther·e is no escape fron, t.his goin g bey ond our -
lselves a nd st ill fulfi ll in ~ our pur poses . And th i s is 
w11a t we mean , when we say t hat the objectivity of thought 
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1s an em~ir i cal fact . It is a fact t hat expe ri ence 
it we l f ( ives us . And to doubt it is to doubt expetiance 
Bu t tt 1 i s ~ it will r ead il y be seen, reco~nizes t hat expcri -
ence is made of someth i ng e l se bes i de s dat a of sense-
Yet we have not fully account ed for the va li d-
it y of t he objec tivit y of t hou~ht . The f act that we do 
beyond on the prese nt need , purpose to satisfy i t , noes 
not const itut e a jus tific s tion f or the objectiv it y of 
thou.~_~ ht . 'rh i s tr,ay r11ean onl y that we succeed in gettin~ 
our needs and purposes fulfiLLed and realized . l\e sal ito.-
f act ion of this, as t he prag_ n:ati s t s say , n1ay be t ne only t l_ t, 
of the vali dity of thou ght •. ~ ' urt her do we not uOilllllit our -
selves to t hi s position whe n we say t ha t the object of 
tllOU>)ht ~)e ts its si 2nificance fro rr! tile cons t ructi ·.q i'iork ~ ~ . 
of t hou~ n t itself? I f we mean t by t hi s t hat t he object 
vas ent ire l y and wholl y a construction of thou~h t , t hen I 
I t hi nk v:e woul d be co mm i tted to t hi s 
I remains t nat our constructionof t he 
std.ement . but t he fa c 
object i s not a con-
struct .i on of s on1et hi ng out of nothin (; . 'The ch 2. racter of 
, tha t someth in g out of wh ich we construct t he ob,ject of 
I i thou ght "e a r e bound to aff irm i s no t son,eth i n!l who ll ~ 
I f or e i g n t o t h o u ~ h t , b u t so rr, e t h i n g i n t n e s phe r e of t h o u ~ h t 
--
==-=-=-==~~=~=-=-===*' ==============================================================~===·~~~~ l 
jl 
I 
because it can enter into the work of thou Qht and thus 
satisfy it s pur poses . 
~ ' o r instance out of v1hat do we ccnstruct i deas of 
eolor? An e xamination of the process of knowin g tells us 
t ha t we bui l d up our ideas of co lor fro ffi af fections of t he I 
! 
I sensib ilit y due not to the existence of colors beyond us , 
but to a certain law of activity . But our examination I of t be process of knowing leaves us with the oonviotion 
i! tha.t the ob ject of thought i s tru1y a " constr-uct" of our 
1! o ~m n!akin g. The c e rt.o.in lav: of acti vity is not color, 
" 
\ n, C'LO if '118 ooul d perceive it just as a l aw of activity our 
aesthet ic sense of nssd would remain unsatisfied. The 
11 object tiH:~.t sat isfies our nee d in t.his C\aSe is tr ul y a i . 
II I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
II 
construction of our own activity. ffiut the poi nt in quest io 
:1 is t lt i:~ , n·;.M:.ily , ths.t. the construction is built up from 
I 
I 
1! sorr,et.hin fi. c1.part from outselves and wbieh we find . The 
·I object is not a.par·t from us for this is our own cionstructio1 
I 
1
· but the incwntive to it s construction is apart from us . 
!1 'l'!1 is I believe is the truth in Ka 1t ' s saying that 11 ttle 
II 
:1 objed, is therefore yours Lo construct , out not yours to 
ll crea.t. e 11 . 
~~~ bear i ng of this notion . 
8ut it is easy tG over - c:r:pbas ize the rea li s tic 
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II Let us ta.ke another exan.ple to see if we cannot gel 
-=~=~r=================-~==-~-~r===-
' i ~ 
clear on this point . An instructor presents an argument 
to a class of students . I1is pre sentation of the r:•rfiument 
may be the occ<;.E·.lon tor t he students Lo :~ Po. ~~p his thought , 
but it iu evid8nt. ti·Hi.L the s tudent: wjl1 >-~ 't"B.sp t he thou ( ht 
~ ~ • :::r 
on l y j f ice CO!!Struots t.he er s un;ent for h i mself in his OVID 
t. iw nfSht. The :3rgument thus becomes an a,r g ument for the 
student only gs he mB.kas it for himself . 1'he coge nt rea.s -
onin ~ of the instructor would not be an argumLnt for one 
who refssed to think it for himself . Here a gain ~o see 
t hat the object o f one ' s t hou ~ht is his own oo ne truction . 
Bu t in this case 8.fla in it is not o f h is own crea,tion. 
t~ow what VH:l ~i2h to po int out is, that. it would be 
i~ r on i; for· a real i s t, t o 1>: a i n t a.i n t hat t he t hou gh t of t he 
a.rg.ument i'la.S something r eal in itself that de termined t he 
thou~ht in t he student's n; ind . No , the thou t, ht ciid not 
e xi s t for the student until he cons tructe ci it for !:iniself . 
What then , d i d exist or 1•ati1er wha l:. .,,, a s r,he stimulus that 
aroused the student to consl:.ruoL the argu~ent ? Th is at 
first s i ~h t e.nd for ~· opule.r tho u ~h t, is too e vident to be 
i n<~uir·ed i nto. i\nd Li! e answ e r would no doubt, be th a t 
it was tlw v10 r· d :.s , ~et"' ture:;;, i r. tona.Lions, a.cc e nts , facial 
expr·essions, etc . of the instruc~tor . Yes a11d no . For hav 
' 'fi e not just ssen t.he>. t t.he se mi gh t not be e. stin;ulus t0 the 
stuJe nt ~ho r ef used to think the ar~ument for himself? ThE 
stin,ulus mus ~, be m0re tha.n thiB . It rr,ust include , also thE 
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int e rest , des il:·e , pur·pose of the student as well as the pe 
for mance of the instructor. And so the quest ion of stimu-
Ius is afte r a ll a complicated one . The realist we ha ve 
seen is wron g , an d non we must say t ha t t he absolute ideal-
ist. ( v;ho makes t he des ire , need , purpose, in itself the 
sti ~ulus) is no less in the wron ~ . The realist i s entirely 
wrorH~ for the thou (; ht has no ex istence for the student 
till ne t hinks it for hi mself . Th e ~tso l ute idealist is 
wron ~ for the ne ed , des ire , purpose , is only ha lf t he 
trutr1 . T!te l atter n,ay put in a rejoincier here and aff irm 
suppos iti on bu t. t hat it. l S ruled out 1 11 t his case by our 
hyp othesis which is not a mere fancy but justified by 
experience . 
The true view of the stimu lus i s one that in -
clu~es boU1 the desir· e s , tioed , purpose , of the student and 
the i ns trumen t a l function of t he performance of t.he i n-
struclor . To see clearly t haf the realist is ent irely 
\'i r on ~~ , we 1nust unde r stand the nabcure of this instrumen t a l 
I 
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fuoc ion . ~e say that it consists 0 f speech , faci a l ac tion· , 
excla mations , bodily move n!ents , e tc . But t his does not ~ ==============~F=============================================================~+========= ---
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~; ire an adequate vi ew of its nature . We mus t aff irm that 
back of these features there i s . thou ~J. hL.. Only as they are 
the expressions of thou Q,!it can they becon,e instrumental 
functions as stilliuli for ether thou~ ~t . 
Now we are ready to apply this to thouk_;ht in 
&:;ene n ,l. 8y t hought in i5enera l v;e do no~ mean abstra,ct 
thinldn ~. , hut only all part ic ula.r ob jective thir1king . 
And we had reached the point in our discussion of t he 
vali d ity of the object iv ·ity of thou~h t whicn Y'b.i l:;e.J the 
4'1estion of the nature of tr1af out of wr1i c l1 or· in tile 
presence of which the ffi ind constructs its own objects of 
t hcn;:)' L And we have seen tha!E t.t1 i s is tv;ofol d ; first, 
c'- need , desire , purpose , wh i ch is a give n fact in t he ex -
perienc:e (this ~ iven fact may ta ke t he forrn of a n,ere g ivet 
" brute" f~ct of exper i ence , or it n,ay in turn be the C!on -
struction of our thousJ,llt ), and second ly, a n in~leper. d ent fa 
or back of which 1s not s cn:e extra- JJiet.tal , hi.lf![1ish ~ubstan 
but thou gh t i tself . In t he dbove example , i t i s evi dent 
t hat the pe rforn;a!rce of the inst.rm~toi·· coulci not have been 
an inst!·umental factor i n the tl1 inkin :;; of t JJG st.ud'9nt , if 
there !lad been no though t baed< of it. Me r e noise cannot 
be an instrumental funetion in t h ou ~~ ht .. The applieation 
I 
I 
I 
to the ob,jec:tivit y of t.hoLl~h t lS plain . The stimu lus to I . 
L---
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thouQht is at least partly indepe!rdetrt of our own thoul?.ht 
but not of all thouQht. It is somethin~ whose ex isteHce 
dep~rds upon thou~ht. All our objective thinking finds 
its confirmation in this way. In re~ard to our knowled~e 
of nature, this is preeminently true. Professor Bowne in 
his recetrt book on Personalism has stated this in a most 
admirable way. Pe says: 
"In the interpretation of an inscription which 
I miQht discover, I can interpret it only as I have the 
key in myself, and it is eaually evident tfiat interpreta-
tion presupposes that the inscription has rational meaning 
lt would be hopeless to attempt to understard 
random scratches. The same is true in the interpretation 
of tHe sense siQns by which we reach the knowledge of 
nature . The mind must have the key in itself, but there 
must also be an objective order and fixed meaninQ as the 
presupposition of interpretation. Otherwise, we should be 
seeking to understand mere noises or random scratches, 
which wou ld be absurd. Wh en this thought is carried out it 
implies an objective rational order parallel to our 
subjective thinkinQ. As speech implies a mind at both ends 
of the process , so knowledge under our human conditions 
I 
! 
equally implies a :rr·ind at both ends". Then, after refer-
rin ~ to the empiricistic claim "that the sersation is all" 
and after showinQ that this view when taken 3trictly 
implies t he phenomerality not only of thinQs but otter 
persons as well, and therefore reduces to solipsism, he 
shows t he futility for knowledge of Mill's doctrine 
of ma tter as the 1 permal!etrt possibility of setrsation', in 
the following words: "If it ("permanent possibility of 
sensation") were permahent in time and space it would be 
very like a reality instead of a mere possibility. I£ 
it be said to exist only in consciousness we are embar-
rassed , rememberinP. that there are many consciousnesses, 
and we need to know in which one it has its seat, and 
a lso how there can be any co mm on system of experience 
at all on this view. This difficulty recurs in all 
phenometral systems, and there is no removinQ it until 
we plant behind the phenomenal system, sensational or 
ot herwise, a Supreme I~telli gence whi ch man ifests his 
t ho uQh t t hrouQh it and thus fou~ds that objective unity 
I of the system of experience which is presupposed in all 
\ our kn owin Q". (1) 
I Thus we find that experience confirms neither a 
I 
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realistic nor a. sub1.ectivistic interpretation of the ob-
li'ectivity of thou ~h t. ¥Hen we not only analyze the proces 
of knowin~ . but also consider the nature of the product of 
thou~ht, we are brouQht inevitably to theistic i dea lism. 
Our thinkinQ is aroused by external sti muli8.nd these stim 
li can be nothinQ other than the expressions of thou ght 
t hemselves. Now this view excludes entirely t he notion 
that t here is an existetrt reality rigidly fixed and com-
pletely finished standinQ before us ready to force itself 
upon us and to which our thou Qht must ~bsolutely conform 
in order to be true. With this notion Qoes also the ob-
jection that if the objects of thou Qh t are its own con-
structions, then there is no warrarlt for the o b~fective 
validity of thou~h t. This objection presupposes that ther~ 
is a ready-made reality and t t at we know it or else there 
coul d be no auestion about the objects of our thouQht 
faili n~ to correspond with it. Now when we reflect upon 
this presupposition its futility becomes apparent at once. 
And we are left with the truth that all t he reality which 
can possibly have any relation to our experience is that 
which exists in the thouQht sphere, or in other words , ex-
ists as the instrumertal factors for thou~ht and the ex-
pression of thouQht. We have no way whatever of tnowinQ 
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that there is any reality apart from experience. Thus to 
assert with realists that there is somethine apart from 
thoueht existin~ in its own riQht, is pure doQwatism . To 
way, on the other hand, with praematists that thoueht is 
wh olly . instrumental and relative in character is to man -
ifest a very superficial view of the real nature of ex-
perience. Thou~ht is not a d~u~ ~X ma~bina that somehow 
comes forward to save the unity of expe rience in a time 
of need, but it is the central principle of experience 
which works in and throuQh all the factors of excerience 
unifyin Q them and buildinQ up meanines which are objective 
ard common to all thinking bein~s . When thou Qht has thus 
systenatized , universalized, and objectivized the facts of 
expeeience, then this Hi~er experience becomes the sole 
test of the validity of thou~ht. But this experience is 
not to be identified with the data of the serses. It is 
a construction of a self-active intelligence workine in 
commu nion with otr}er self-active intelli~ences and all 
dependin~ on a hidden power that is both i mmanent in t hem 
and transcendent beyond them. Thie, the nature of thou~ht 
clearly vindicates when it is considered in its true natur • 
But this relation of thouQht to an underlyine 
~ti mulus makes clear the fact that a universalizin g 
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principle is functicninE in the thouoht of individual 
experiences . I t is this functionin~ of thou~ht that is 
ma nifested in its tendency , previously mentioned , to al-
ways reach out towards an ideal beyond its present status . 
We offer no furt her explanation how th ou ~h t can do this s 
save to call attention to the fact of experience that it 
does . At~ thus we see that a careful study of the process 
of knowing , of t re c·taracter of ' the stimu l us of thouRtlt, 
a~d the constructive nature of thought in buildinQ up 
its own objects of knowled~e . brinQs us to a confirma tion 
of the fact that the objective function of thouQ ht is an 
empirical fact . Therefore, when one questions t he ob-
jective validity of thou Qht , he is auestionin ~ t he reality 
of experience . But to question the reality of experience 
is t o question t he very data en wh ich we must stal !d even 
to question anyt hinQ . To persist in this shows a prefer-
elrce for irrationality which has no place in philosophy. 
Brownin Q' s view is more philosophical : 
"Oues t i on, 
answer p res u ~pos e 
T.wo poi nLs ; t!1a t t ile L !1 i n~~ itself wh ich 
_quGs ti ons , an swe 1· s , - .i.§ , it knows ; 
As it also knows the thing perce ived outside 
itself , - a force 
Actual ere its own beginnin~ , operative through 
its course , 
Unaffected by its end , - that this thing li kewise 
needs rnust be ; 
Ca ll this - God , t he n, ca ll that - sou l, and 
both - the only facts for ilie ." 
='--- =-=-=-===!!=== '======================-=-=================== 
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Pragmatism and Truth . 
It is a wel l known fact that th e lliost falliiliar 
words are the most difficult to define . Popular thinkin g 
is satisfied with very indefinite conceptions . Terms are 
Futther , such terms often gather about the mse lv es c lusters 
of sent i ments , ~roups of prejudices , and s ystellis of be -
liegs that shield t hem from crHieism •. E:specially is this 
true in the reli gious field . Many words , such as "fdth", 
" gr·a.c:e" , for ~ iveness ", "salva.tion ", etc . sta.nd for va.gue 
conceptions , as anyone wi ll scan see when he undertakes 
to ex?la i n the terms , yet any criticisru of them is resente 
wi t h a ~ reat show of earnestness and determinatioh . , .. r:er·e 
their defenders asked to vindicate such resentment , t hey 
, would in all probabi lit y refer to the sacredness of t he 
conceptions and for the rest appeal to sentiment , and the 
' a.uthority of the past ". 
But reli ~ ion is not a lone in this respect. 
The same tendency is to ~ e found in philosophy . 8specia ll 1 
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1s this so with intellectualism. A number of ter~s glide 
from the moGths of intellectualists without carrying much 
concrete si gn ificance and without adding much to intel -
li gent thinking. However , the terms are held in as much 
affection, reverence, and if possible, more devotion, by 
many speculators than reli gious people accord to their 
time - honored terms . It is true , indt.;e ci. , that philosophy 
is n!ore Clritical tha.n reli g ion , but the criticism is 
usually directed a~ainst the other fellow's views . Certai 1 
conceptions are separated from all contingent eleruents 
and are then said to possess in their own ri gh t eterna l 
significance . This s i ~ nificance is too lofty to be es -
presse'i in concrete instances and must ther·efore be ex-
pressed only in terffis of itself. When such conceptions 
I arc seve red froru the actual experience of individual 
persons t hey become as dry bones in whi ted sepulchres . 
It is wi t h t he nse of such terrJ!S as these tl1at intellectu-
allsm a ttempts to exp lain life . 
As a reaction against this tendency in irrtellect -
ualiem , pragru~. tism is a ttempt ing to explain the entire 
a:ea.nin~ of a.ll philosGiphical conceptions in practic:al term~-
1 It t a k e s t he v i e \'I t h a. t t he IE ea. n i n g of a concept ion i s it s 
consequences in ter ms of exper i ence . Th is method is 
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spoken of as being simple and free from all a~b i g uities . 
However , a great confusion , as we will see later, is 
b rou~h t into their discussions through the failure on 
their part to assi gn a definite ffieaning to the term 
experience . One pragmatist confi ues t he term to beliefs 
that have been ver·if'ied by ~~~~~B i bl ~ .. nxper iences .§Qlll~:ah~r: 
wi·lich somebody' s "ideas have copied" . b"or the most part, 
ot her pra~matists use the term without a tte mpting to 
explain it, taking it for ~, ranted that there is no 
question about i ts mean i nd . But passin~ by t his laxity 
in pragmat is m, we will take up their account of the time -
honored conception of truth . 
v:e con1e now to the sLcategic point 111 pragmr~.t i sn~ . 
Its account of truth sets forth at once its value and its 
limitations as a philosophy . To understand pra~matism , 
t he refore , it is necessary to comprehend thoroughly its 
theory of truth . Let us then begin l'; it.b the pl:'a:~n.atist 
ana l ysis of truth . Intellee:t~alisnJ is accused of having 
11 etherealised 11 and " ' epersona.lized" truth. Ey t his is 
ll!eant. that trut h had become something so ideal that it 
remained above t he reaoh of hurN3.n persons . T'hus ;·, ith inte 
l ect.ua.lists it is a.bove eritieisn1 and beyond all analysis . 
It is one of those terms rhe ntioned above tha.t are too 
\I 
I 
tl 
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sacred to be sub j ected to analyt i c i nterpreta t ion . It 
enfolds its !lieB. t!in ~ within itself and must be taken 
for just what it is without further ado . In the words 
of Professor Ja.rn es , "1'he ~ re a t assumption of the intel -
l ectualist s is that truth means essentia l l y an inert 
static relation . Wh en you ' ve ~ at your t rue idea of 
I 
1 anyth i n ~ , the re ' s an end of the matter . You ' r e i n pos -
1: se 2s 1on ; you hllQ l! ; you hc:we fulfilled your tilinkin ~ 
,J 
aestin.y. 11 
To s how t he error In this view , p rag~atism sub-
j ects t he conception of truth to a eritical ana l ys is . 
It is poi nt ed out in ·the first pl &c e that trut h IB a 
property of i deaB . Its use is a hab i t peeuliar to n:an: a 
hab it whicn he s haDes neither with the animals nor with 
' infiniL e intelli r, ence ' .. As be in g a habit pecu liar~ t o t1 1e 
huuw.n 111ind , it, ciepetrd s on psycho logica.l conditions just as 
t he percept ions of ' red 1, ' sweet 1, ' ha.r· ' ; etc. do . ~' u.r -
t ite r , just B.s these a. r·e rr ! e , min ~ l e ss apart frat:, t .1eir 
psycholog ical ori gin , so t he conception of truth is mean-
ing less apart from i t s specific ori ~ in and indi vidual 
develo p nH3 n t. • 
Th is does n ctm ean , as I understatrd pra.Qmat isn' , 
t ha.t truth i s somethin g .perceived by a speci a l sense, l i ke 
( 1) Pragmati s~ , p. 200 . 
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!I r ed through t he . ~ enB(-3 of si ~ht , bu t rather t ha t it is a 
I 
' 
product of the mental - process and may be applied to any 
i deas of the mi nd . On t his poi nt Mr. Sc hiller says : 
" As be i ng a specific peculiartity of t he human mind , 
the conception of ' trut h ' seems closely ana.lo €~ ous to that 
of ' good ' and of'beaut if ul' , wh ich seem as nat urally 
to pos se s s ant it he tica l pred i ca t es in t he ' bad ' and t he 
' u~ly ' as t he ' tr ue ' does in t he ' false' . And it may be 
antic.ipated that when our psycholo~ y has quite out grown 
the mate~i al istio pre jud ices of its adol escen ce , it will 
pro bab l y regar·d ai.l these habits of judg ing ex.Ier i ences as 
just as d is~inctive and ultima te features of me ntal 
process as are t he ul ti ruate fac t s of our percept ion. In 
1 a sense , therefore , the pred icat ions of ~ ood and ' bad ' , 
' tr ue ' and ' false ', et c ., may t ake r ank wit h t he exper i enc s 
of "swee t ', ' r ed ', ' loud ', etc ., as ultirr1a te facts that 
need be ana l yzed no further " . ( 2 ) 
I n this quotation , we see how. much emphasis prag 
~atism puts upon t he psychologi cal conditions i n its con-
ception of truth . It has been cus to mary i n ptJ ilosopl!y 
to consider t he conception of trut h as lo~ ica l entirely 
and t herefore , to have a rueanin~ apa rt from it s ori g i n. 
But this i s just t he feature of truth t haf pragma tism 
Stud i es in Humanisn;, p. 143 - 4 . 
discards . I do not ~ather from t his that truth is abso-
lutely inseparable from its genetic conditions, for prag -
matists speak of ' funded truths ' , but th a t it gets its 
lliean in g in this way and has no othe r meanin~ than that 
which it does ~e t in this way . It is , however , t o be 
noted tlmt 'funded trut hs ' are merely truth s in col d stor-
age , or po tent.ial truths and t ha.t it is more in keepin~ 
wit h pra~mat.ist vie ws to t hin k of these as ' facts ' a.nd 
not ' tr·uths '. 
In the third pl a.ce , truth is an evaluation of 
assettions . This i s the unique characte rist ic of truth . 
The re is np disa~reement between pra~mat.ism and intellect. u 
a lism on this point . 6oth a.ff irm that trut h iu:~.s reference 
to oue ,judgments . And as referl'in~ to jud~~llients it 
evaluates t hem . Some judgwen ts are tr ue and some are 
false. Wha.t is meB.nt by this is the "gr eat divide 11 be -
tw een pra.grna tism a.nd int e ll ect.ua l isn ~ . The l at ter insists 
t hat it is agreement with reality , wh ile the former aff irm 
t ha t it is practical usefulness . This difference be t ween 
t he two views will come up later for a fu ll er discussion . 
Bot h vie ws hold t hat truth is an evalua tion of pr opos i -
tions and t hat is the poi nt to be brou~h t out at t his ti me 
In t he next pla.ce , pra~rJJaL i srr, erq:.has izes the 
-97-
a.n,b i guiLy of Lhe coneept i on of trut.h . rl'hou gh truth i s ar 
evaluat i on of propositions it is used t.o include proposi -
t i on s t ita. t o n l y c l a i 11! t o be t rue a. s VIe 11 B. s propos i t i on s 
tJH:J.L have been validated a.s true . Now th i s t ·.'/Ofol d use 
of trut.h is the source of mueh ru nfus i on . If all propo -
sitions that c la tm to be tru e ~ere rea lly true , t hen 
trut h wou l ti Ge as si~ple a matter as pe rception . But this 
i s l:ot. tne case vdth concret e !mowing . It is tru e t hat 
e very as sertion i nt ends to bff i rw the truth , but we f in d 
t hat ntany of our i nte ntio ns miss the n r C~.r· k . Only afte r' 
they ha ve been proved can they rank as actually true . 
'fh is an.b i gu ity in tfle aoncept i on of truth can never be 
overlooked . And as every asser t ion cl a i ~s to 6e tr ue , and 
exper ience t eaches us that SO!r!e , yea , rr!any , ·;.re not true , t 
1s perfectly evident tnat we have lo ~ o be yond the mak in g 
of t he asser t i bn t o va l i da te it . Df course , we mi ght loo k 
' about u.::; for son,e fundamental pr·oposiLion and t hen 1ueasure 
up all our a·sertion with it , or cieduce a~sertions from it 
and hold that all others assertions wa ul ~ be false . In 
this way ne CJl i ~n t bu ild up a formal systen, of truths , but 
t hey wonild be void of practical si l;!, nificance . Lo 5~ t. : has 
de vote d much of its ti me J USt to t h i s kinci of ·iork , s.nu so 
it has s e ve red itself i'l'Oll! ac;tucd concrete know ! ng. 
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Now pragrHtti srn hs.s seen t he utter futi lity of 
tl1is f orm~l and impersona l procedure in the verification · 
of assertions and has ri~htly lifted up a hand a~ain st it. 
Instead of meas urin ~~ assertions wit!J one B.nother· accordin!~ 
to the l aw of contrad iction, pra~matism goes behind the 
assert ion to the concrete situation in which it was made 
and hopes to f i nd t he test there . The assertion will t hen 
be judged by its adequEJ.CY to n,ae t the demanas wh ieh t he 
situat io n i~poses upon it • 
. I 
Th is br in(;s us to t ht: fiEa.l step in the pr agma t -
i st ana.lysis of the conception of tr·util . 1'his is tnC:lt 
truLh is t eleo l ogical i n Ci d~. r acte r. 1 t is not an end 1n 
itself so much as i t is a means or in~trument for the 
r econst r uc tion of experience ~ If our i deas 1n a concrsL e 
situation he l p us to preserve t hs inte ~r it y of experience 
t hey are cal l ed true i aeas . 5ut t he i ieas thus ~risin~ 
11 have a definite purpo::;e to fulfil l. It is the fulfillin~ 
11 of this purpose that. coflstitu t es their truth . 1'he purpose 
depe11d.s on the des ires , interests , hab its , previous 
be liefs , i dea ls , etc ., of the person as we ll as upon the 
sense - v;orld t hat surrounds hlrH BL t.ne ti rH~ when iw r~al·:es 
his pur pose . . These t hin~ s cont. rol t ne . urpose and t h ::; 
purpose sets t.l1e tasi< wh i ch an i de a. ri,ust pE::rform if it. 
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va li da.tes its clai 11, to truth . Hence true i deas s.re not so 
!H tc: h conce!'ned a · out copying ready - made reality as t hey 
are to make thin gs conform to a ce rtain purpose . Truth , 
1
1
· then , instead of bein ~ a. qu<dity of i deas t hat represents 
i 
I 
I 
I 
!I 
I 
I 
:I 
an objec tive reality t ha t stands waiting from all eternity 
to be repre en t ed , is a property of i deas by virtue of 
which purposes are rea lized . 
'I'o r acaritu la.te , we f in d tha t pra~ n , a. ti sll! ho lds 
t ru I. i1 to tl3.ve a psych oJ.ogi ca 1 or L,,i n wh ic h nJU st be 'taken 
i nto account in jud<;;in,~ of its ll!ean in g. It is a ~rope rt y 
I 
II tf1at attaches to juci gn,en t s a.no thereby evaluates r, rwn, •. 
1 'l' i1is 1s the l o ~ i eal aspect of trutl; a.nd it is a deve lop-
! llietrt of the psycholo gical aspec ts and not an entire ly d i f -
~ fe r ent an d dist i nct affai r . Tha t i s , the ori gin and t he 
II meanin0 of i deas are not separated . In the t hird pl ace , 
I we ~ a ~ that trut h is ambi~uous . 
! t rue tha t turn out to be f a lse. I· 
Pro pos ition s claim to be 
Th is se t s t he cent ral 
'I I, 
II 
pro bl e lf for e r i stemol o~y . Last l y , trut h i s the fu lfillmen 
I of purpose rafhsr than a representation of independent 
I reality. This i n br i ef is Lhe pra~matist vi ew of truth . 
I 
v·e riill proceed nOi'; to est inrate its value and po int out 
I' I 
its limit.a.ti ons . 
t.rnt r. of 
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app lication . This seews a very obvious remark to make . 
Eut. v1hen it 1s s tri c tl y ca.rded out it. involves llluch 
tha t is not so obvious. In t he fir s t p l ace it connects 
I lo ~ ica l mean i ng i ndisso lubly 
I wi th psychological condition • 
I 
I 
I 
il 
I 
Th i s is one of t he hotl y contested quest ions bet ween int e l 
l ect ua.lis n1 3.n0 emp i ric i s !I. The former asserts t hat 
logical mean i n ~ i s en tire l y i ndependent of psycholo~ ica l 
fac:tors . Now pr a [ n! a tisni con1es a lon g and aff irms t. ha.t the 
I psyc ho l ogi ce.l fa.ctors 01' int erest , purpose , emotio ri, and 
! 
I satiefacti on a r e essent i a l to Lhe meanin g of assert ion s . 
I Let us se e i n wha t eense this is tru e and if there be 
I ~ li mi t to it s truth . 
( a ) All thi nkin ~~ nCJs a psyc!1 olo ~_~ ical bas is . ThL 
i s ::1. truiSH! o.ild is menti oned only to sho w that LllEH'e is no 
sucn th i ng as ' pur e ' t hou ~ n t . L o ~ icians have a ~reat dea l 
t o say about ' pure thinki n~~ · as if t he re were t houf,ht in -
dependent of a t hi nker . Th i s is a pure abs traction an d 
h8.S n o t i1 i n f~ t o do wi t h i1Ctus l kno•N i ng •. In o. ll ac tua.l kn ow 
i n ~: . our t:n i nkin g is ca.rr·i ed on a.rr,id psycho logical con ~ii -
tio ns . ~ haL we t hink is de t erlli in ed by our interests , pur -
poses , and psych ic equ ipments in ~enera.l . This, I t hink, 
is beyond den i al . ~ urt her , i n orde r to jud ~e an assert ion , 
it i s necessa.ry to kn ow whCJ,l ti1e asse'rtor meant . T'his can j 
-1 01 -
'I 
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only be known 1 n r.lonnectioE witi1 the context of the asser -
tion . Hence , for ano t he r to kn ow 1vhe t her one's assert ion 
i s true or not he wo l[l d have Lo know wlw.t the as s er t. ()!' 
~ean t . Bu t after he d i s cove r ed t he i nt ent ion of the 
asser tor , he would not need to t~ke an inventory of 
his psyc hie equ i pment a t the ti n:e in order to kn ow whe the r 
the assertion was true to the intention or not . What -
ever the menta l co nti ition of t he assertor, the assertion 
i~. true or fa l se as it exrr-esses or ci oes no t expr-ess his 
purpose . 
Pragma tists ha ve confused t he know i ng on the pa r 
of ano t he r of the trut h or fa lsit y of an asse rti on , wit h 
the truth of t he assertio n. Of course , t he n:e;;,ning of 
an asserti on can be known by a second party on ly by tak-
i n~. it in connection mjth itR con t ex t. Tt1is is the 
i 
1 o b j e c t ion t o t ex t q u o t at ions • The q u o t at i on s vi 11 en t a ken 
a l one may mean somet hi ng en tirely d ifferent fro m the i r 
meani n~ in the context . Gut this i s not t o be conf used 
with the act ual truth of the asser tion. F'u1·t her , it i s 
also true t hat an asserti on ~ay be suc h t hat it can mean 
more t han one thing . Take for exan,p l e , t he f ollowin g 
asse rtion : No a nswer is bet t er than a fa.l se one . 'I'h i s 
t , a t a false answer is be tter t han a true one ,· or may mea.n flu, 
it llJEl. y n:ean t ha t it is bett e r t o ~e t no answer t han to 
ge t a fa lse one . The CO ntext woul d h~.ve to dete r min e the 
&ean i n~ of the statement . In t hi s sense pr agmat ism 1s 
ri gh t i n affirmi ng t ha t t he rnea.n i n ~-s. of a.n a sserti on to 
another dep9 nds upo n it s appl ic:at i on . Eut t hey confound 
' t hi s wit h t he proposi ti on under d i s~uss i on , na&e l y , 
The trut h of an asser tion depends on its app licat i on . Th is 
I S L0 conf use gr ammar with l og ic . 
Bu t we ha.ve not yet reached t he vit a l ro i nt of 
the pa~ j 1a ti s t sta.fement ur:aer consi de :r· e.tion. It rea ll y 
~eans t hat Lhe actual me an i n ~ , t he l o~ i c a l truth of an 
assert ion canno t be se ra r ateci. from its ps.t cholo~l ica.l 
ori S,in . Mr ) Schille r says : "-Tbe wost f undament~. l con-
cep ti ons of Lo ~,(ic: , lihe ' Necess it y ', ' Cer t cdnt.y ', ' s e lf-
ev i dence ', 'truth', <ire pr i n:a r•i ly de seri p Li ons t hat 2.re 
psyc h io a ~ facts. They a re i nseparably a ccompan i ed by 
specific fe.;din i,S s •. 't:ha.t is called t h8 ir ' str ictly lo~ ic ­
,: ca.l ' sense is QQUU .. llJ.lQ!.l~-!1,j.1dJ_ t h e ir ps ~cho lo f! ioa l senses , 
and whene ver t ni s QQllU~QtiQu_i~_ralll~_ttQk~D-Qff~-th~ 
lli~~UiD~-~illi~l~-Gl~2~~~~r~~· (1) 
In d i sou ssi n~ t hi s st..atemen t,, ;; r •. Sch ill s r po i n t s 
out t ha t i n t he case of ' c: e rtCJ.int y ' (!J e (~ onfines hi s d is-
cussion to th is one Conception) t he d i st i nction bet wee n 
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' .:ubj'i:lc Live ' ·- :-Fl ' ob .j ec.tive ' cer t. e.in ty . The former he 
s ays i s ca l l ed psy uho l o ~ i cal and the latter loa ica l. And 1 
since the fo:cmer corr.es about of ten bef ore the l atter , lj 
and s i nce. psyc!Jo lo ~ .ical ' stup iilit y may r ebel ;'l.gainst 
ma t hemati ca ll y demonstra ted truths ', ma ny a f fir~ t hat 
psyc~ h o lo~ i ca. l an d l og ic<ll cer t ain ty have not h i ng to do 
. h t' I ) U' t ' . h vnt. one e.no na r . 1!"0 .n1s e obj ec ... ~ . Lo~ i cal certa inty 
, he aff irms , ~s conti n uo us wit h psycho lo g ica l eertodnty . 
VI e i'l ill quot e ct~~a.in : " The notion of lo ~l i ca l certainty'' , 
Ill he ~; 13ys , "ari ses f ro m the extens i on of po t ent i al beyo nd 
actua l pur pose i n thin king. We aetually stop a t the point 
at which ~e psychGlo~ ica ll y are sati sfied and wil lin~ to 
acce pt a clair£ to truth ::n:; .;ood ; but we ca n E:.on:e r, i JJies con-
c~i ve ult er i or pu r poses ~ hich wou l d r equire further oon -
fir mation , ahd other minds that wou l d be sat i sf i ed less 
, es.s i l y . ~' h is en~.eTJde r ~; Lhe ide B,l of e, eon, p leL e 'log ica l ' 
II ' . ' . ' 
, ·~· root tran~: eend l n ~ t nau wr1i ch j_ ~; good eno ug h for us , and 
carab l e of compel li ng t he assent of a ll intelli gences . 
our· cs.pa.eity t o pro .ject t he idee.l. Both a r e Je 1e nde nt 
on t he aetmd powe rs of tl18 i mlivid u::;.l mi nd" . ( 1) 
In t his quotation we fin d t he l imits as we l l as t he 
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t r uth in the prepos ition un de r di scuss i on . Log i c is an 
affair of f i ni te mi nds . As s uch i t ce~ta inl y ca nno t be 
Qepar a t ed from our ~en tal make-up . ~ it h us ' logica l ' 
certainty i s fo r t he most par t ' psychol og ical' ce r ta i nt y. ! 
Eut psyciio l ogical in this sense n.e ans . ou r VI hol e persona l- ' 
i ty . We canno t divi de our persona l it y i nto par ts , so 
that cme l'" r·t can th i nk ' pure i n t e ll ec tua l ' though t s 
whi ch v: i ll have no re l at i on t o the o t he r ra.r t s of our 
person::. lit y. He~'ce , e.ll t r uU for us vlill depend t o c;,, 
c e rts.in extent on our· who l e persona lit y - feel i n ~ , en,o ti on 
.. ' 
ir,tere at , ._;Dl' pose , i dea l, e t c . This l er:wes no r oom fo r 
t.he " s.b:.::.trac t t hink i ng of i mpers ona lism11 • Tt r u l es out 
t he i nso l ub l e e.ntimon i es ,- the l ife l e s s ab ~ t rac tio ns of 
for rE e. l lo ~; ic . The trut ils t hus at t ained wil l be per so ns. ! 
t r utl;s e.nd a."' ~. uch they wi 11 be app 1 icab l e to hul!lan 
know i n.;_ . E' ut on t he othe r hand , t hey will be t ru t hs 
reachi~ ~ beyond our parlicul&r i nten ti on . 
He re we ~ et a ( l irupse o f t he limitati on of t he 
prP- ~ il.a . tist assert i on . ·rhe truth of an assertion depends 
upo n it s app l ication , but. it s a~p li cat i on i s i dea l as we ll 
ae psycho l ogica l . Now Mr . Sch ill e r himse l f admit s t ha t we 
hsve the power to projec t i deals . Tha t ~o~er need no t be 
r es t ri c!ted to the ma.k i ne of i dea l s t. ha t l:ave no c onnection 
- 105-
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II 
li 
Jl r·iith our hu1r:a.n existence , but also to the ability to tr·a.n-
' 
I scend the psycholo f!, ica.l aspects of t be tliOliJent. ~ ow when 
I 
/ pragmatists mean th~t the truth of an assertion depe nds 
j upon the inciividual conditio ns of the assertor , and means 
I noth i n ~ apart from these, he is al lo win ~ his reacition 
a~ainst intellectualism to blind himself to his true r er -
sonalit,~ , When we co~e to a com~re~ension of our com-
plete persona lit y, we find t ha~ we have universalizln ~ 
powers as ~el l as perceptive powers; ra tionaliz i n ~ as 
we ll B.s ewot ion a. l or fee li ne pov;ers . 'l'hus when an assert -
ion is applicable to our indi~idu~l feelin gs , e motions, 
interests , and purposes we will be satisfied when it meets 
II 
these a.nd Lhereuoon call i t t rue ; and e.l so when it is ap -
plicab le t o our universali~in ~ , rationa li zing powers we wi·l 
!I 
I 
not be sat i sfied unless it irreet s tne se . Grant i n~ then 
that lo gica l mean in g ~rows continuousl y out of p sycholo~ i-
cB.l conditions , ye t tlter·e i s no rea son for not reuo ~. nizin g 
its full worth when it i s ~ rown . ~ ut th i s extends t he 
trutn of an assertion beyond in clividua.l psycholo~ ieal co n-
ditions to its universal appl icat ion in a world of rationa 
rn ea.nings. 'I'li is pr·a.g rna.tlsm ov erloo ks , and consequefltly 
cannot find any other ~a y of v a li datin~ the claims of an 
assert ion t han observin~ the conte ~poraneous feel in~s , 
""' 
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e motions a .. d i nt e r es t s of the ird i'J i dual. Vitlen a sLate-
r!!etrt sat isfies t lw,e , it i s t ! ·ue s,ecord i ng to prag ma. tisrr;. 
In t his we s ee t he COlli~on fallac y of evo l ut ionar· 
th :i nk i m1. The r'e Llacy consists in a r e fus al t o reco ~ln ize 
that e. cont i nuou£ deve l opmen t of conseq uents f rom an t e -
ce dent~ i s e r e9.l dc vc loplr.ent. l f t he de ve l op men t i s r ea l 
then tbe co nsequen t 1s JUs t as d i stinc t from t he an t e -
ceden t as i f it had not deve l oped from it, or if it had 
re su lt ed f rom a discont inuous chanee . We cannot insis t tha 
t he r e has been a real de ve l opment and then i ns ist on 
e v a l u 3. t i n g t h c p t' o ci u c t b y t il a L f ron, w h i c h i t de v e 1 o p e d • 
Hhen v;e see t his falls.c y , t hen v;e can admit:. tn b t lo ~, i c<il 
r!iean i nfl ha.s psyc:ho l o~~ i c &l anteceden t s wit iwut e:onildtt i n ~, 
ou r ss lves to the s t. a ten, ent t tH;,t, Uie trut.n of t he forme r 
1s r elative to t he l~tt e r. 
li e 2ee t hen tt:a. t the va l ue 1'o r exper i ence of a 
pro r ositio n is r e l a ti ve to B par ti cu l ar i ntent io n when we 
are t h in k i m~ only of it~:; i nuH;d i at.e a. pp li ca.~ion . B'or 
i n s t an c e , i f I i n t. c n de d t. o t e 11 a f c i end vd w r e I a. n! 1 i v i n g 
i n Ca n b r i::l ~ e , atrd st:ty t hat: illY home is at 1426 Milvitt St ., 
F.e rl e l ey , Co.l i for ni a , n1y s t z t e1llE:n t wou l d be wort h l ess in 
r e s p e c t t o my i n t e n t i on • Y e t i L t l 0 u l i s t i 11 be t ru e • I f 
W8 know t he pa rticul a r i nt ei1 ti on of t he a £.serto:c we can 
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\1 
11 de ter mine t he trut h , t' a lsit y , or i nd ifference of his 
I 
I 
I 
a sse ttion i ~ res pect to t ha t i ntent ion . But t hi s le a ves 
t he a ssertion tr ue or f a lse i n re~ar d to its essen ti a l 
a:ea.n i ng . T'hus it. is tr,1e to sa.y that t he utilit ,y of a 
/ pro position i s 
I t.1i s leaves t he actual trut h of Ll1e pro osition untouched . 
Gla tiv e to a part i cu l a r intention . Yet 
I, 
il 
,, 
' 
I 
Thi s is rot r- e l aJl ive t o t he p sycl10 l o ~ ical fee li .n §; s , inter -
e s t s ) 3, t! ~ • en, o t.. i c n s o [ t n e as s e r t or , out it depe nds upon 
the a~ree~sn t of tne meanin ~ of the proposition with t he 
fact about wh i ch L fte a. sse rtion is rN3 de . My home '3.cic:iress 
1s independe tit of an a.ssertion abou t it , bu t t he tru th of 
an a,s sen io n about it 1 s dependent Llpo n tile fac t. 
p 
1/ int erest ·, 
,, 
purp oses, e tc. , and t hus these way be sa i d t o 
'I \. 
r 
,J 
I 
il 
li 
i! p 
jl 
det e r n, ine th e Lrut h of a.ssertions ab.out niy hon;e. But the 
trut h of an a.ssert ion o i' a.not he r a;1:Jout my ho rn e would , t r1en 
depend upon these Gesir e~~ . i nte r ests , p1 rposes of mine, 
i cal 
a.n .:l. no t upon his p3ychOlogA interests and pur·pose~ . Th is 
is not wh2t: pr ;3,g n:2.ti s rr· me <'Ml£, when it in~ists. th<.1.t th~ . . \ 
tru th of an asserti on depe nds upon ps yc nolo g1ca l cond 1t1 on~ . 
But it is wha.l. the i r a ssert ion r educ es to when c a rried 
o ut . F' r om ti le atov e we see c·ll ear i y t ha .tx pr·a(m' t.i:::. n; con - 1 
ti nua ll y confus e s 11 n:y " ·t: it h "-your' s" , or~ " mett v;it n " us 11 1 
I 
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II 
and i n t his way Ce ts alon ~ ver y we l l wit hout a ny l og i cal 
tr uths independen t of par tic ul a r in t enti ons . tnis point 
will be t al<en np l a ter. Her e v:e wis h only to poin t out 
that the tr uth of a rroposition is relative t o a parti -
cular i ntent i on on l y wh-:;n "trut h" a.nd " utili ty " are 
i dent ifi ed . No~ we must .eep this in wi nd anci not allow 
I' 
1! t he pre.(:nat i s t t o ta.ke this c nclu~ion as a proof t ha t 
I, 
I 
" tru.t h1' and " utilit _ll 11 a.r e ident ica l. 'rhis wou l d be 
·I i 
:, 
I me rel y going rou nd 1n a circ l e . 
I 
I 
II 
( b) In the seconci c lace to say that ~ truth 
11 lS relat. i •1e t. o a. part i cu ! a r i nt e nt i o n ob 1 i t. era L cs the 
I d i ~.tinction be tween univer::-a l and par ticul G.r tr uths . If 
I a ll truths ere r elative t c a pat~icular i ntcn ti o~ , then 
1-1 09-~--
I t h8 r e l·:oulci Le no un i ver·f;a.l LruLns . '-:-'h i s L::. v:hat i s inten -
II 
I 
I 
I 
li 
II 
II 
,I 
I 
I 
I 
' 
ed by ~ra~ mat ists . but here a~a in the p ra~~a tisl confuses 
t he tr uLh ~it~ a certain particular appl icat io n in huma n 
thinkin 8. Un iverse. l s hc-;ve n.o app liea.tion ::;av e ~- s Lil ey 
are real ized in individual s . Fut Li1 is is f c.r· f rom say in 8, 
t ha t t he truth of t he universa l is r elative to the 1n -
divi aua.l in wfuich it is ce::d iz ed , for it rr.ay be rea.l iz ed 
ot he r individua.ls at the sa.me ti me . Nov: 
t he ex i s t .:mc:e of universa l t rut~hs i s a psy~no l c~ica l fact 
as much as t he existence of pa rticul a r truL!ts . 5ut, t h is 
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does not jean that t hey are relative to the particular 
i nterests, emotions , purposes of the asser t or of them . 
It means , rs.ther , that the self is not exhausted in 
these particular factors , bu~ tnat it has also a uni-
versalizing powe r . Mr . Dewey reco~nizes this uni versal -
izi ng power of the mind but thinks that it consists in 
the "control of experience in its reconstructive transi-
t ion fro m one u n i f i e d for iT! t. o an o t her·" . ( p • 7 6 ) 
This aeans that it is li mited to particular ana 
i nd ividual cases . 
Pra~ rratists seem to take offence at the notion 
that e. universbl truth can be applied to ma.ny particular 
individuals (;l,t tile se.me time . Tilis is to them a sever -
a.nce of lo gic from ps ychology which their evolutionary 
views prevent . Gut we have already seen the fallacy in 
1 their a9plication of evolutio n to truth, and here we must 
., 
I 
poinL ou t Lh8.t when they limit the application of univers -
als to a particular trans1 ~ion period in experience , they 
I shut 
I 
============~=================================-=-==-~~---==========~=========== 
trut h up to one particular and individual experience . 
I 
I Of course, the pragmatist could say that another ' s experi -
~ ence was a fact which could enter into the situation which 
I codditioned the truth of his own statement , but he could 
I not assert any truth about the experience of his fello w 
' 
apart from the particular situation in hi s own experience. 
Truth , then, becomes a private affair , and knowledge 
reduces to solipsism. 
This is the peculiar situation in which we find 
ourselves when we deny the mind ' s power to construct 
universal truths that apply to many individuals at t he 
wa.me time . To affirm this universa.lizing power of the 
mind is the only way to pass fro m u! Y individu a.l experi e nce 
to the common experiences ' for us' all . But pragmatis ts 
speak of the validity of thou ght as applyin~ only to the 
particular transition in .an evolving experience , and then 
without warning speak of "truths valida.ted by US". 
11 Through this confusion of " me" ' and "'us" they manage to con 
I 
ceal fro m themselves the actua l universal i zing power of th 
self . 
·I To insist upon the point that we make our truth 
I 
j and therefore it is entirely relative to us and to the 
particular situation in which it is made involves two 
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oversi ~hts . First it overloo ks the fact t hat we make 
our truths out of intelli gi bl e facts which we do not 
make but find , and t hat it i s the relation of t hese facts 
t ha t makes our tr uths transcend t he particular situation 
in v1h ic h t he y a r e made for us and by us . Secondl y, it 
overlooks the fact t hat wh il e our trut h- mak i ng activity 
i s conditioned by psycholo ~ ic a l factors it is a lso the 
espression of tl1e exper i ence of a living, sonsc ious, uni -
v e rs a lizin ~ intelli ~en ce . Thus back of t he ps ychologi cal 
fac t ors wh ich furn i sh the contin gent e le n1ents in our 
trut h ma.kin~ , li e the uni versal l aws of logic wh ich trane -
j• 
l a t e t i1e fac ts of exper i ence i nto ab i din e mean i ngs wh ich 
t ake their pl ace i n t he rea l m of un iver sa l and rat i ona l 
truths . Th i s d6es not impl y that t hese formal l aws of l ogi 
a r e ulti ma t e princi ple s and t herefore to be relied upon as 
the so le sponsors of wha t is tr ue and what is real . For 
t hese laws are to be co~ s idered only as for ms t hro ugh 
v1h i ch living intelli ge nce wh i eh is t he sol e t es t of r eed it 
, li!an i fests it self . They get the ir i nt erpretat ion 1n it, not 
it in t hem . So wh il e i n t hi s sense truth becomes universa 
and not va li da ted so l ely by it1:; prB.ctict:ll ....  onst::quene,_;s , ye 
en the other hand , it is not validated, solely by t he ab -
s tract l aw of se lf-contradict ion, but by it s bearin ~ on 
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experience when experience is interpreted in terms of 
living intelligence and not as the product of sense - per-! 
cept ions . 
2. The wecond general proposition of pra~matism 
which we will consider is the followin g: A claim to trut ~ 
i s vali dated by its practical c:-onsequences. We have al -
ready mentioned the fact that al l claims to truth are not 
valid . Some on inspection turn out to be false . Tlie 
question now IS what i s the criterion by which claims to 
truth are tested? This quest ion brings us to the very 
heart of pra ~ matism . Professor James gives the answer as 
i follOVIS: 
"Grant an idea or belief to be true, what concret 
difference will its beine true make in one ' s actual li f e? 
How will truth be realized? What experiences will be dif -
ferent from those nllic i1 would obtain if the belief were 
false? \'ihat , in s hort , is the truth's cash -v ~;~. lue in 
experimental te:rms?il And then lle answers in the following 
words : 
"True ideas are those th a. t we can assimilate , 
validate , corroborate and verify . ~alse i de as are those 
that we cannot . That is t he practical difference it makes 
to us to have true idea,s ; that , therefore ., is the mean ing 
Pragmat i sm p. 200 - 201 . 
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i s 
of truth , for it Aa ll that truth is kn own as ". 
Experience here is rr!ade the criterion by which 
to test claims t o truth. 5ut as we have a l ready sa i d , all 
philosophers do and must rt,ake exper i ence the ultin:a t:. e 
f act in philosophy . Hence , the differentia of pra) ,mat ism 
must co~sist in its view of experience . What t hen is the 
praematist ' s vi ew of experience? Though Professor J ames 
speaks of beliefs conc:erni ng "relations aman t~ pure ly menta 1 
i deas " a.s "·eternal " and ",unconditional'' and therefore not 
1 in need of any "sense -verific..~ation" , ye t he conc:ludes hi s 
discussion of t hese be li efs by s a yin g, that "all roads 
lead to Rome , and in the e1d and eventua ll y , akl true 
processes mus t lead to the face of directly verifyin ~ sens -
ble experiences .§.Q.W~:t!hsa:~ , whieh son1 e~ ody 1 s ideas have 
copi ed". (p . 215,) 
~rom t hi s it i s evident that experience~or the 
ph r a.se "·i n terrLs of experience" , means i n sense - terms . 'Th t 
is what Dr . Bowne ca ll s sense - empiricism i n di s tinct ion 
fro m transcendental - eiDpi ric i sm which views experience as 
meanin g "n ot. mer e l y the s ense ex perience of the outer 
v;orld but also the i nner ex per ience of t he cosscious se l f ". 
(1) Wit h this correction of t he mean i ng of experienee , 
t he fcregoin ~ ans wer to the quesfion how are be li efs found 
(1) Bowne Personalism p. 100, a nd see ~ eta p hysics p. 421- 23 I 
'truth ' and ' utility ', as the above a nswer does. We have 
a lready sh own how this comes abo ut through the bl ending o1 
psyc hological f actors with logical mean i ngs . This is un-
war r anted by experience • . 
M:r· .. Schiller holds tha.t B. dl a i m to truth is va.li-
dated by "it s consequences, by its bear i ng on t he interest 
t hat prompted its assert ion, by its r e l a tion to the purpos~ 
t ha. ~l put t he ques tion". (1) Th is statement appears to 
~ ive a very simple rul e whe re by we can vali da t e a ny cla i m 
to trut h. It a lso seems to emphas ize the pur posive side 
of the a~e nt i n t he know in g process so as to overco me 
t he sense- empiricism i n the vi ew just mentioned . This 
vi ew does, indeed , emphasize the part played by a purposiv 
i nt e lli gence in testing clai ms to truth, but 111 d oin ~ t his 
it ~oes to t he other e xtreme and makes the test of truth 
its "t·e l eva.nce to a. proxi mate rather than an ult i mate 
s c i e n t i f i c p u r p o s e " • ( i b d • p • 1 5.6 ) 
Now th i s rai ses t he i mportant question as to 
the real va lue and pl ace of the Will in our co~ n itiv e 
fun~t i oning . It has lon ~ been objeete d to Int e llectualis rr; 
that it has interpre ted \'/ill e.nd F'ee ling in ter lils of 'I' ho ugl t 
(1) Stu di es i n Human ism p. 154. 
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exclusively . The question no w a r1ses does pragma tism go 
to t he ot her extreme and interpr e t Thought who ll y in 
terms of Will? Some critics of pragmat is m t ake the vi ew 
that it does . Much of t he l'lri tings of pragmatists , it 
ffi ust be sa i d , l end pl ausib ilit y to t h is stand of t hei r 
critics . Ye t pragmatists def init e ly affirm t ha t t his i s 
not t he ir int en tion . Mr . Sc hill er expresses his vi ews on 
t his ~ oint a.s foll0ws : 
"The aim of Vo lun tari sm is not to ass i gn to t he 
1 will ' the f unetions of the 1 int e l!ec:t ', but rather so to 
a nalyze the l a tter phr ase as to br ing out t he volitional 
I struct ur e and dependence of every i nte llectua l function(l ) 
I However , this sta. t men t t hG?.t prC:J.g;,.at ism does not ex t end 
. I t he function of t he ' will ' so as t o i nc lude in it a ll t he 
' func ti ons ' of t he ' i nt e ll ect ' cannot be t aken as a proo f 
I 
I 
I 
I 
II 
of the position of pr agmatism in Lhi s r e spect . This can 
only be deci ded by each one for hi mse lf after co1~i der i n~ 
t he account wh ic h p r a~mat i sm gives of the relation between 
t hese factors of t he mi nd . Wha t this r e l at io n is we will 
find in the pra.gmat is t expos ition of how cl a i ms to tr uth 
are ver i f i ed . To t his we wi ll ho w tur n. 
We may observe, so t he pr axmat ist t hi nks , ho ~ 
claims to truth ar e vali dallxed by wa,to hing ' truth in t he 
( 1) Mind , N. S. XIV , p. 126 , 1905 .• 
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mak ing '. That i s , by observing how sci ence goes about to 
d iscov er new truths . The f i rst t hin g that we notice is , 
t ha t nev: truths a re found only through a des ire to know . 
I is def init e and specific . It is not s ome genera l or vague 
j des ire to kno~ the truth i n the abetract , but a particular 
I 
des ire to know Gt, particular thin g .. F'u:rth.er , this pa.rt ic ula. ~ 
desire i s pro;;;p t eci. by SOti!B st-:ec:ific pu rpose . 'rhe purpose 
1 grows out of the needs of life . Our ex perience has been 
j runnin0 a lon ~ smoothly , but suddenl1,1 a con f lict ar i ses . I -· ... 
j Th is break i n t he i mmediacy of experi ence sets a prob l em 
I bef or e us to be solved . This p~obl em may b~ a conslruc t ion 
I 
of our own; or it may ta. ke the for n~ of a n obs t acle w_ ich 
I intrudes it se lf upon us . But the question ar ises , why do 
we not accep t t hese problems F.J.s final and turn to semmthin~; 
else less annoy in~? In some cases , the pro blem r a i ses 
I 
1
the i ssues of life <HJ.d deat-h , in which cases the ' v1ill to 
l i ve ', t he instinct of se lf -p reserv a ~ion moves us to action 
But t he r e e; r c m .::,  n y cases ·n hen t hi s i s not. so • T 11 e pro b l em 
ictoes not have suc h i mmed i Bta bearin~ on lif e . He re it 
I 
seems that we mi gh t we ll di smiss the problem and Lurn our 
--., 
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experi ence 111 another direct1'on . r:'ut t ' · t h ~ n1s 1s no t e 
1 ca.sewith us huma n be in gs . We wa.nt to know the solution 
9f t ne problem whether it affects our life or not . Th is 
seems to be exp l a ined by r efe rence to a ' will to now'. 
!3 ut tlli:2 will to knov man ifest s itself in ·a oonorete 
des ir e , a def inite wan t . When t his desire , this wan t 
i s setisfi ed , we say tna t we haue solved our problelli , 
t ha t we k~o w ~ he brut h. 
I 1'he second f ea ture to whic.:h pra1~ rr: a tism calls our 
! a tt en tion in t he pr oc ess of ~ a i n in ~ new k nowl ed~e is t he 
I funct ion of our ' s electivle i n t eres ts '. Vi e study f or t he 
I I most part wha t · v•e choose to . Vihat facts we shall busy our -
se lves wit h a r e of our own choice . A mass of r aw ma teri a l 
surrounds us on a ll sides but only v1ha t we selec!t, becomes 
t he object of our s t udy . Th is is only partly true , as pra~ 
rM:l t.i s tu is free ' to ad11!it . So rr!e t hi ngs ac tu a lly i n.pr·ess 
1 
therr!selves upon us . They i rnpe l , if not cun!pe l , our i nter -
es ts . He re t hen we have two features connected wi t h t he 
o bjects of our know l ea ~ e . These featu r e s a r e d isti n8uished 
1 as ' t he (_ i ven ' a.nri ' t he made ' . 
Bu t this br in ~ s us to t.he t.hird consideration in 
the process of kno w in ~ . 1'his do uble a speet. of the object 
is expla.ined best by a referenc:e to the purpos i ve e len,en t 
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1n our na t ure . The i ndependent object , ' the given ', re -
sists our will ; while the select ed_ object , ' the made ' 
fact is under t he contro l of our wil l. But it seems 
I plaus i ble t ha L we could r efuse to gi ve our a ttention to 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
e it, her·. Tha t. i s , nothin g can compe l our at tention . Vie 
wi ll t o at tend to t he obj ect , whe the r it is one of our 
own se l ection or one wh ic h has intruded itself i n our 
exp·cir ience . 
Now after our pur posive insti nct decides to 
a.ttend to the "fact " before us , our " intell ect ual function ' 
comes into play . Vie solve the pro b l eru by use of i deas , 
hypotheses , by ref e r·en~e t o oLller ob j ects of experience , 
i n short , we rea son and t hink ov e r the prob l en!, un lil Y!C 
fi nr.l it;:c: 3olution . Thus wh il e the \'Jill se t s t he pro blem, 
it doe s not s olve it by blind striving. Ra ther it i s 
1 a ss isted by t he ' intel l ect '. However, we are to not e , t hat 
I the t hi nkinQ is a ll de termin ed by the situation . r he 
I . 
I I var ious hypotheses arise out of t he s i tuation ,. and t he one 
lS 
I that works i s not a r bitrar ily selected , for itA aeoided 
\ upon bec ause i L sol ves t he pr ob l em and satisfi ed the pur -
\ pose or des i re t ha t prompt ed t he investi gation . 
B' ina lly , we mus t not ove rloo k the fa.ct t ha.t t he 
reason s for cal l in ~ t he idea which solves t he proble m true , 
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I 
!i 
are t he same as the reasons why it sati s f i es . Whe n the 
cl a i m to truth concer ni n~ the ~ituati on satisfies , t hen we 
a c cept it as t r ue . It a l s o, as we ha ve seen , fits the sit 
uation , but as t he solution of the situat i on is guided by · 
particular pur pose , it i s accotllp lis hed v1hen t he purpose is 
s a.t isfied . So pra~ i~atism ho l ds t hat the reco gnition of thE 
t r uth of the i dea and the satisf action of the plllpose are 
one a nd the sa~.tie . St ar ting t hen with t 'ie fact t hat a.ll 
new kn owl ed ge i s attained t hro ug h the guidance of a 
def inite purpose , pragma tism asserts t ha t the truth is 
identica l with the satisfaction of a pm r pose . 
When Vi e a re dea.lin ~ with t he a tt ainmen t of ne w 
k novi l ed~e , the pragmat ist viei'i ha s much to recommend i t. 
Yet t he r e i s one feat ure ~entione d in t he anove de s cript ior 
of the proce ss of ge tt in g n(;~W trut hs t hat i s not expla.ined 
by t his vie w. This i s t he "i ndependence of t he f aet. " of 
our will . .He r e the so lu t ion is not; me rel y t he satisfactior 
of the par-tieul a r purpose i n hanci , but t he di scovery of t.hE 
nature of tll!:'J. t 1 i ndependent fa.c! t 1 • Pragmat isn1 answers t h iE 
ob. jection by sayin g t he. L the 1 i ndependeut f a ct 1 i s not 
copied by our i dea and thus aete r mines t he truth of t he 
i dea , but the.t t he 1 i ndependent fact. 1 i s it self transformec 
by our pr ocess of knowin~ , and when t he tr~ns6~r~ati on 
..., 
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reaches t he sta~ e where our purpose is satisfied , then we 
pronounce the prob lem solved , an d the 1 i r!struments' of 
solution true . Thus our know i n6 i s a proces~ in which our 
'i nte llect' tr e1nsfor·ms " given" or " seleeted" fa.ct s so t nat 
they will s:;.tisfy any particular cies ire or purpose tll~t 
presents itself to us . This denies that the ' facts ' have 
any part whatever in ths cietermination of the truth of 
knowledge , and i mplies that there are de grees in truth . 
T be sat i sf act ion of any purpose g ives a tr·ut h, but t he 
satisfaction of a. higher pur;_Jose g ives a true r truth , than 
t he satisfact ion of a lo wer pnrpose . ·rJJis br .i ng s lJS to thE 
po i nt where we can decide the question concerninb t he ~e l~-
1 
tion between t he function of t he 'i ntellect ' and the 
funct ion of the ' ·nill ' in pr a gma tism. 
In the first p l ace we see that· the ' intellect' 
is not entire ly i gnored . It is a. most potent means of 
fulfillin~ the desires and purposes of the wi ll'. As a 
means it has a work to do tnat c ann ot be perforllied by t he 
·I 
' wi ll '. Inthis way \:.iue honor is thouf5 ht to be g iven the 
1 i n t e 11 e c t 1 • Second ~ y , (I e .:: e e t h a. t t he 1 i n t e ll e e t 1 h a. s no 
' 
poVJer to tr-anscend ;the particular· situa.tion w!1ieli a pa.r 
ticular purpose ha~ set for it . Wh ile tl1en it is not e x-
plaineci a.way in ter·n1s of ' wi ll' t he 'i r! tellect' is lin1ited 
I 
I 
I. 
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to part ic ul ar situations . It has no univer saliz in ~ power 
by whic h it can formu l ate universa l pr inci pl es , but it can 
only apply the ideas which past experience has verified as 
' true, or call for more facts , or elim i nate some facts , or 
n,ake this or that eombin at ion of the facts i n hand until 
it hits uron the ' ela i fll 1 wh ich sat isfies t he purpose that 
controls t he situat ion. 
The justification for this vn~ew seems to be tnat 
te.ke v 1n j n for1 in<.-l our purposes . ;~hen looked i:l.t ir! t his 
w~y t he . e lf-activity ma y an d in fact, does form purposes 
that are ·not satisfied in the present , but alwa.ys reach 
out to somethin~ heyond . That somethin g appears as a true 
' ot her ' to the self . Jn this way our claims to truth 
woul d ueem to extend bey ond our individual experience . 
5u t just wna.t does this irl!ply . in respect to t!1e 
rel at ion be tween the ' will ' anci the 'i ntel l ect' ? I s it 
not the ' intellect' that systema.tizes , or- ganizes , and 
uni f ies our knowled~e of the world? nhether we look upon 
t his kno~ledge as be ing made up of ' postulat es', as the 
pra8fuatist does, or whether we loo k upon it a s ~ade up of 
universa l ~ rinc i p l es , valid apart from our kn owledte of th 
we Ui US t sa.y t iJat t he YJOr l d of our knol'l ledge iS the 
I 
!j 
I 
construction of the ' i~tell ec t' . 
of the n:inci frO!T! t he aetive side, 
\'he n we view this work 
wh en 
it iB purposive ; but " 
we a ttempt to understand the ' will' apart frorr thought 
we ~ind that t he re is no t. h in ~ t.o define . \'1'e corr,e 
t hen to the conclusion t.hr-~t. these are two a.spects of 
a livi n B i nt.elli ~en ce which cannot be separat ed . Th i s 
hel ps us to see t.ha.t t he gap between the 1 theoretica.l 
r easo j " Bnd the ' pr act ical r·eason ' wh ic h v;as i mpassa ble 
for kant 1 ~ an abstraction due to had p ~ ycho lo g y . 
D t -Lron. the foi· e goin g a.ccount of the pragl!la t ist 
viEH'J of how cla i n;s to trutJ1 a re V<didatc d , this ~ap i s 
ctossed by mak ing the ' t heore tical reason ' completely 
sutor d i na.te to the ' pr actica.l re s.son '. 'I'his so lution 
fails to re co~n i ze the :i•1:port an c e of the ' intellect 1 • Or, 
rather , it fails to see tha t neither i s subordinate to the 
ot he r , but t hat both tn·e for·rr ·s throut,h which a. e.e lf -
ccnsc 1ous , univer s alizin q intelli ~en ce proceeds in its 
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seH- realizP-.t.ion . When we r ecogn ize this trut h , then v1e c n 
s a y that nl l think:in ~ is rurpos ive , but ye t it is t he 
ra tiona l act ivity cf the self t hat lifts it up abov e the 
' perishin~l ' v;e:rld of sen ::-~ e -expe ri enc e into the •norld 
of unive r sal a~d ab i d in ~ lliean i n ~ E . 
But t h•s carries us beyon d the pragmat i st view 
that the satisfact i on of a ny pur pose would give us truth . 
Such a view fails to give any criterion whereby purposes 
are evaluated . Eut as we human beings are constituted 
at present, H is .just as impor·t e.n t to evaluate our 
purposes as our claims to truth. The criterion for 
findin g truth wh ich seetred so simp le and so tempt ing at 
· the be g innin~ now turns out to be no criterion at e,ll. 
'I 
We must have some way by nnioh to determine the relative 
north of different purposes . In discussing t he pra g matist 
doctrine tiJa t the truth of 9.n e.s sert ion depends upon it. s 
application , we saw that this wou l d lead to individualis m. 
We find that the present doctr ine fails even to provide 
a standard for testin~ the different purpose s of the 
individua.l person h irr,self •. 1't1is <.:artainly JY!anifests a. 
limi tat ion in pragmCl.tisnr that. is simply appe, llin~ . 'l'here 
i s no crit e rion of truth sa.ve the s11ee.r stren0,th of a p ur-
pose to ~et itself reoo~nized . But a ll claims to truth do 
this and therefore the dist inction betYJeen true s,nd faLse 
cl ai:ns vanis hes. 
This is a deplo~ab l e co~dition to wh ich prag-
rHatisn·, has brou~~ ht. us. AnJ since we have tacitl y agreed tc 
many of t he contentions of the pragn,atist, esp3cially th&.t 
the test of truth must be fo~nd in exper i ence , we think 
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the best way out of this dep lorab l e situation , is , not to 
si mp ly review t he above d i scussion and po i nt out what we 
accept and wriat we reject , but to set forth our own view 
as to bow clain1s to truth are verif i ed. 'rh is we no11 
proceed to do . 
Modern psychology has exposed the error 
I 
of divid i n ~ the mind i nto ~n te l l ect , wil l, and feelin g as 
dist i nct and separate f ~cul t ies . The se are not distinct 
funct ions eae:h goin (; on ape.rt fr·on• the othe rs . 'They a.re 
rathe r distinc tions improvised IDerely for a better under -
standing of the comp let e function of t he ffi i nd . Thus 
ll10dern psychology teaches, and ri ghtly, that t he whole min 
i s ruanifested i n each of its dif ferent func:tions. It is 
the whole mind t hat thinks, viil l s , and feels . Yr1hat v~e 
have is a self - conscious agen t manifestin ~ itself under 
d iff er·en t. f orn1s . Hence , any e t te n,pt L o reciuce t he u,ind 
t0 the narrow terns of one of its funct ions is i ll eg iti mat 
and who ll y unwa rranted . 
This being true, it. i s self - eviden t t11a t e.ny 
attempt to li mit tr1e nature of truth to the n;an i fest~tions 
of any one of t:.hese aspeeLs of the rr;inei tc t he esclus i on o 
detr i ment of t he others would be to distort experience . 
Nov1, a.s we have agreed t hat trut h is SOltiething Lllat applies 
to our assertions abo ut fac ts of experie nce i t wi ll ~ppear 
t hat the t es t of trut h mus t be f ound withi n experience 
itse l f . 6ut thi s br in gs us a~a in to the que s t io n ~hat 1 s 
~eant by exper i ence? We have a lr eady seen th~t there 
a.r e def~rees or var i et i es in expHrience . It is a t, .sr •J. 
that i ncludes a.ll the f unc ti ons of life from t he lowe3t 
affec ti on of the sensi bility to the hi!:'(hest asp irat ion 
of tl13 soul. Any limitation of ex ·re l~ i ence to any function 
or ~roup of functions of the Livin £ Self t o t.he exclusi on 
or ne~lec t oC any of t he other fu net, io ns 1s ai' bit rs.r-y . 
The fact for us to note here i s that experi ence 
i s susceptible of an i ndef init e vari e ty of forms . But 
pr agffiati sm as we ll as i dea lism has done well to e~phas iza 
t he fEtc t that our· own a.etivily has n; uch to ':i.o with br i n~~ .i. n~ 
ab out t hese varieties in exper i ence . T1 i s mean~ tha t 
exper i en ce i s l a r ge ly a pr oduct of our own ac tivi ty . And 
now tb8 quest i ons arise, I s trut h wha t we ~ake i t by 
acti ng according t o our own purpos es or· , Is there some 
standard ~h ic h determines a t l east in a certain de~ree 
wna.t pnq;oses when r ea li zed br .i. ng us to the truth? This 
really br in gs us i~ si~ht of the proble m of reality which 
we do not wis h to ente r i nto at t hi s po i nt . I t nil l suffic 
here if we can show t hat exper i ence i s it self i n need of 
===========#===========~~-=-======-~-==-~­-=-~-
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systematization . And we need only to mention this to 
receive the answer . Certainly, experience must be ration-
a lly interpreted or else it leads to utter blindness . 
Life is comp l ex and in its complexity many incidental 
feelin~s and emotions gather around the catholic feelin gs 
and sentiments of nankind . For our Will to urge the 
satisfaction of these incidental feelings to the neglect 
of the more ca tholic sentimetrts of the race is not to be 
allowed . Hence , we conclude that our purposes are to be 
valued by a standard . This standard is to be found or madE 
by intelli gence supervening on exper ience and interpreting 
it according to the common rationality found in mank ind . 
But this is not the end of the matter . It is no 
clearer that experience must be rationally interpreted th&l\ 
it is that an endless variety of rationality is to be 
found among men. Hence , there is a social rationality as 
well as an individual rational ity . It is the unique mark o 
man that he can understand hims8lf and his fellows . So 
whi l e the standard must be self - imposed by t he individua l, 
yet it is not wholly an individua l product . But we no 
sooner see the extension of t he standard beyond the 
ind~~idual to society than we see that the standard is not 
static but a chan~ in g ideal . This br ings us to see that 
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' there is a certain relativity, and mus t always be , about 
our standard whereby experience is interpreted. Hege lian-
ism has recognized this fact and asserted that all finite 
interpretation . of experience is relative. The realization 
of finit e pnrposes would not bring us absoluteJ:i' , but 
only reJ at ive1 t ruth. 
But t he He gelian view needs to be carefully 
int erpeeted a t this point. In speaking of truth as not 
be in g absolute , it implies, i f not explicitly affirms, 
that there is an abso lut e and st a tic tr uth of which our 
experience represe.rts a, su:a ll port ion. This le9.ds to 
absurd implications. The absolute would be so all -i n-
elusive that it would become static and thus impose a 
determinate nature for our future exper ience , Th is, when 
strictly carried out, would involve the confusion of error 
with truth. Lrror would become truth in partial develop~ 
ment . Th is cannot be ma.inta ined without doing violence 
to the nature of thought . Thought is possible only 
where there is freedom and freedom vanishes when error 
and truth are confused . 
The Absolute cannot , then, become a static all-
inclusive experience in which error and trut h blend into 
one organic who le. The hi gher truth wh ich trcwscends 
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t he truth of our experience must also be the fu l fil l ment 
of a personal Life . As such it will not be the fusion 
of error and truth but the perfect functioning of a 
perfect self-conscious Intelli gence . The a.djustmetrt of 
our truth to the truth of this Intelli ge nce must be on 
the sanie prjnciple as the adjustment of the rationality 
of the individual t o the ration a lity of society . What 
is wrong will have to be entirely discarded and not fused 
with what is right . 
In this sense what is true now in our exp3rience 
will remain true, and what is false will remain false . 
The relativity of experience wil l be one 'of content 
r ather than of truth. On this point , Dr . Bowne says : 
"It is quite credible that our present experience 
does not exhaust the cont ~nts of the (divine ) thougn t and 
s o does not exhaust the possibilities of e xperien~e. If 
further possibilities should unfold we should ~ot have a 
truer experience , but a more extensive one. Our present 
experience is of a certain type , with certain contents 
and limitations , and it is entirely possible, that there 
should be other beings with differetrt types and contents 
of experience. It is equally possible that we ourselves 
shall pass i nto a new order of experiences , in which 
-129 -
case we should have no ri ght to say that the present 
order is false, but merely that it is not all and final . 
In li ke manner t he new order would not be ri ghtly 
I 
descri bed as more true than t he present order, but only 
!, as perhaps hi gher a nd rieher in content, giving a fuller 
and a ~ore abundan t life. In t his sense there may be 
any nu mber of universes of experiences , each of which is 
relative to its own sub jects , and all of which are 
e~braced 1n t he thought or plan of the Infinite Mind and 
Yl ill on wh ich they all depend ." (1) 
Trut h for us then is to be found in our experience . 
Th is cannot he done by followin~ out the leadin8s of our 
i nc i denta l f c e~ing s and desires , nor by fulfilling any 
purpose whatever that preselits itself to us. F'or wh ile 
it is true, as alread y said , t hat our own activit y shapes 
our experien ce and has therefore so~ethin g to do wit h 
' the mak ing of truth' , for us , yet we have seen t ha t our 
activity is partly at least det ermined by our organ ic rela-
ta 
tion to other pe r s ons, as well as ~ nature . But this raises 
the question what is r eality and t his we must postpone 
!
again , and consider rat her what is the test of our claims 
I to truth and whe r e is it to be found? 
j Without• raisi ng , then, t~ie question a.s to the 
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( 1) Perso11al is m, p. 108- 9 
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essential nature of reality, we can readily see that our 
knowledge of real it y must co me through our experience. 
Eut s i nce our experience presen t s a great variety of 
forms , we must conclude that the test of truth wh ile 
it is exper i ence itself, it is exper i ence not as it 
comes t o us bit by bit throu ~ h the senses, bu t as it 
is af ter intel~i gence has supervened upon these bits of 
experience and organ ized t hem into a tational whole . 
But it must not be for got that this is an i deal 
standard . Not i dea l in the sense that it is not in touch 
with human life, but that it is an end to be attained . 
Furt her as an idea l it is not stat ic, but deve lo ping . 
Its use J t herefore , i n the test of truth, rr.ay be call ed 
fornal . As such it does not give detailed instructions 
about eve r y fact of experience~. Such instructions are 
to be found in the concrete co{jditious under wh i ch 
knowled ge arises . So we are brought to the conclusion 
that t he criterion by which claims t o truth are verified 
has a twofold character ; one formal and ultimate, the othe 
concrete and re l at i ve . Either character i s ti c taken a lone 
i s i nsufficien t and when united they do not giv e us final 
truth, but truth for human exper i ence . 
This , however , brings us to note a dis tinction in 
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the f i eld of knowl edge . We have prev i ous l y spoken of two 
views of exper i ence ; the ex pe rience based on sense- empir -
icism , and the exper i ence based on self - conscious -empir-
icisn1 •. In a.ceorda.nce with this view , we ma y spea.k of 
knowled~e of objects , and knowledge of self . In the form 
er case c l a i ffi s to truth wil l be tested by concrete 
experiments wi t h the facts as sense - exper i ence presents 
the m to us . Here our concrete purpose will have a selecti e 
wor k to perform, but i t will not be the sole test of truth 
The truth will consis t rather in the d i s covery of the 
actua l con ditions in which we live . 
In the l atter case , the test of truth is self -
realiz ation . I am aware that psycho l ogi sts for the most 
1 par t hold tha t in the knowled ge of se l f , as in the know l ed e 
of objects , we are dea l in ~ with object i ve facts . That our 
own states of consciousness are treat ed as objects and 
t hat the l aw s of their nature are just as predet er mi ned fo 
us as the l aw s of thin ~ s. When we viev these from the 
point of view of an observer, this contains much truth , 
but , as we have prev i ously insisted , this is not t he way 
to ge t at the truth of our i nner l ife . The truth here is 
disclosed only to the ~lg~ti~D~ , not to the expe r i menter . 
And the theories of the latter must be valid ated by t he 
~~~-=-=-==-~-=================================================9r===--~==~ 
I 
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actua l life of the former . 
But whe n we vi ew this conscious life as the 
posses sor , and not as an outside observer, we find that 
t he mental pr ocesses are a gr eat deal more than me r e 
psychical fA.cts as the psychologists describe them. 
In t he words of Mr. Noernle , "'I'he living thought is 
But t his living clai m to validity discloses our position 
in a world of ot her persons . And thou~h eac h one may 
refuse to accept on trust any be liefs of his co mpanions 
yet he will inevitably f ind that his in dividua l c l a i ms 
asp ite to universal approva l , and will refuse to be sati s -
f ied 'IIi t. h a.nyth ing l ess . Th is fa.ct l ea.ds to t he r eco gni -
tion "t ha t the individua lit y of i nterests and pur pose s 
8 1l d t:c i n ~3 of vi ew has its li mits : that men have interests 
i n co mmo n which a r e t he more f un damental the mo r e they 
reach down to the bedroc k of huma.n na ture" . And t hus 
t he purposes of t he indi vi dua ls blend in ·t he purp ose , 
t he r ea lization of Vlhich include s the hi ~.hest develop nent 
of a ll. Th is gives us t he final criterion of tr~t h for us 
=
==============================================ir=======·-=-=-==---
= =---=~--=-=- =ljf======--=-=-=- ----
( 1 ) Pra. ~1n .a. tisrn and Absolution , II Mind N. S. XIV , p. 475 .• 
'l'he Pragjratist Viev1 of Reality. 
Vie have B.lready seen that pt'<l{~Ml.t ism is pr ima.ri lj 
a ~ethod. It s most devoted aciherents emphasize in stron~ 
terms that it cioes not pretend to be metaphysics, but only 
a way of approach to phi losophical problems . Yet its 
account of truth compels it to take a certain view of 
reality . Most pragmat ists are loath to discuss questions 
telating to the nature of rea lit y, wh ile some insist 
with great zeal and enthusiasm that as a method pragmatism 
leads directly to a Humanistic interpretation of reality. 
Further , it is i mp ossi ble for any pra€1r.atist to escape 
' taking a stand on t he deterruinabb( nature of reo.lity . 
If truth, as p rag~atists aff irm, is ' made ' 
by us , and not. an agreement with e. reality which r·erneins 
' unmodified by our act of knowin ~ it, then reality ~ust b~ , 
partly a.t least, nade by us . Professor Jajres says: 
"Truth is not dup liea.tion but e,ddH ion; not the 
constructing of inner copies of already comp lete ~ealities 
1 but r ather the reaotin~ on imperfect realities so as to 
brini_1 a.bout e. c l ea.rer result". ( 1) 
(1) Min , N. S. Vol. XIII , No . 5.2, p. 460 . 
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Elsewhere he speaks of reality as follows; 
" Eixperience is a process that oon tai.nually gives ne 
ruater ials to digest . At first experience was chaotic but 
now it lS so envelo ped in pred ic~ates, historically worked 
out, t bat V/8 can think of it a.s little more than <HJ 
Q1.b~r of a Ih~1. ... .. Fu t whether· the .' Other' , the univer -
sal I 1'ho.t I ha.s itself any def inite inner structure , or 
w·tether if it have any , the structure resemb les any of 
our predicate 'what s 1 , this is a question wh ich Humanism 
leaves untouched" (1) . 
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Now this strenuous effort to a.void saying anythih~ 
about reality , has assumed a great deal about it . I n the 
f irst place, it ass un1es that rea l ity is at first on l y 
'raw material' to be made over into something e lse . 
Socoodly , it is "a most chaotic pure experience which 
i:H.~.t~-U~-~US;it! t.i.QLUi"· And finally, it is ' plastic' in such 
a way that our thought can work 'predicates ' into it 
c::.nd thus make it over into ' t r·uths' which bri.r1 ~~ us 'outer 
power and inne r peace '. 
These assumptions, it will rea&ily be seen , are 
attempts "to dispense with the notion of an object i ve 
counterpart to which our i deas mus t correspond as copies , 
and to explain truth and reality as postulates necessary 
(1) Mind, N. S. Vol. XI II , no . 52 . 
·• 
• . l ~· 
fo r the practical "ut .ilities" of life". This is a, 
thorougn- going den i a l of the realistic v i ew of reality. 
A.rd as suel! it must be r·ec:o gni zed as a f:hilosophical 
vi ew of t he na t ure of re a lity. Nothing coul d be more 
dr a.stic In its renunciation of a. "rea lityil which rema.ined 
un affec t ed by ou r know in ~ it. And t his i s jus t the unique 
doctri ne of Rea lism. So , then , pra~ ~atis lli does 
have i ts vi ew of r ea lit y. 
With t he fore goin g account of rea lity we find 
ourse lves in parti a l ag reeuient . It i nsists t hat reality 
as we know it must be amenabl e to our cognitive activities 
, Further, it emp has i zes the fact tha t our pe rsonal efforts 
bu il d up f or u~ t he object s of our k no w l ed~e . But at 
t hi s poi nt t hei r vi ew be gins to run off into careless 
ev olutionistic va.guaries . It is s uggestive to ask here , 
How d c e s t ll e ' p r i s t i n e p u r e e x p ~:r i e n c e ' t h a. t i s n1 o s t 
1 ' chaotic ' con!e to 'set us prob l ems ' ? And who i s the "us " 
wh om this c l1aoticl ex pe rience i mpert i nen tl y di s t urbs'? 
When v;e B.sk such quest ions as t hese , t he ca.reles·s :refer -
ence to a rreauin ~ less evolution s.ry process appear s in 
fu ll li ~,il t. 11here i s j ust enough of rea.lisn; in t i1e above 
I 
1 assumptions to ffia:rk i£ off fro lli subjecti vis m, but there 
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is n ' t eno ugh 'constructive f orce ' in it to provi de f or 
fhe formation of tho 'postulates' which render the 
'Chaotic' experience ' useful' to 1 us 1 • Now such a 
vi~w of the basis of experience as this is unthinkable . 
Either there mu s t be an intelligent character in this 
' pristine experience ' or else our intelli gence would not 
ha.ve evol ved. 
We see pra~matism f a lling into a dilemma in 
, regard to its view of rea lity before it scarcely ge ts star 
' ed, yea , even before it gets ~ ~o in 1_: at a.ll. Mr . Schiller 
1 
has recognized this di le mma and h~~ exerted himself to 
his wit's end to escape it . We see such a recogn ition 
in Lhefollowi M statement: " When the doctri-ne of i::akin&! 
- - u 
: rea lity out of a relatiYely indeterminate materi1l is 
c~on3trued metaphys ically , and push ed baok to the 'beginning 
it seems to assert the f orma tion of tne Real out of a 
con,pl ete l y indeterrr!ins.te Chaos" . 
However , he no sooner points out the dilelliroa 
than he covers it up with &, l'eference to theology. "It 
is li ke the demand" , he sa_ys , "to k t10v1 hoVi God ma.de himself 
out of nothin g" . And t hen rema.rks thB. t "this is a 
question to which v1e shall never ge t a.n a.nswer ". But this 
1I ma intain is not relevant to Lhs dile mma of pragmatism . 
I 
' F'or pragmatism as suiJles to start with the fa.ots of 
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exper i ence as we know them, and prove that Voluntarism is 
tile ultirnate bas i s of r ea.lit y. Now t his ass umes that so me 
t hi ng wholl y chaotic , who ll y wi thout int elligence, 
arb itraril y or ac~ i denta lly creates i nte l li gence . When 
Mr· . Schi ll er admits that "Cha.os is no exp l anat ion" (2) p. 43 
and Wilen he ad mifts t hat the r·ragmatist 8,CC OU nt of truth 
dema.nds t ha t "ini ti~:d pr inc i ples l.e li t era. ll y 
mere start in ~ points , va riously , a.rbitrar i 
l y, causa ll y se l ected , f rom wh ich we hope and try to ad -
vc;,nce to some t hing better", he should see that he must a;d -
mi t i ntell i gence to be as pr i mo r di a l as ' wil l'. Not to 
adm it this is to hold t hat intelli ge nce is creat ed out 
of chaos , whic h" is no . expl anationli . 
Aea in t hi s vi ew of !initi a l facts ' as ~ore 
J ' start i ng no intsu, cert a inl y contra.dicts Mr . Sc\hi l l er ' s 
I
I i de&.lism. For ~, r~n~in ~ ~ hat th~r e may ~be ' pos t~late s ' 
t hb L are not expl1c1t ana consc1o us l y rormu lat ou , yet I . 
there must be a mi nd funct io ni ng ill i mmed i ate experience 
to have even ' unconscious postulations '. But the n we may 
C:l,si<. , a.nd per t.i nent l J , •·1a. s t he first mind a tabul a. rase,? 
Or if not , wha t was its nature? But sti ll more to t he 
po int; as Mr. Sc hiller hol ds that we can speak of reality 
only as kn own , we ask , Vi11a. t was t he nature of his 11 hyla" 
-1 38-
bef ore there was a mind to know it? As above we saw 
that realis m was too ri gid for the pr agmat ist's account 
of t rut h, so here we find that idealism contradicts it . 
So the dil emma i s not escaped . 
If we tnodify the pragn.:a tist account of truth so 
that realism wo uld no t be t oo ri ~ id for it , we do not 
i n the l east , escape t he difficulty of how ' truth' is 
rel a t ed to ' fact! To say t hat rea lit y is who lly un -
iiOdified by our act ivi ty 1n knovlin~~ , conduets us to a 
v;orse di l enlrf,a., if posd ble, t hu.n t ha t to Ylh ic h pra~ matism 
brou~ h t us . For , as Kan t clearly showed , realism cannot 
deal with thin gs apart frot!l the r epresentat ion of those 
t h i n~s in our thou ght. 1-3u t in this c~ase the existence of 
t ~1. tin( s apart from t he ir representat ions , c oul d be known 
I -· 
I 
I on l y I! t h r ouR h a s y ll o g i s n' fro rn e f f !~ ct. t o cause 11 • ( 1 ) 
I . ~lo'.'l accep t in .J t.he notion of realisn, that r ea lity 
1 exists apart from o ~r knowing it, a nd as a cause it r emain s 
! unaffec ted t. hou~h it re produces in us a dup li cation of 
I itse lf , we a11 e brouilht to c;, conception of ca.~ ts a lity that 
j is destruc tive to realism. The realis t s ee~s to for ~ et , 
\when he speaks of a thin8 as the ca us e of our knowledge 
I 
lof i t , that t he causa l r elation in the rea li st i c sense i s 
lone of reci proc it y. That i s , both terms of the equation 
I 
(1) Criti que of Pure Reason , tr. by Max Mue ller, p. 302. 
I 
I 
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are HioJ i f.ied . 'I'ake f or inst ance , the simple illustration 
of one ball i mpin~ in ~ on another bal l. The first c~u ses 
the second to 1wve only by a T(! odif tjcat ion in an equa l op-
posit e w~y of its own motion. Thus to apply t his realist -
ic conception of 6ausaliLy to the relatioti between a thing 
anti our kn owl eci~e of it, necess i tates a mod i f ication in 
tne thing itself . It woul a seem that this fact alone woul 1 
direct t he realist to a better concept i on of t he caus al 
relation bet we e n t he thing and our knowled ge of i t. This 
conception in a ll probability wou l d be that the th in~ 1s 
onl y a stimulus that excites t he mind to bu il d up an 
oGjec t of kn owl edge . The thing, then, as an object 
of our knowled ge would not re prese nt t he t h in ~ as a 
st i mu lus . As a st i mulus the t ning would exist only as 
a certain l aw of activity , and as the object of our know -
led ge a 'construct ' of our own activity . This construct 
i s pure l y a phenomenon , havin ~ no existence apart fr om 
our thou ~~ h t. Th us reali sm cannot be relied upon to ren,ove 
the cl ilen!DJO. of prag,lns.tisn, . 
1' url l ir: ~; now to i ntellectual i sn:, (t his is whB.t 
pra ~ffi atism rea ll y op poses) we find two forffis ; one i ss uing 
' i n phen on,ema. lism, t he other in Abs olut e i· iea.li sm . I n 
the former the re l a tion be t ween our knowl edge and it 
·• 
object con:p l etely va.nis!1es . The v:orld 1s not hing as i de 
f ro m t he knower . F' a.cts c...r·e not r·aw mater ial to be 
wo r ked over into reality by tlie njind , bt.tt t h0 tr1ind ' s 
own t h i nk in ~ is its own ~ orld . There is no question 
a bout t he correspondeuee of truti1 wlt h realit y , but 
only of ' cloar ' and ' d i s tinct ' id eas . Nhe n t he i deas are 
thus , t ht;n t hey give us trull1, i f not t hus , fa ls ehood 
o ot;;~. i n s . Eut t his form oi i ntellectua lism is easily 
It i s int e llectualisffi 1 11 the f orm of Absolute 
I dea lism that b the avo wed ene ny of pragmat i sm. li;x -
l per i ence i s i n t erpr·e ted e nti r el y in t ern:s of tho ught . 
Th e otne r a.speet3 of se l t" -con~e io uS Jless , Sllt..lh as ree ling , 
vo li t i on , paroaption , ara uon s i Je r ed as rel a t ive o 1ly , and 
whi l e t'or· human e xper i ence t.he y Sive cert.a,in he l ps , .yet 
t hey are only i nci d e~t s of finite ex i stence . Tney do not 
The Ceat ur·e of a.bso l uLt.::: i iaa. li sn, t.h~t rt:lce iv e:.> 
the ~ rea te s t. dc nu neia.t .ion by p! ' i:i gJJ!a t lsiJJ , i s not its i dea l -
i s ul , .J u t it s a b s o 1 u t l s m • 'I' h i s f e a t u r· e m a L-1 t a i n s t. 11 a. t 
on l y t he absolu t e i s rea l , a ll c la e i s only a c e rtain 
de~ ree of real i ty . Hence , our k now in~ is a process of 
- 141 -
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! d iscoverin~ the truth . ~r . Brad l ey stat es this as fo llow I 
I 11 'h'lJttJs must ex ist in a mi nd , a.nd, to exist in i 
they n.ust come t here ~ and , to speak rou~ h l y and in t he 
n~a i r! , t hey must also be brought there. And so of course , 
in or·der to exist , they mu~. t e. lter the mind. But the 
truth itself does not cons is t in its ex ist ence in me . 
Ne ither I nor any other man can make truth and falseho od 
what tney are . Truth may not be truth a t all apart from 
its existence in myself and in other f i ni te subjects, 
ana at l ea~ t very l ar~ely that ex istence depends on our 
wills . Eut , though I can fin d in truth the satisfact ion 
of a want , . an d thou ~ h I can reco gn ize my own being in 
the possession of truth, yet on the other s i de , I cannot 
regard its nature as subject to my will • 
Here we have t he abso l utist ' s vi ew of t he 
relat ion be t ween 'L ruth ' and our know ing it. This view 
seems to app roach the view of rea lism i n a cert a in sense , 
viz ., that reality ie wha t it is apBrt from our know i ng 
it . The dif ference is t hat while rea l ism takes the 
t hin gs as Lhey appear Lo us i n thou ~ ht to be rea liti es , 
abso lutis m consi de rs t hese only appearances . Rea lit y i s 
not to be ha.d by any f i nite mind . It is one EJ.ll-inclusive 
8.11 - errJb racing abso l ute experience . Our knowled ge of reali y 
II 
'I 
lj 
--1 must , the n , be 9.1\-;a y s i nco mp l ete . Dut, wh i le H 1s i n-
comp l et e it iE no t fo r t hat r eas on f a l s e . Th i s bri ngs us 0 
a.n a.spec t of t r ut h t ha t fin a s acceptanee Vl i th prag j1a. tist s . 
' We r efer t o t he oc trine of Degre 3s i n trut h . Fin it e 
k no w i n ~ i s r e la t i ve , a nd t h~,;; refore , f i nite knowl e dge 
c o nta i ns tru th on l y in v ar y i n ~ de gr ee s . Th e pra ~ ~atist 
doctr i ne o f De ~ rees in Tr ut h , has , howe ver , a diffe r en t 
or i ~ i n , and a d i f fe r ent si gni f i cance . Wit h t he abs ol ~tist 
we d i scover· on l y a pa rt of t Le t r uth , an.J. t ile de gree of 
realit y of our knowin C depends on our a bi l i ty t o e li minat e 
i ndtiv i uaJ s.nd ra.r + i cuhtr s l e n;e n t s 1 11 t he r·rocess of know-
i n ,o , a.nd t hm:. a.t t ::;i n t he un i ver sa l pos iti on as much 
as ~ oss i b l e . The a spect of t he mi nd tha t enab l es us t o 
d o t hi s i s t he i n t e 11 e c t • He nc e , t he i n t e 11 eo t gives a g r . t -
e r de ~ r ee of t r ut h than 3ny other aspect of our ex peri en c e . 
But as f i ni t e bein ~ s t he r a nge of our i ntellec t l B very 
li mit e d , so i t . t oo
1 
c:a n onl y ~) ve us deg rees of trut h ~ Eut 
t 11e poi nt t, o not e is t. h <~. t the t r ut i , t ha t. i t does g i ve , i s 
1 di scove r ed ' t r uL h ' an d not ' tr ut h of o ur own ~ak i n~ ' · 
No w t he pr e~;n , 9. t i ct d. oc t r i nc of cie ~rees of t r ut h i s 
ver y d i ff e re nt f r oHi t rtis . 1'here is no t ruth at:~ar t f r o n1 
I a. hun1an purpose . Gut purpose ::: di f f e r' i n ex t en t fro m a 
i pas si n ~ wi sh to a pur pos e t ha t i ncludes t he fu llest de ve lop 
===~================================~====~~~= _;:== ---
I 
I 
I 
jl 
II 
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1.enr, of a ll hua.an i nte r es t.s . 
t;it n prag natism the s a. tis action of the lowest 
r ur pose is a trut n. Th Us it is read ily seen that t he 
hi ehe r t he purpose tne truer the truth t hat satisfies it . 
iu.d furt ner· , the truttt tna.t 88.t isfies a, purpose is not 
fcun d but ~adb . It i s not unf ol ded froru t he purpose it -
e e lf, but i s !.La de out of j.n .tiB.l f ac~ts . Th is brings us 
a ~Et in to tne p rs. ~ Ju? ti::>t view of the re l ati on between 
trut h and fact . Truth correspono3 wi t h reality , but 
r ea lit y is made or e volv ed alan ~ with t he mak in~ of truth 
Re t u rni n~ to t he position ot· t ne ab so l ute 
i dea list, we find that trut h and reality become a fua tter 
of l o~ ic a l se lf~consist e noy . Wha t can be found to be 
i nconsisten t vihe n subjected to thE:ior e t .ica l Cl' iticisitl is 
declared to be ~1 appearance and not reality~ 8ut when 
tne cr i t ic is a ri ~ orist no object of kn owled0e is abl e 
t o 'nit.J1gtar.d the test of real ity, hence , rea.lir. y is 
beyond our finite ken . This vi ew i s saved from complete 
ri dicule by Lhe doctrine ( juct !l!en tioned ) of de~ r ees 
of tr uth a rd re::dH .. •. While ea.oh object ot' kn owledge is 
appear a.r tce only, yet it i s not for that, r eason unr·ea.l or 
fa lse . IL contains a certai n de~ r e~ of rea lit y and the 
t::r ob leHJ of epist e n; olo ~ y becol!les how shi:l.ll the d .:n~ ree of 
=========*============================================~==--=-=-=--~ 
r e a li t y roJ ses sed by an a~rearance oe de t ermine~ ? 
Vihen t he Absolutis t be~~ in s t.his prob l eni he h . i .r.e v.ita.b l y 
li carried al'lay f ron; aetual life to f in j rc~lity. His 
I 
II 
test beconteS purely t heoretical anu as such i g nore ~ a 
great H : ~?s s of a.ctua.l li ving · xpe rienc.~e ). Im.: t e ~:1.d of the 
in te llEwt rents.i rd ng one a spect o t<xpcrienc(:J it i s lTiade 
to n:o ~10r;olize t t1e v1 Lole fiel ct. dut life i s n:ore t han 
l o ~ ic ; anci _life itself lli~st be rooted in r ea lity a nd 
not ·irpe;n·a.nc , so we ~m::;t say t iw.C reali t y eannot be 
fou ni ty seraratt u~ the intellect from tl1e li fe of wh ieh 
it is a par. . The pragn,atist conterlt ic,n i s nearer ac. tual 
li fe tna n t.h a t of t he abso luti st . 
re find , t hen , t~;o objections to i nte l lectua l 
is w in the form of a.bsoluLi sn; . lt;.i rs r. , i t n.ake~ truth o.nd 
re c:diLy sorr, e. thin ~ whose 11ature i:: une.ffee:ted by ou r· a.ct iv-
it.y ii! reaJiz in~ ti1em . And secogd l y , it i nte q :: re.ts 
~~ e;q::e!'ience entirely in ter ms of one aspect of experience. 
I The fir~l feature when s t rictly c onstrued l eaves no roo m 
I 
I for error a nd evil excap~ B8 appea r ances . Furthe r , truth 
I it. self as far as v1e know it is only an apr.earance . Hence , 
I 
I t here is no c.~riter·ion v.hereb:y we can disting uish t he 
I 
I appear a.nce tha.t is errm· fron, the at-•tiearanee tha t is 
! trutlJ . Th i s seri ous obJect i on is enou ~ !l in itself to 
I 
! 
I 
;\ 
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discredit absolutism. 
The second feature must always remai n inadequate 
to all except closet philosophers. No man in actual life 
can live by the principle that logical contradiction is a 
mark of unreality. Life cannot be held within the bonds 
of logic. It moves on in spite of logical inconsistency, 
and vindicates itself in the face of formal contre di t ions. 
So Absolutism instead of providing a way out of the dil-
emma set by pra~ratism leads us to t wo others, either one 
of wh ich is inexplicable •. 
Before going on to a detailed discussion of the 
various issues of the pragmatist view of reality, we will 
indicate our way out of the dilemma that beset the fore-
goin g views. To begin with, we must affirm, what is a 
truism, that our knowled ge of reality must come in terms 
of experience. But since we have seen the futile attempts 
of ~very view that has endeavored to take one aspect of 
exper i ence and interpret reality in its terms, we will 
lay it dow n as our most fundamet~al principle that no one 
aspect of experience can be given exclusive right of way. 
But it is a notorious fact that when experience itself is 
made the test of reality that so many differe1t interpre-
tations of it present themselves t hat we are lost in a 
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maze of bewilderment. We must then seek to include all 
the essential elements of life in our interpretation 
of experience. Atrd when this is clearly recogn ized, 
we at once see that the various aspects of experience, 
such as thought, will, feelin g, are only forms t hrou gh 
which a living intelli gence manifests itself. Pra gmatism 
·ras conclusively shovm that thought catJ never be separated 
fro m volition; intellectuali~m has shown that will apart 
from thought is blind at~ unable to systematize experience; 
and actual living has shown that feeling apart from will 
aud intellect leads strai ght to anarchy in every field 
of life;-?rt,ethics, po litics, industry, society, reli gion. 
Neither one of these three aspects of experience 
can maintain itself apart from the others, much less usurp 
their functions. This fact makes futile any attempt that 
endeavors to interpret life in any one of these forms, or 
for that matter , in all of them together. Life cannot 
be understood through these, but these must be understood 
through the unity of the life behind these forms. Kant had 
glimpses of this fact and in one passage expresses it in 
tre followi'n g words: "The thinking I (the soul) ••• QQ§JL 
1 QQi_kllQ~_ii2~lf_i~I:Q~£h_1h~-~~i~gQri~~~ but 
j Q~i~il.QI:i~~-only ••••• !:.hr:Q~~h-i!i.~~lf"(1) 
knows the 
I (1) Critique of Pure Reason, tr. by Max Mueller , 2nd ed. 
revised, p • .324. 
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F'rom this it is evideut that our way to 
reality is through experience. But it has been customary 
for philosophers to distinguish degrees in experience, 
and then having decided upon what seemed to them the 
hi ghest phase , this t hey take as the test of reality, 
and discard what seem to be the lower phases as only 
' accidents strewn alon g the pathway tc reality. Th e 
serious objection to this method is that tte criterion 
by which the phases of experience are ranged in a series 
from higher to lower usually contains an arbitrary element 
Mr. Schiller has recognized this fact and given expression 
to it in an article published in Mind , Oct. 1904. He is 
opposing intellectualism in an attempt to establish 
voluntarism, but what he says applies to both alike. It 
is as follows;-
"Attempts at unification (of human life) 
are not new, but they have usnally been conducted with an 
i ntellect tta.l i st Cia.s, and with the purpose of reducing all 
willing and feelin g to co gnition. And this has often 
been supposed to be something ma ~ nificent and inspiring. 
I cannot see, however~ that there is any greater spiritual 
elevation in sayin g_All_i~-ThQYEhl than in saying, All 
The whole question see ms merely one 
--~===*============================~===4~====~~ 
of t he conve nie nce and use of ps ychological classification 
And so when Mr . Brad ley wonders what I am ' to re pl y when 
one c hooses to assert that this same whole is intelligen ce 
\ 
or fe eling t1 I am not dismayed, I should me rely underline 
t r}e 'c hooses', and beg both parties to observe t hat this 
1 
is wha t they are severall y 'choosin ~ to assert', and there 
fore ~~~it~~~~. (1) 
Now it is evideht t hat we have come here upon a 
real problem that must be a11swered before experience can 
be made the test of trutr :· and reality. How is the rank 
of the various phases of experience determined? Is one 
phase as good as another? If not, how is the degree of 
truth in each to be discovered? Pragmatists refer back 
to Kant's doctrine of the "primacy of t he practical reason' 
and quote his concludin g phrase, "all interest is ultimate 
ly practical, ~~ even that of speculative reason is con-
ditional, and it is only in the practical employment of 
' reason that it is complete", from which they argue that 
practice, not theory, is the t est of truth and reality. 
But pragjBtism too oft en for gets Kant's proviso 
to his dictu m of the pri macy of the practical reason. The 
, more complete statemer.t of Kant 's view is found in t he 
first sente hce of th e paragraph from whi ch the pra gmatists 
-149-
-----====~====~~==~==~~~~~~~~~~~=t~-~~---==== (1) In Defe1~e of Huma nis m, Mind, N.S. Vol. no. 52, 
Oct. 1904, p. 534 
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1 
gucte . It is as follows: "Thus, when pure speculative a.r:dl 
; pure practical reason are combined in one cognition, the I 
,j·· 1 at t e r has the primacy , "-I:QllsJ~~ U~lll~lJl.-... 1b.aJi._.t.bi~ 
I 
il ~2mtillQ~iQn_i~.llQ~_QQll~in~~ul_~~£-~r£ilt~rY, £gi_f2~ll£~£ 
'I I 
1
,1 
ll 
I 
Intellectualis~ overlook~ ent ir ely his view of 
t he pri~acy of the practical reason, while pra~matists 
overlook tv1o features. Trrese are (a) when the two are 
"combined in one co gnition", and (b) wher. "this corr.binatio 
is not contingent and arbitrary, but founded a priori 
on reason itself and therefore necessary". When these 
features are not overlooked, we find that the great phil -
osopher's criterion of experience is twofold, rational 
or universal, and practical or conditional. 
The former indicates clearly that our experience 
1 IS not wholly exJ-austed in i ts finite11ess. We have seen 
(in our discussion of truth) when experience is taken as a 
possession of a n 'experient ' and not as a series of events 
to be interpreted by an experimenter, "that our individual 
cl aims to truth aspire to universal approval and refuse 
to be satisfied with anything less". Here then we find 
the inner life as it is actually lived followin g an Ideal. 
'I Now this i deal is as much a part of experience as the 
I' 
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aspEcts of tl1inkin ~ , willing , feelin~ and acting are . 
I To "Lheexpedent this IdeB.l lw.s objeetive vali dity as well 
as p s y c lt i c a.l e x i s t. e n c e • As o b j e c t i v E' 1.:,; v a l i d it u n i t e s 
.I our e xperi ence with a po\'ler beyond us. 
I 
Th i.s power is 
I 
I 
a.n emp irical datum , Berkeley 1 s st1;tement that we have no 
F'urt her th:i s 'i dea ' of such a p o·t~er not withstand i nB. 
power, the i n ~anent One is not, a s Berkele y tau~ht, known 
so much t hrou8h the nature of his activity as t. iu·o tH],h 
t he fact of his activity . 
'J'he divine Will is not to be i aen tified wi th 
e t hica l pr i ncip les but is to he reco ~nized as insepara bl y 
eonnect ed with the fact tha.t the I ciea.l "emnes horne to us, 
pr io r to any experience of its value by way of action , 
with an iub~t§Ut worth , a ~oodness , trut h, and reality of 
i ts own". (1) Here then in the eor.sc iousness of an Idea l 
we have an ~wgit~Qil_[~gt_t hat we are connected with 
' a power not our own' and t hrou ( h whieh our exper i ence 
ov erreaches t he boundar ies of its fin iteness . 
I am fully aware that this conception 1s brandet 
as turnin~ mysti cism i nto epistemolo~y , and this would be 
the outco~e were we to make thi~ t he entire standard by 
which to judge rea lity. 5ut we llJUSt re11,ember that this is 
only one of the phases of our standard . The other phase w 
(1) See followin g pa~e . 
I 
I 
.l 
c:c:.ll~d practical or <.londi t iona l. As the pila:.5e just 
' isc:ussed man ifests ~he extension of our expclrience beyond 
I 
1 ts finitc l Je ss, so t his l atter phase i s the te::.t of truth 
.nci r eality for our finite experience . The Ideal points 
I 
o scrr,ething th~, t i s h i ghe r that. la.s yet been re~. liz.e d 
' n any pract i Gal s.ohe iven,ent,. ln thi s sense it is 
~ t0 is i n this sphere t ha.t nconsequen .. :es on conduct" 13.re ~ be the criterion of truth e.nd reality . But even here 
'I 
·e mu st not fail Lo oijserve th&t "pra.ct.ical c:ons equences 11 
re not so n,uch a test of reality a.s t.hey a re ot r means of 
indin g out the bes t way for us to act . EuL as our 
l ctions do greatly wociify the cond iLions of experience, 
Jl e can in a very true sense s ~ea k of t hell! a s the tests of 
eality of a certain kind . This is a point, however , 
hat mus t be considered more fu ll y later so we will not 
I 
nlaree upon it here . 
What we hope has become clearer from the fore~oing 
iscussion is thBt ne i ther t he theoretica l nor the practical 
nterest goes t0 the bot tom of experience . To make either 
152-
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1) S. H. f'~ellone : Is Humanism a Phi losophica,l Advance? 
1 Mind , N. 8 . XIV , p . 523 . 
I 
one of these the stanaard in terj~ of which we must 
interpret our whole life is one sided and arbitrary . 
Kant ' s notion of uniti ng the two in one cognition is 
much preferab l e . Had Katrt recogn ized more fully that 
the inner life , as it is l ived , not as it is observed by 
the psychologist , provided empirical data as well as tl1e 
sense- life , his pheno me nalism would , no doubt , have 
passed over into persona l idea lism or the i stic idealism. 
As it was, he made the world of science entirely 
dependent upon the forms i nherent in the mi nd . This with -
out the objective va l idity of the ca te ~ories beyond sense-
experience wou l d readi l y pl ay into the hands of Humanists . 
Bu t with a ful l comprehens i on of the truth that the self 
does not kn ow i tself throu gh the categor i es but that the 
cate gories must be i nterpreted through the self , he woul d 
have coffie to the i nsi ght that all ex i stence depends upon 
self - acti ve Intelli ~ence . Bu t just as he deduced the 
object ive validity of the categories as applied to data 
of the sensibility according to the 'mode of a ~ iven in-
tuition ' so he would have deduced the objective validity 
of our idea l s from ' the mode of our inner intuiti ons ' 
in actual l i ving. Not all affections of the sens i bi l i ty 
were interpreted as having objective val i d i ty , so not a ll 
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the ideals of the in ner life would te eo interp~eted . 
In both cases actua l experience must be the final criteri-
on, but the latter need not lead to my stici sm , when taken 
in connection wit h tr le for·mer , any rr1ore tha.n the for me r 
need l ead to solipsism, or subjectivism. When, however, 
we ta ke bo t h together , we preserve the unity of exper i ence 
anci still ha.ve (i n the inner Idea l) a c:ri terion by whiol1 
we can arran ge the n6eds , interests, purposes , asp ira-
tions of lif e in their prope r places, and thus look to 
exper·ience so systerna.tizsd, or ~anized , and rationalized 
as the final criterion of truth and reality. 
We come t hen to the conclusion that se lf-active 
intelli ~ence man ifests it self, both throu~ h thought , 
vol ition, and feel i n8 ; that it is not to be exp l ained 1 n 
terns of either one of them, nor yet in terms of a.ll of 
t he ~ togethe r; and that on the other hand, they ar e to 
fin d their interpretation throu gh it. When we s ee this 
trut h, we need no t hes it ate to say that reality in all its 
fullness is not to be fourtd in our knowledge . Our 
know l edge is the product of the self rnan if es tine itself 
and i nterpreting its relation t o ot~cr se l v~s an: a 
Supreme Se l f , throu~ h these various aspects of experience. 
Our knowled8e then becomes our int erpretation of t he 
reality of experience . In this interpretation we are 
brought to distinguish between knowledge of things, 
interpretations of sense - data , and knowled ge of persons, 
interpeetation of eelf - conscious - data . Bu t in this 
distinction we see different kinds of reality; phenomenal 
or resultant rea l ity and noumenal or causal reality . 
This vi ew makes provision for a real deve l opment 
1n both our knovlled ~e and the r·eality to v;hicll our 
knowled~ e pertains . The static notion of truth and 
reality of Absolut i sm again~ which pragmatism hur l s its 
heaviest batteries is ~iven over to the purpose of a 
Suprej~ Intelli gence . On the other hand , ne are not ied 
into the dilemma of ' creating' intellige nce out of non-
itrtelli 2ence as the pragn:atists are. l~xperience as 
unified , organized and rationalized by self - active 
intelli ~ ence i n conformity to an Ideal is the final test 
of trut h and reality. 
We will now turn to a consideration of some of 
the more specific staten:ents of pr-a2,matism abou t t l}e 
nature of reality. In the first place , pragmatism asserts 
that Ree,lity i s not ' static ' but ' pl a.:: tic 1 • 'J'h is staterr,ent 
is directed at the ol d view which considered reality as 
determ i ned once for all , and that it is the province of 
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trut h to cor respond with it . Th is abso lu te determinism 
other 
ta.kes two forms : one mec:hanica l, theA i mpersona l. 
two f orn!S reach the same goa l b y ex&.et ly opposite me t hods . 
Aecording to t he fo r mer we a re livi n( i n a physical 
uni verse where everything is de termined by mechan ical 
necessity . All phases of life, such as perce ivi ng, fee l-
in g, re membering , thi nkin g, reasonin ~ , et c. are 
mechanicall y determined by the natural necessity t hat 
rei ~ ns throughout t he universe . Th is view of the wor ld 1s 
fast disappear ing. Professor Haeckel 1s perhaps , it s 
only livin~ exponent . We pas s on to the l atter view 
i mmed i at e ly . 
Of the conclusive refutations of t hi s l a tt e r 
vi ew , t hat of Professor James i s one of t he s i mp l est and 
most co~plete . It i s se t fort h in the volume ent i t l ed , 
Ti1e Will to Be lieve . The special a. r ~ ument i s given in 
the c f.a pt er on The Dilemllia of Determin i sm . The f ormer 
vie w of detern· i nism is chara.cterized by hi m as ' hard ', thi l 
view as 1 soft 1 determi nis m. \'ihat marks ' sof t 1 determi11is m 
~ ff from ' hard ', is that it recogni zes indeterffi i nat ion in 
appearancet , but hoL1s to s tr iet determin is m in r·e a lit,Y . 
1 All tl1ings are now and forever just what t hey are in the 
Abs0 l ute . What we loo k upon as a lternatives in 
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exper·ience are not really altt.:rnatives , f or the om:: we 
v:e fin a lly a OClep t, t3d is t ha on ly poss ible one t rat t Le 
universe would permit . To us in ~he hea ' of th s strife , 
•;; c t. h c t) ~ ll t t. n a t t. h e r' e v.· ere a H e r 11:l t i 1· .-~ ~: 3 y s , a. !l d t h 9 t 
~s vcre free to choose e it her ons , out t his wa s o ~ ly a 
seerni n.; . 'J'he ways 1 ili c h we: t bought ~·~ c (lOU ld t. :ike but <1 id 
not were not possible ways of aoti o ~ at a ll. 
Profe~~or James admits that we cannot. refute this 
contention of 'free- will Jeterruini sta ' by an observation 
of the facts of exper i ence . ~h en a choice is made , that 
~1 ay of actin g takes it s pLwe forever· in trie pa st histor.y 
of the Vl orl d . To s'Jy t ha t it v:as t.he only possible way 
cannot be refutea by sin.t:lY oLservin g tl1e facts . But 
Professor Jc;r.r;es 111ee ts thi8 conte1~Lion by tvkin B a. simple 
exa.m ple . He refers to the poss i bilit y of te.king either· 
one of two Streets in or-d e l~ to re s.ol1 !! Olli e , e.! n:l tht:-:n ar~~ ues 
as fo llo ws :-
111 ,~, o throu 1~ h Divinity Aven ue . If c-1.s ; ood 
deter~inistn, you now be gi n La affir m, what a ll ~ ooJ de-
t.er mi nist.s punctu a l1y tlo a.ffir·m, tha t in the na. tur of 
t h in ~. s I eoul(in ' t ha.ve ~1 one thro ugn Ox f ord St:c e et , - had I 
done s0 it noul ci havA been chance , irrationality, i nsan i ty 
El. f',o r r i i ~~ ap iP natuN~ , - I si mply oall youl' 8.ttention to 
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this, that yo ur affir mation i s wh at the Ge rmans ca ll a 
M~~b1§UrYgb , a mere concept ion fulmi nated as a dcgma 
a~d ~ased on no i nsi ght i nto deta ils . RA f o e my choice 
either street seeffied as natural to you as to me . Had I 
happened to t ake Oxf ~ rd Street , Divinity Avenue wou l d have 
fi ~ ured in your philosophy as t he gap in nat ure ; and 
you would have so procl aimed it wit.h the best detern:inist i 
conscience in. t he world . 11 (1) 
Now the real di fferenne beL~een ' soft ' determinism 
and the view set forth by Professor Jame s is that our 
voli t ions aocord in ~ to the for~e r make no rea l difference 
as to t ne structure of our future world , while the l atter 
vi ew cla i ms t ha t they do . The former agrees wit h the 
scierti f ic a ssu mp t ion that the future is wholly determ ined 
by t he past , the latter , t hat the pa~t is riead and ~ one , 
t ha t the future i s st ill indeterminate and determ inable 
by our volitional activit i es . This brin ~ s us ri ght to the 
heart of pra.~ne. tisrr! . Its centra l doctrine is that t he 
world is developin ~ . That it is no t a ' st a tic' universe 
in which rea lity is de t erm ined i n one fixe ri structure , 
~, can~ by our activities be made to t ake on a nev1 
structure . 
But does not this re pudi ate the fu ndame ntal law 
1) The Will to Believe, p . 156 . 
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of sc:it:mce t,ha,t, natttl'e i s unii' or·m 111 al l her actions a nd 
Ytlrat the future bc·w on~es i s rw v1. determined by vilw.L t he 
pre sent is? Pass i ng by the valid.Hy of r::meh an assump -
Lien , rc know that it is t he purpos e of sc1ence to 
ren:Gve the c ont in~cn L e l en;en t fron! t he fu ture B,::: 1Wch as 
possible . ]1ri iS i s what science has been do in g e.n d it is 
wha.L we bore r-;.H:l. expect ' t. hat it w i 11 (; ont inue t0 do . 
1:3u t when we f ix our at tention on this ~lOpel:t of t he ~1 ork 
of' sc i ence , we too often fo t get t hs:,t a ll of her dec.la.ratio s 
Bre hypoti·ietical. 211e 'rever t e lls vilw.t rr ust takEl p l ;>..ce , 
but only what will happen if certa i n cond itions are ful -
f ill ed . Se ientific f orti:ulas ars exe.ct on ly v:he n they a}··e 
abstnwt. App li ed to concre te proble.rrs , they C3.ll on l y 
tell us what t o expect . 
Indeed , this i s ~l. ll t hat v1e V1::1.nt science to t e ll 
us . \';' here we c.8.n c on trol our· affa.irs ;~e wan t ns.tu.r·e to ce 
p li able and yie l d to our d~mands . Sut in the realm 
o f' l ·i f a that. is 110t ~nde1' om· C\ Orttr-ol we wa nt J!G.ture to be 
fixed in respect to the p .rt not under· our control , and no 
in ot her· part.t: , is ~m abhorent vie w to t h~ n.an of ri ~; or 
and v igor H1ethocs . So they cl a i m that the iltota.l stat. e of 
thing \3 f-lr. one n;OtJ!ent. J'(, u,~ t t.e th .:; cause of t he total stat.e 
c.f tl1 i nS,t~ :;,t. t.he succ.eed in ~ ?.;nd the e ff ect of the tota.l 
1r f) 
- 'J7 -
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st~ ~. r:: in t hs ~· rec ed in g ·noment ". 1'hi"'. 1. "'· to n1·· "' 1'8., D''ne"' -
..._ ~ • • <;J. t--~,. c-.J_, =:. V . J. 
a an~ a bs tract f o r ~ u J a part i cu l ar and concr ete . It i s t o 
ropl~ce partia l by absolut e det erm i n ~ t ~ ~ess . 
Now this i s t0 deny tha t t here are ~ny r ea l 
a ' tern atives in our ~ orl d . It den i es a lt ernat i v e~ in 
our i ntel . a. t u~ l ~n d ~oral l i ves , me r e ly so as to root out 
chanc.e f!'Ot•! p h?s ic~d nature . What ri !l ht ha ve we to Bay 
that te c. a.us e de t ermini sm r ules in t he physica l world 
tl~_, a t _i L' r u l e~ i 11 ~ n·, A ill.OY' P l wo r l d 8 l .. so?. I•· 110t th1·~ rr· 1 ak 1·n ~ 
""' '-' - - • v - ,_.. • - • "' ' • "' -· o.- i"S 
a part ffion opol i ze the who l e? Gu t the ' s oft ' det er~ i n i s t 
steps fo rt h and say s t hat if ~e admit i ndet ermin i sm i nt o 
our i nt ellectua l an d mor a l wor l ds then we will he dr iven 
i nto scepticism for t hwith . Put does no t knowl e dge 
vi rd i c<.i,t.e he r •·1or th ~>.. ncl r i c ht to exist e very da.y of our 
lives? What is knowl edge apar t f ro11, e xperience, and i f 
our ab ilit y to make o ~ r ex per ience th ns or so is grant ed 
wh at vo ul d the r e be i n thak to de ny a knowled ~e of it? 
To deny indete r minism i n any form is t o say t hat the world 
i s a r i gid an d a lready - made world . To hold t ha t we are 
caoable of mak i n ~ r e~ l cho i ces , means that t he wor~ d , our 
worl d , is in a process of deve lo prr!ent . That it is not 
yet f ul ly reali zed . Further , it rreans t ha t we are , at lea t 
par tl y , r espons i ble for its develop~en t . We are not 
passi ve beines , but active , and as such we cannot remain 
neutral to tne deve lopment of the wor ld. EitHer we must 
add to its good or to its bad character. We must , t here-
fore , affirm t ha t the world is ' plastic' and t hat we have 
a par t in its future moulding . 
In t he second place , pragjnatism affirms that 
we make reality . e have just seen tfist pragmatis~ holds 
' that the world is in a process of making . This conclusion 
we accept . Our acceptance is based on the fact that we 
are free to act alon g alternate lines. As yet there is 
nothing said about the exteht of our freedom and the 1n-
determinate.ress of the world . So far we claim only that 
it is plastic and that we can mould it either this way or 
t)'lat.. 
Now, indeterminis m is generally admitted in trte 
moral aud reli gious world . Not in the same sense that 
pragmatism holds it, but yet in a very similar sense. By 
be lieving in a person we put ourselves in a posit ion to 
undevstand him. So also by believing in a doctrine or 
principle we will be prepared to comprehend its meaning . 
WHeh, however, we turn our attention to the world of 
science we do not expect our belief to help us very rr.uch. 
, The f acts are there to be discovered when we apply our 
I 
.l 
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mind s to them. Wh at ttey are we must find out . But 
our findin g out will not alter the facts . We will 
si mp l y build up our knowledge so as to corres pond wit h 
t he facts. 
Pragmatism , however, qoes not stop here . 
The facts even about nature are wha t we make the m. And 
our faith in a certain fact will help us to ~~k~-1b~1 
This does not mean of course, t ha t we are free 
to mak e t he facts of natnre over to suit our whims and 
caprices day by day. It ~eans r at her that our personal 
efforts do really ~ ould t he 'pri mary facts' of experience 
into differe1 -t for ms so that they will satisfy the es-
setr.tia l needs of our purposive lives . No.vi fron: our view 
~ 
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of epistemology there is no object ion to t hi s as to the 
o b~ects of our kn owl edge . But whi l e we tuild up our objec s 
of knowled~e, we do it according to a rational necessity 
tha t i nheres in intelligence. From this view we would 
·~- L 
make our own 'realit y ' , but t his would be only phenomenal 
reality . As such it would have existe~ce only for intel-
lige nce. As long as intelli gence kept the same structure 
its phenome~a l reality would be const ructed according to 
t' re sarre la ws alid have t he same appeara11ce . This leads 
us up to a point where v;e can be tter understat rd the 
-, 
pragmatist view of the ' making of r ea lity'. 
To the pragmatist, the structure of intelligence 
is not 'static' but in a process of growth. The most 
f undamehtal featur e of intelligence is its purposiveness. 
Thi s purposiveness is accompanied by action. The action 
modifies both the subject and the object in~olved in the 
situat ion. They, in fact, evolve together. Mr. Schiller 
expresses this featur~ of pragmatism as follows: '~he 
actua l situation is, of course, a case of interaction, a 
process of cognition in which the 'subject ' and the 
'object' determine each other, at·rd both 'we' and 'reality' 
are i nvolved , atrd we might add, u~.l~~~"· 
This is the radical part of the pragmatist view 
of the making of reality. We have certain purposes, 
interes ts, desires, etc., and we find in 'primary reality' 
or 'initial facts' something which can be worked over so 
that trey will satisfy our purposes . Now, when Profes so r 
James says, "that faith in a fact can help cr eate the f act' , 
he is refer r ing to th~ result of the process just 
mentioned, and not to the 'initial fact'. It is true 
that Professor James refers particularly to 'facts' 
1 
connoting rerat ions bebve·en persons. To i 11 ust rate, let u~ 
t a ke a few of the ex~mplei whi6h te uses: "Do you like 
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11me or not? ••• Whether you do or not depends, 1n countless 
instances, on whether I meet you half-way, am willmng to 
il assume t·tat you must like me and show you trust a.nd ex -
pectation . The previous faith on my part in your liking 's 
existence is in such case what makes your likin ~ come. 
" 
But if I stand a.l 0of , and refuse to budge an inc h until 
J I have objective evidence, until you shall have done some-
thing apt , as the absolutists say, ten to one your liking 
never comes ". And aga.in, "How many worr:en 's hearts are 
1 
va nq uis hed by tte ~ere san ~ uine insisterce of so~e rr:an that 
t hey rrust love him ! He wil l not conseht to tte hypothesis 
t hat they cannot. The desire for a certain kind of truth 
here brings about that wpecial truth's existe1~e; and 
so it is in innumerable cases of other sorts . Wh o ga ins 
promotions, boons , appointments, but tHe man in whose 
life they are seen to play the part of live hypot heses, 
wh o discounts them, sacrifices other things for their 
sakes before they have come, and takes risk for them in 
advance? His faith acts on tte powers above him as a 
claim, and creates its own verification". 
The fact here is the product, not t he ori ginal 
situation . In later writings , Professor James carries 
this beyond the world of personal relations to t ·l"e vwrld 
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of objective facts. We see in t he above examples differ-
ent stages in experiences. There is the desire on my 
part t tat you like me; the desire on tHe man's part that 
the woman love him; the desire f or promotion, etc. Now 
these are facts of immediate experience, but their pos-
sibility of becoming realities, or at l~a st t he kind of 
realities t hey shall be, depends upon the fait h or lack 
for 
of faith t hat inevitably influences our actions and there-A 
determiries the results. Now t he same distinction of 
'initial facts' and final reality for our purposes, are to 
be found in re gard to our mental make-up as well a~ to t he 
world of personal relations. Our mental equip ment, t he 
very str~ wture of our intelli gence, has been moulded by 
our activity guided by our faith t hat t he world could be 
fitted to our desires, purposes, needs, etc. Through this 
method of procedure, we develop 'instrumehts' by mear s of 
wh ich we satisfy the desires of our im mediate ex perience. 
Professor James says: 
"Ex perience is a process t hat continually gives 
us new ~aterial to di gest. We handle t his intellectually 
by the apperceiving mass of beliefs of which we find our-
selves already possessed. Some of the apperceiving ideas 
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There 1s probab l y 
not a co mn,on - sense trad ition, of a.ll those of wh i(~ h we 
no w live by, which wa s not in the first i nstance a genu-
ine discovery , an inciuctive genera l isa tion like those 
more recer1t ones of t he h to111 , of i ner·t i a , of energy , of 
r ef l Bx action , or of fitness to survive . The noti on 
of one Ti me and of one Space as sin ~ l e conti nuous 
r eceptacl es ; the d i st i nct i on betwee n t houghts and t hings , 
ma tt er and rr1ind; between permane nt subjects and c hanging 
attributes • • •• surely all tnese were once def i nite con-
ques ts made a t nlstor ic ciate s by our ansce stors i n the ir 
attempts t o eet t he c h~os of t heir crude i nd ividual 
experi ences i nt o a nJOre s hareable anci n!a \Jageab l e s hape . 
They prov ed of such s overei (p1 use as Denkmit t e l that they 
a r e now a part of t he v~ry struc ture of our mind. 
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c annot pl ay fas t and loose wit h the ru . No experience can u ~~ 
. II 
set t hem. On the contra ry t hey appe rce iv e e ve ry e x per1enc~ 
and as s i gn it to i ts pl a.ce . "(1 ) 
I have quoted a t l en ~ th ao as to ~et the exact 
I concept i on of hi s v i 'W of c.~ ur me. nt.B.l rrake - ur: . Reo. J.it y, . 
whethe r consi de red as ffien tal or phys ica l i s i ncomp lete , 
pl as tic , and subject to grov1th and developn:ent under our 
pur-pos iv e ac~tivity . 'l' hus ' init i a l fact ', or reality , is 
'~~==~~=~~~~~=· ~.- ~- -~--
,1 (-1-) ~;~;~:~ is m & Trut l , Mind N. S. no. 13, p. 460 - 1. 
I 
li 
1: 
il 
I 
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/' not a world of a certain structure in which are minds of 
a definite s t ructttre . It is in Professor James' own 
words , "a t::ir§:!i. in the shape of a most chaotic pure ex-
per i ence which sets us question s , of a second i n the way 
of fundametrtal cateeories, long ago wrought into the 
·I 
II 
I: 
'I 
II 
I' il 
I 
I 
structure of our consciousness and practically irreversible 
II 
which define the ~ener a l frame within wh ich answers must ~ 
jl 
II 
answers in the shapes most congruous with all ou r present ~ 
,I 
II 
II 
of \ 
fa ll, and of a third which gives the details of the 
needs" . ( 1 ) 
~e have now exposed to our view the rational~ 
1 t he pra~jRtist doctrine ' of the nak ing of reality' . I t 
starts out with the view t hat our activ it y moulds our 
life , and that our relation with other persons re-~:akGs 
their lives. Then it goes on to show ths.t our fo1· ms of 
I 
knowin g, are not immanert principles of se lf - activity , but l! 
to purposi ve act ion s in ' a c haotic ex - ij de ve lopments due 
I peri e,rce 1 • II I 
It is at t his point that we can no longer go I 
with them. We have no obJection to their mak in g 1 i llimed iat 
experience ' the source of our kn owle dge concerning reality ~ 
But whe n they insist that reality ' at first ' is 1e. pure 
~ chaotic exper i ence which sets us quest ion s ' the answering 
l1 
lj 
II 
I~ 
(1) I bid . p . 461- 2. 
of wh ich ' makes r ea lity' i t seems to me that they stick 
their heads into the dark cave made by philosophizing on 
the sense - pla ne , and for get the great lu minous world out -
s i de . We have a lread y po i nted out the incongruit y on this j 
view and the di le mma to which it leads . Further we have ) 
indicated how this dilemma can be avoi ded . The way , it 
will be r eca ll ed , was by making active intel lige nce the 
r ulti mate reality . Th i s led us tm a distinction wit hi n j 
:1 reality . Reality that get s its ex ist ence for and throu~ h 
1
1 intelligence , and the reality of intelli gence . tihen the 
1\ 
1 pragmat i st doctrine of ' the mak in ~ of reality' is app li ed 
I 
to the former , we accept i t. Bu t when t tley call this t he 
final reality of expe ri ence , we break company with t hem . 
The li mit ations of experience to the former r ea lity would 
tJiean tho:rou~ h -g oin g phenomena lism. But phenomenalism 
cannot even get itself stated without f all i ng back upon 
an ul timate reality t hat is not phenomenal . Whe n t his 
is r ecogn i zed the pra~jat i st view of reality l eads direct 
t o theistic idealism. This means that the foundat ion of 
li 
our phenomenal wor l d is, not ' a pure c haotic experience ', 
1 bu t a Supreme I nte l l i eence . 
I 
I Accepting this i nt e r pretation of the doctrine , 
II 
I 
1\ 
I: 
we agree vi it h 1\ pr8 gna, tism tha t tlie wor l d i s not ' a bloc k- II 
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universe ', but an ever- developing process . Th is process 
is not one of our own making, save in the sense just 
indicated, but one in which we find our own realization . 
The worlci of our expenence 1s not exhausted in the con-
struction of phenomenal reality. It di ps down into the 
world of intelli ~ence and here strikes ' bedroc k ' reality . 
Our relation to this t:undametrta,l and ultimate reality 
can ne ver be explained in ter ·,s of phenomenal r·eality . 
The nearest approach to an explanation of it is (as we 
~ have seen above ) the actual in ner life of the self . I In 
II this 1nner life, we have the immediate exper i ence of 
I! dependence and the freedom of i ntel ligence . The most 
I 
explic it express ion in terj£ of phenome na l reality of how ~ 
tvese two features of our life can be united into one self I 
act ive person, is that this is the form in which the 
Supreme Intelli gence realized his Will toward us . If this 
li 1. s unsatisfactory as 
II - ' ~ can do no bet ter th~n 
a philosoph ical explanation, then I 
to refer the critic to his own acLua 
II 
:1 inner experience, and rest the case ther·e . 
I 
I 
i\ 
lj 
, With this limitation on Lhe pragmatist vie~ 
I the 1 rrak itH~ of reality ' let us go on and consider the 
II 
II 
of II 
s tatE1 
~ -
~ ment , To what extent 1s ' objective ' reality the product of 
\1 hur11an experience . 
. - 1 '70 -
~e have seen that Professor Janes cons i ders the 
term ' reality ' to be co- extensive with finite experience . 
Another quotation will make this more explicit . In dis-
cussi ng Mrn Bradley ' s statement that ' true thou~ht must 
correspond to a determinate be in g which it cannot be said 
to !Lak e" (1) he refers to the ' whereabout:;:. ' of that bein •~ 
"" 
in the following words : "As fo:t the whereabouts of the 
beings thus corresponded to, a lthou gh they may be out 
side of the present thought as well as in it , Hurr,anism 
sees no ground for saying they are outside of iiuit~--
mod ifi es this equating rea lity with expe rience , as follows 
"that this drift of experience itself is due to something 
i ndependen t of all possible experience may or may not be 
true . There may or n,ay not be an extra -experienti ~), l 
Din~ -an~sich that keeps t he ball rollin ~ , or an Absolute t at 
lies ete'rnal!y beh i nd all the successive determinations 
which numan thou~ht has mads . (2 ) 
In an earlier work , Prcfessor J ames explains 
how our freedom ~o make our world is compatible with a 
Provicience t.hat knew how tl1e mak in g of the wor·ld was com-
ing outM He like ns the Creator to an expert chess - player 
playing a game with finite intelligences who are novices . 
~ 1 ! Cl . r . li . oraa 1ey . un _,!'1"uth ana Pract1ce, Mlna 1~ . >::i . 
Vol . XIII , p . 311. 
(2) I bid . p. 403 - 4. 
~ :\ No w in a game of chess t here are many ways for the novice 
I! 
.1 to play . He is free to play in any one of these alterna-
I tive ways . The expert player , however , knows just what 
I play to make, whatever the play of the novice , so as to 
c heck - mate his king . That is , t he expert player does not 
know wh~t turn the game will take , but he kn ows whatever 
way it turns he will be able to make it co me out the way 
I' :I he wants it to . Then Prcfessor James says : 
i' 
1 "Let now t he novice sta~d for us free agents, 
I 
and t he expert for the infinite mind in whic h t he universe 
~ I i' li es . 
I 
Suppose the latter to be thinkin g out his universe 
I 
I 
before he actually creat es it . Suppose hi m to say , I 
will lead things to a certain end , but I will not NOW de-
cide on all the ster s t he r et o. At various points, a mb i gu-
ous possibilities shall be left open , either of wh ich, at 
a g iven instant , may become actual . But whichever bra nc h 
t he se bifurications become real, I knovl whet I shall do at 
t ·re hext bifuri cation to keep thin gs fro m dfifti ng away 
from t he final result I intend. 
"T·re Creator ' s pl an of the universe would thus 
be left blank as to rrany of its actual detail s , but a ll 
;
1 
possibilities would be marked down. The rea liza t ion of 
some cf t hese would be left absolutely to cha nce; that is , 
II 
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woul d only be determined when the moment of realization 
came. Other possibilities would be contin geutly determine 
that is , their decision wo uld have to wait till it was 
seen how the matters of absolute chance fell out . But 
t he rest of trte plan , includin g its final upshot , would 
be rigorously determined once for all. So t'le Creator 
tbe worl d wou l d be a view partly of facts and part l y of 
possibilities exactly as ours is now • . Of one thin g, how -
ever , he mi gh t be certain; and t ha t is t ha t his world 
was safe , &~ that no matter how rruch it mi ght zigzag 
he eou l d s ure l y bri ng it home at last ". Ib i d . p . 182. 
Now this view allows opportunity for the mak -
i ng of rea lity by finite intelli gences. But it at t he 
sarre ti me in d ic~tes unmistakably ttat there is a limit 
, i n wh ic h we can ' make ' objective reality . It recogn izes 
t he constructive power of fi nite agents . This constructiv 
power is nothin g less than se lf - iniative , and self-activit· . 
Th i s se l f - activity really determines the actual structure 
of tte finite agen t . And as we mu st hold that the finit e 
agent is a part of reality , it ~eans t hat our personal 
efforts do rea l ly make r ealit y. 
Khen we further reflect upon the influence of 
one rerGon upon another, we mus t adm it that persons rnutu ~ l -
ly aff ect on:; another .. That is, in the ;.-;orld of pe r sona l 
relations we actually make reality . I do not see how this 
cono l dsion can be escaped . If we ca.n trust our knowledge 
a t a ll , (and this trust is abc,o lut e l y essent. i al for all 
j philosophies a li ke) we must a.dn:it that ·ne are in v. process 
Jof development in which the actual makin~ of ourselves 
!takes ~lace . ~e are not mere creatures of cir0u~stances 
I 
i 
jt ut we are our own architectc and bu il de rs. This has 
!been interpr eted by srime as only an unfo l din g frou within 
wh at ~ae determined by necessity . But if there is a real 
acivalJCe i n the unfoldin g so thc.l.t we are now v:ha t we v;ere 
I no t once , then t her·e ha:.:; been a. l' ea. l e;,et of nJ a.ki n ~ [Jer -
; t'Ot-l::sd . r.u t a t: ain this self -realization 1s i n terpfeted 
l<:,s t he 11n f old.in ~ of partial reality into mo r e perfect 
I ,.. fTI~ ' - t' ' l - d ' . t 
·e<:l,ll\,y. Lt!lS no 1on, as we nave seen , ea.as 1rect o 
ia bstra.ct t i1 i nkin~ and 8Hiounts in the end to i:l denial of 
~nd ivi dual self - a,ctive perso ns apart f r oE, a p a.ll - inclusive 
~xrar ienc e i n whjch a ll tLin ~ s unite only throu0h the 
I 
J vanishin~ of c:dl dif fe r ences . 
I t seerrs to me t hat pra~ mat is m has comp l ete ly 
~verthrown such a notion as an a ll-i ncl u3i ve experience by 
1 
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its ri gh t interpretation of What know ing means . The fal l a 
lj cy in it appears on th e surface when app lied to persons . 
But when it e.pp lies to t hings it seems very plausible t hat 
th ey are what t he y are apart fro m our know ing t hem . Our 
content of knowled ge and not hi ng more . But the pr agmatist 
i nterpre t at ion of knowing ~ oes deepe r t han this. We know 
a thin ~ when we can en ter into s ome ki nd of relation wit h 
I that thing. Th i s , a ll philosophdes accept . But pragmat is 
,, 
II 
goes on to affirm t hat a th ing i s affected by our kn owing 
if 1 and only if , it is 11 awar e of our knowing it" . Now 
I i n tl1e case of spiritual be in gs of a~out t he same natur e , 
' suc h as two finit e pe rso ns , th is awareness of t he kn owi ng 
pr oces s is ~utua l . fhe effect of kno wing , th er efor e , 
affects bot h part s . A rea l c han ~ e is rrade in t he actua l 
I ex i stence of bot h. 
lj . 
Th 1s , too, as we have said 1 is readily admitted. 
5ut when we l eave the rel ations of persons , and consider 
· our knowl ed ge of the lower an i ma ls and thi ngs , this' awar e -
,j 
\\ ness ' on the part of the obj ects of our kn oVT ledge be co mes 
11 l ess and l ess until i n the case of i nanimate thi ngs we 
.\ ti1ink t hat it must cease a ltogether . Th is, hol'iever, is a 
·I I 
II 
i 
I 
! 
.I 
II 
!\ 
Ji 
I 
superfic i a l assumption . Of course , the stone, or even 
the v1orm, lS not av•are of our know i ng .them in the sense 
that persons are . But if knol'i ledge i s to be more than 
a mere abstraction it must mean , or at least issue in , 
some kind of act ion. ( For the e l ucidat ion of this truth, 
phi losop hy is greatly indebted to pragmatisrr, · ) But this 
implies that real knowled~e of t hin gs means that we can 
act on them or with t hem in some way . This act ion 
implies reciprocal change in both partties . This means 
t ha t both are actual ly a lt ered by the process . 
If thi s alterat ion i s to be considered as a 
real making of the reality of the thing as we ll as the 
real mak in~ of t he reality of the know i ng agent , then 
the character of t he thin g must be indeterminate . And 
he re aga i n, pra~1mat i sm is doing a good service t o sp eeu l a -
t i on .. Things are not ri gid entities that refuse a1l !l!Odi -
fieation by their relation with active agents . Even 
sc1ence itself is f as t coming to affirm that things are 
nothing apart from their law of ' behavior '. -Without 
inv0lving ourselves in Hylozoism or Panpsychism, we can 
accept t his view of the nature of t hings . In fact , it 
is the only view which critical reflection will a llow·. 
Once we accept this view of things , then we can realize 
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t hat our actual knowledge of them will include an act ua l 
i ntercourse bet ween us and t hem. The y will not be ' aware ' 
of t hi s intercourse In the full sense that we will, but 
that they w~ ll in some sense cannot be disproved. In 
spe ak in ~ of the sense in which a stone is aware of our 
es ist ence , Mr . Schi ller says: 
"A stone , no doubt, does not apprehend us as 
spiritual bein ~ s , and preach ing to it would be as useless 
as preach i ng to deaf ears . But does this amount to sayin g 
that it does not apprehend us at all , and t akes no note 
of our existence? Not at all ; i t is aware of us and affec -
ed by us on the plane on which its own existence is passed 
.1 and qui te capabl e of making us aware of its existence i n 
'I our transaction s with it". 
~ow the point is not merely t hat the stone I S 
aware in some sense of our existence , but that it has a 
f orm of existence th at is in some respects i dentical with 
I certain forms of our existence . If our activit y can i 
j modify our existence in this respect , viz . , our physica l 
be ing, then we cannot deny that it can modify the existenc 
1 of i nan i mate things . To say that things have a def init e 
I ' mode of behavior ' does not carry wit h it the assertion th t II 
'I 
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I 
of a way in wh ich, our activ it y may actually result in thJI 
I 
real mak ing 6f i nan i mate things . We may modify their 
' mode of behavior' and g ive it another habit entirely . 
Mr . Bur banks , of Santa Rosa , California , has demons trated 
this fact in regard to many plants . Civi l ization i s 
continua1ly do ing i t in re gard t~ the elements that ffiake 
t he cli mate of a r egion. When great forests are felled , 
or when expansive prairias are brougltt under cultivation 
t he climate In respect to mo ist ure and seve rity of 
temperature Is great ly modif ied. 
Th i s work may seem at first glance very superficia I 
and not to be considered as hav i ng any i mportant cenr i n~ o 
the ma king of reality . 6ut this is a hasty conclusion . 
It certainly indicates that our personal eff ort s have grea -
er influence i n our world than we have hitherto dreamed of 
'\ Aud we thus sanction the conc lusio n of pragrr,atism in this 
II 
'I 
. I 
respect ofthe mak i ng of objective reality . 'I'Le con-
elusion a s t, (;(ted b .Y L: r. sci I i 11 c r i s as r 0 ll 0 )';.:; : 
" F: vcn phys ically , therefore , 'facts ' .• r e not 
ri ~ id and i mm utable . Indeed, they are never q~ ic e the sam 
for any two experiments. The facts we accept and act on 
are contin ua lly transformed by our very action , and so the 
results of our effo~ts can s lowly be embodied in the worl d 
Studies in Humanism, p. 442 • 
-I 
I~ 
we mould . The key to t he puzz l e is f ound i n pr i nc i ple, 
once we abandon i ntel l ectuali sm and gr asp the true 
func tion of know l edge . For the al i en worl d , wh i ch seemed 
so remote and so ri gi d to an inert cont emp l ation, the 
rea lity that seeme d so int ract ab le to an a i ml ess a nd 
fruitless speculation , grows pl as tic in this way to our 
intelli gent man i pulations ". (1) 
I n accepting this v~ew of the mak ing of realit y 
by us , we wish to be ~nderst ood , not as accept i ng the 
pragjatist as sumption that ' initial facts ' are nothing 
~ore than ' pu re chaotic experi ence wit hout any 1nner 
structure". Nor t hat apart from finit e experietrce there 
is no thing but 'l iteral ar ka i ), mere start -
ing points ' best descri bed by the use of the Aristotelian 
te r m hy l a ( ). The r·easons for our r•ejection of 
sueh vie ws have been giv en . It only r emai ns for us to 
state how what we have accepted is compati bl e with our vie 
of rea lit y as set forth above. 
'l'ha t vi ew ll!aint a ined t he,t Acti ve I N t e lli ~;enc:e 
i s he ulti mat e rea li ty . Our exper i ence is based on this . 
But an adeqqit e i nte r pretation of our experience , leads us 
inevitably to an Ulti mat e I ntelli gence "i n l'lhom we live 
cl.li<.1 n.c v e and have our being". Now t he world of our 
(1) Stud ies 1n Human ism p ~ 444. 
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experience esists through his Intelligence and Will . But 
in this world we find ousselves in relation with other 
selves and wit h things not sel ves as we are . I n this expe -
ience we find that there are different kinds of existences 
Existences for self , and existences for others. Further 
while both these kinds of existences are in some sense 
dependent on the Supreme Intelli ge nce , the former have 
the funct i on of self - consciousness and active intel li gence 
in a degree not found in the latter . Hence , the forme r 
partakes of causal reality , ~hile the l atter only of 
resultant or phenomena l rea lity . I n the fore going di scus -
1
1 sian of the ·~ mak ing of real i ty ', 1~eference in all cases 
1 
wa.s to phenomenal reality . In this realm , we actually 
1 have a part i n t he mak in g of rea li ty , but even here we a re 
li mit ed . There is a determiAateness about the ' behav i or 
of things 1 that is beyond our control. This detern1inatene 
1 is plast ic and capable of be i ng moulded into different 
' modes of be havior ' . It is in the real m of moulding this 
i nto certain forms of act ivity that our 1~ak i ng of 
1 reality pertains . But pragj.Jatists affir m tha.t this 
mauldin~ of reality applies to the forms , i . e . the 
categories in wh ich we express our knowl edge abou t our -
selves and the things about us , thou gh they admit that the 
det e r minateness is he r e more ri gid a nd l ess pl i ab l e than 
J the ' modes of the behavi or ' of t hi n ~ s . The livin~ se lf 
II 
1
1 man ifests it self to others in ways that are deter mined 
by i ts r ationa l and universa l structure . I t ~ay be that 
I 
these cannot be a ltered , though t he concrete app lication 
II 
1 of them vary wit h c on ti n ~ent'dat a , a nd ar e su bject to con -
I 
tingent condi t ions . 
To what extent , if any , t he cat e~ories of t he 
mind can be mod ified we have no means of telling. When 
radica l empiricism endeavors to e xp l a i n them as the re su lt 
of ' trial and er ror ' exper i ment2 , we ar e not convi nced 
of anythi ng eave t hat it i s f util e to att e mpt to expl a i n 
~ irt e lli gence i n any othe r terms except i tself . Hence , 
I we accept ac t i ve int e lli gence as t he riltimate rea l ity. 
As pe rsons we share i n this reality and through it have 
il 
1 a part i n t he ' mak ing ' of pl!enorr1ena l rea lit y. 
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